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Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the 
World) in Abandoning Capital Punishment? 
FREDERICK C. MILLETT* 
The execution may have passed into British history, but it is an en-
during if infrequent spectacle in the United States.  The parallels 
between the British past and the American present are striking.1 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Walking down Nanjing Road in Shanghai, you will not only pass by 
the foreign clothing stores that seem to be taking over the area, but also 
Pepsi signs every fifty feet, a McDonald’s, and a KFC—all with the back-
drop of Chinese characters and the Oriental Pearl TV Tower.  Along your 
way, you can stop in The Chopstick Shop to find the perfect set of chop-
sticks, buy a smoothie from a vendor, or just sit on a bench and watch the 
thousands of Chinese people walk by wearing Nike hats and Levi’s jeans.  
Just across the river is the Pudong New Area, ten years ago just farm-
land—now one of the most recognized skylines in China, indeed, in the 
world.  These skyscrapers showcase foreign investment in China like noth-
ing else.  Foreign banks, companies, and law firms are all flocking to this 
area to compete in the Chinese marketplace. 
There is no doubt that even China, a country halfway across the world 
and so fundamentally different from the United States, is influenced by our 
business and culture.  American culture is no longer limited to the fifty 
states, but is a way of life throughout most of the world.  The way we 
dress, the way we act, even the way we think is becoming the global norm.  
However, this is not just a one-way road; the United States is also slowly 
adapting to the way the rest of the world thinks. 
One area where this can be seen is in the recent Supreme Court cases 
relying on international precedent.2  Much like the streets in China that are 
no longer free from foreign influences, our own Constitution is now being 
interpreted using international authority.  Justices Scalia and Thomas dis-
approve.  In his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, Scalia went so far as to state 
that the use of international authority is meaningless and dangerous dicta.3  
Justice Thomas, referencing international precedent on capital punishment, 
has stated that “this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not 
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”4  But do we not as 
Americans impose our fashions, fads, and moods on the rest of the world?  
The irony is thick—our globalization mentality is coming back to haunt us. 
This is not unexpected.  Most of what is in our Constitution was writ-
ten over 200 years ago based on foreign influences.  For instance, our first 
ten amendments were derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1688.5  
  
 2. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
 5. See Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.). 
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The question should not be whether international precedent should be used 
as persuasive authority, but rather in what way it should be used.6  While 
this debate rages on in the background, the fact remains that international 
precedent is currently being used to interpret the Constitution—for better 
or for worse.  One key area of interpretation where international precedent 
has been greatly felt is the Eighth Amendment.7 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons, which held 
unconstitutional the juvenile death penalty in the United States.  Relying 
on both the recent state trend of abolishing the juvenile death penalty and 
international authority showing the abolition of the juvenile death penalty, 
Justice Kennedy ruled that the juvenile death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and usual punishment.8 
Since reinstating the death penalty in 1976, the United States has lim-
ited its use and extent.  For example in 1977, in Coker v. Georgia,9 the 
Supreme Court limited the use of capital punishment by ruling it unconsti-
tutional to impose capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman when 
the victim was not killed.  Further, the Supreme Court in Enmund v. Flor-
ida10 and Tison v. Arizona11 ruled unconstitutional the imposition of capital 
punishment on an individual who participates in a felony in which killing 
takes place, but the individual does not intend to kill or does not show 
reckless indifference to life during the course of the felony.  The Supreme 
Court has also barred the execution of insane persons,12 mentally retarded 
persons,13 and juveniles under the age of eighteen at the time of the 
crime.14 
Comparatively, the British also restricted the use and extent of capital 
punishment before abolishing it in 1965.15  For example, the Children Act 
  
 6. Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign 
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 359 (2005).  Glensy discusses that using international law 
as persuasive authority to interpret domestic laws is not a new phenomenon—it has been used in this 
country and abroad for centuries.  Id.  Glensy further states that not all nations are equal when it comes 
to comparative analysis and deciding which nations’ laws to use can be difficult.  Id. at 405. 
 7. Id. at 373.  Glensy points out, though, that this is not the only area of the Constitution where 
comparative analysis has been applied—it has also been widely used in substantive due process cases, 
federalism cases, and equal protection cases.  Id. at 382–87. 
 8. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 9. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 10. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 11. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 12. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). 
 13. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 14. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 15. Furthering the debate to abolish the death penalty were statistics and reports from other coun-
tries in Europe showing that the death penalty was not actually a deterrent to murder.  In a letter to The 
Times in 1946, English lawyer Derek Curtis-Bennett wrote that England should not use these sources 
from other countries, showing a parallel to what America is currently debating: 
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of 190816 and the Children and Young Persons Act of 193317 abolished 
capital punishment for juveniles under sixteen and eighteen years of age, 
respectively.  A further limitation of capital punishment was the Sentence 
of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act of 1931,18 which abolished capital pun-
ishment for pregnant women.  Finally, before abolishing capital punish-
ment for all murder cases temporarily in 1965, England issued the Homi-
cide Act of 1957, which limited the sentence of capital punishment to only 
five types of murder.19  England then abolished capital punishment for 
murder in 196520 and later for all crimes in 1998.21 
In recent years, there has been a lot of comparative analysis between 
American law and foreign law, especially England, without much in-depth 
discussion of the similarities and differences between them.22  This article 
will discuss in depth the British death penalty and explain the similarities 
and differences between England’s abolition of the death penalty and the 
current movement in the United States to abolish the death penalty.  In Part 
II, this article will discuss the history of capital punishment and its aboli-
tion in England, discussing the major statutory provisions and reasons for 
England’s decision to abolish the death penalty.  In Part III, this article will 
discuss the history of capital punishment in the United States, focusing on 
the period between 1976 and leading up to the Simmons decision in 2005.  
  
Derek Curtis-Bennett considered that to abolish capital punishment would be “an act of the 
greatest folly.”  He could not understand how “anyone with experience in criminal law” 
could say it was not a deterrent.  Life imprisonment would not stop criminals going armed 
to avoid capture—and as for other countries, he concluded, laying claim to being the first 
Eurosceptic, we did not “need any lessons on criminal justice from outside.” 
BRIAN P. BLOCK & JOHN HOSTETTLER, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: A HISTORY OF THE ABOLITION OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN 107 (1997). 
 16. 8 Edw. 7, c. 67 (Eng.). 
 17. 23 Geo. 5, c. 12 (Eng.). 
 18. 21 & 22 Geo. 5, c. 24 (Eng.). 
 19. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 (Eng.).  This Act restricted the use of capital punish-
ment to five types of murder: (1) murder in the course or furtherance of theft, (2) murder by shooting or 
causing an explosion, (3) murder while resisting arrest or during an escape, (4) murder of a police 
officer, and (5) murder of a prison officer by a prisoner.  It further mandated the death penalty for 
murderers who commit two murders on different occasions and created three defenses that would lower 
a murder charge to that of manslaughter.  Id. 
 20. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.).  England abolished the death 
penalty in 1965 temporarily for five years.  The act was made permanent in December 1969.  Id. 
 21. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37 (Eng.). 
 22. This is not just confined to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, either.  For example, in Miller-El 
v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection peremptory challenge case, 
Justice Breyer, in concurrence, wrote that peremptory challenges should be abolished and to back up 
this point, mentioned that England abolished peremptory challenges back in 1988, and seemed to be 
doing fine without them.  See id. at 272 (Breyer, J., concurring).  However, just a quick review of the 
jury selection system in England shows that the system in England is completely different from that of 
the United States, thus making comparative analysis difficult, if not impossible.  See, e.g., Sally Lloyd-
Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and 
Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1999). 
File: Millett - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on: 3/5/2008 10:31:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 10:33:00 PM 
2008 WILL THE UNITED STATES FOLLOW ENGLAND . . . ? 551 
 
In Part IV, this article will then compare and contrast the process with 
which England abolished capital punishment to that of the United States.  
Further, following the analysis in Simmons, Part IV will look at the interna-
tional trend of abolishing the death penalty since 1976 and the trend the 
states are heading in the use of the death penalty.  Finally in Part V, this 
article will attempt to predict where the United States is headed in the 
death penalty debate and whether Simmons and the abolition of the juve-
nile death penalty is the first step, similar to the United Kingdom, toward 
the complete abolition of the death penalty, or if this trend will end with 
Simmons. 
II.  THE DEATH PENALTY IN ENGLAND 
The public imagination is fired by the particular rather than the 
general, and capital punishment had the effect of always concen-
trating things on the particular.  The question was not “is there a 
danger of miscarriages of justice?” but “was Evans innocent and 
executed?”  Not, “should adolescent accomplices be hanged?” but 
“should Bentley have been?”  Not, “should women go to the gal-
lows?” but “should Ruth Ellis have gone?”23 
A. The Bloody Code and Early History 
The first execution was recorded in England in 695 AD for theft.24  
While William the Conqueror abolished the death penalty in 1066 (not for 
mercy, but because he favored bodily mutilations such as castration), exe-
cutions were reinstated by Henry I in 1108 and were not again abolished 
until 1965.25 
Throughout the early history of the death penalty and until its aboli-
tion, the main reason for judicial executions in England was its supposed 
deterrence of crime.26  During the Middle Ages, the majority of executions 
were for property offenses27—a peasant farmer could even be executed for 
leaving his home without explanation28—and it was believed that the death 
penalty could deter these types of offenses.  To maximize its deterrent ef-
  
 23. HARRY POTTER, HANGING IN JUDGMENT: RELIGION AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ENGLAND 
FROM THE BLOODY CODE TO ABOLITION 167 (1993). 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 18. 
 26. POTTER, supra note 23, at 7. 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 18 (“Whereas the runaway thief would have been seen 
committing the offense, and often had the stolen property with him, it would simply be assumed that 
the farmer had committed a crime.  Explanations were not regarded as useful.”). 
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fect, a variety of methods of execution were used: hanging, decapitation, 
and even burning and boiling.29 
As of 1688, there were fifty capital crimes in England; however, this 
number would rise to over 200 in the next 130 years during a time referred 
to as the Bloody Code in England.30  “Even stealing fruit from trees and 
damaging ponds to allow fish to escape became capital crimes” during this 
period.31  This trend, the opposite to that of other European countries, “was 
largely due to the political, economic and social changes accompanying the 
rise of Parliamentary supremacy and the early days of the Industrial Revo-
lution.”32  Mass urbanization, the development of “middle-class prosper-
ity,”33 and the lack of a sufficient alternative punishment to death34 were all 
factors in the expansion of the death penalty in England. 
Despite this large increase in statutory capital crimes, the punishment 
of hanging for most of these crimes was rare.  Fewer people were executed 
per year at the end of the eighteenth century than at the end of the sixteenth 
century.  Most people were hanged for crimes against the person; the “only 
property offence for which the capital sentence was regularly executed and 
rarely commuted was forgery.”35  The reasons for this result were a jury’s 
  
 29. POTTER, supra note 23, at 3.  Some of the methods were reserved for specific groups of people: 
[H]anging was considered the most degrading form of death, probably because it was more 
messy and squalid . . . . Decapitation was regarded as a right reserved for the wealthy, and 
burning at the stake was considered to be suitable for women.  As Sir William Blackstone 
expressed it, “For as the decency due to the sex forbids the exposing and publicly mangling 
of their bodies, their sentence is, to be drawn to the gallows and there to be burnt alive.” 
BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 18.  It is interesting to note that the guillotine was in use until 
1710 and the burning of women at the stake was not abolished until 1790.  Id. at 19. 
 30. POTTER, supra note 23, at 4 (“All felonies except petty larceny and mayhem (maiming) were 
capital.”); see also BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 20–21. 
 31. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 21. 
 32. POTTER, supra note 23, at 4.  During this time, both the political order and property were con-
sidered of critical importance.  BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 21.  John Locke, in his Second 
Treatise of Government, did not think any punishment was too severe for property offenses: 
He emphasized again and again that the state had “no other end but the preservation of 
property,” and could employ whatever punishment it would in its protection without infring-
ing the civil rights and liberties of its people.  Although every citizen had an inalienable 
right to life this right could be “forfeited” if he committed a criminal act that threatened the 
fabric of the social compact and so “deserved” death. 
POTTER, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
 33. POTTER, supra note 23, at 4.  The Times wrote in 1872, referring to the Bloody Code: “It was not 
justice that was administered; it was a war that was waged between two classes of the community.”  
BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 21 (internal quotations omitted). 
 34. POTTER, supra note 23, at 4.  The common alternative to the death penalty in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was transportation.  Fifty thousand people convicted of felonies during the 
1700s received transportation as a punishment.  Bailey, supra note 1, at 111.  One reason for the in-
crease in the use of the death penalty could have been “the curtailment of transportation at the outbreak 
of the American war.”  Id.  This left only one reasonable alternative—life imprisonment—which in the 
eyes of retentionists “was both too lenient and too damaging.”  Id. at 112. 
 35. POTTER, supra note 23, at 9 (“Few of the capital statutes were regularly employed: between 
1749 and 1819 there were only twenty-five sorts of felony for which any individuals were executed and 
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reluctance to convict petty criminals if they were to receive death and the 
regular use of mercy.  The pervading thought in England’s criminal law 
system was that the “power of the deterrent was supposed to lie in the un-
certainty of the threat, not in its constant implementation.”36 
This theory was later questioned in 1764 in Of Crimes and Punish-
ments, a book by Italian nobleman Cesare Beccaria, which “gave birth to 
the crusade against capital punishment.”37  Beccaria argued that to be a 
more effective deterrent, punishments should be small and inevitable, in-
stead of severe and irregular.38 
Around the time of Beccaria’s book, British Archdeacon William 
Paley published Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy in 1786.39  In 
contrast to Beccaria, Paley believed the death penalty should be a possible 
punishment for every crime deserving of death, but should only be inflicted 
upon a few examples of each type of crime.40  This remained the prevailing 
view in England; nearly fifty years passed until the number of capital 
crimes was significantly reduced. 
The Reform Act of 1832, due in most part to the efforts of Sir Samuel 
Romilly,41 reduced the number of capital crimes, but the death penalty 
could still be used for “rape, buggery, murder, robbery, some types of for-
gery, attempted murder resulting in injury and housebreaking with larceny 
  
about one hundred and seventy capital felonies for which no one suffered death.  Only a small and 
declining proportion of those capitally condemned were actually executed.”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 23. 
 38. Id. at 24.  Beccaria also argued that capital punishment was not a deterrent to criminals and 
instead was an unjust, “barbarous” act of violence: “Countries and times most notorious for the severity 
of punishments were always those in which the most bloody and inhuman actions and the most atro-
cious crimes were committed; for the hand of the legislator and the assassin were directed by the same 
spirit of ferocity.”  CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 39 (1764). 
 39. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 25 (“This remarkable work ran through fifteen edi-
tions in Paley’s own lifetime and was adopted as a textbook by Cambridge University.  Its influence 
remained prevalent for nearly a century.”). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 41–44.   
Born in Frith Street, Soho, in 1757, [Romilly] was the son of a Huguenot immigrant from 
France. . . .  
Although totally opposed to the death penalty, he believed that when it existed it 
should at least be made clear to precisely what crimes it applied. . . .  
Unusually for the time, Romilly saw the principal aim of punishment as the reforma-
tion of the criminal—and he believed that the excessive severity of the criminal law, far 
from acting as a deterrent . . . was the main cause of the increase in crime. 
Id. at 41–42.  Romilly argued for reform and was an inspiration to many others in the fight for the 
abolition of the death penalty.  POTTER, supra note 23, at 34–39.  He died in 1818, committing suicide 
shortly after the death of his wife, unable to see the fruits of his labor—the 1832 Reform Act.  BLOCK 
& HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 45; see also POTTER, supra note 23, at 38–39 (“If others would reap 
the harvest, it was Romilly who had sown the seeds and nurtured the young plants in often hostile 
terrain.”). 
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to any value,” among other offenses.42  By 1837, only fifteen capital of-
fenses remained.43  In 1840, an attempt was made in the House of Com-
mons to abolish the death penalty—it received over ninety votes and was 
praised by the press, but ultimately failed.44 
By 1841, only seven capital offenses remained, with the abolition of 
capital punishment for rape being a major one to go.45  In 1861, this num-
ber was further reduced to four: “murder, treason, piracy with violence, 
and arson in Her Majesty’s dockyards.”46  These were the only offenses 
punishable by death going into the twentieth century—the final era of capi-
tal punishment in England. 
  
 42. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 49. 
 43. Victor Bailey, The Shadow of the Gallows: The Death Penalty and the British Labour Govern-
ment, 1945–51, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 305, 311 (2000). 
 44. POTTER, supra note 23, at 42.  However, British poet William Wordsworth had a different 
viewpoint: 
The ageing Wordsworth . . . , worried that the continuing restriction would lead to the ulti-
mate abolition of the death penalty, penned a series of fourteen sonnets on the subject which 
reflected both a considerable empathy with those condemned to die on “Weeping Hill” and 
a concern that legislators might be tempted to abrogate their duty to the nation to maintain 
deterrent measures by their tenderness for the suffering of their fellow human beings.   
Id. at 43; see also Sharon M. Setzer, Precedent and Perversity in Wordsworth’s Sonnets Upon the 
Punishment of Death, 50 NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERATURE 427, 429 (1996) (analyzing the sonnets 
and finding that they are “not a cogent argument for retaining the death penalty but rather a dizzying 
and highly provocative study in perspective”). 
 45. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 57; POTTER, supra note 23, at 43.  For a recount of the 
history of rape as a capital crime in England, see Barbara Clare Morton, Freezing Society’s Punishment 
Pendulum: Coker v. Georgia Improperly Foreclosed the Possibility of Capital Punishment for Rape, 43 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).  The common law penalty for rape in England was death; however, 
this was changed by the 1275 Rape Act, which punished rape by short imprisonment and a fine.  Id. at 
3.  The death penalty for rape was reinstated in 1547, where it remained until 1841.  Id. at 4–6. 
The author’s conclusion, however, that “[t]hroughout British . . . history the crime of rape has been 
punishable by death,” seems to be misstating the facts.  Id. at 1.  Death seems to have been brought 
back as a punishment for rape during the Bloody Code, when nearly every offense imaginable was 
punished by death in England.  Further, the punishment of death for rape was abolished in 1841, only 
nine years after the death penalty was abolished for forgery and robbery, and many years before the 
death penalty was abolished for murder.  Looking at the history of capital punishment in England, it 
seems clear that the punishment of death for rape was found very early to be an unjust punishment, like 
that for robbery and forgery, and the conclusion that “British . . . legal history demonstrates grave 
uncertainty and lack of unanimity on the question of the appropriateness of this sentence for this of-
fense” is inaccurate.  Id. at 28.  The death penalty for rape was abolished over 120 years before the 
death penalty for murder was abolished in Britain, over ninety years before the punishment of death for 
juveniles was abolished, and even over twenty years before public executions were prohibited in Eng-
land.  See infra Part II(B).  The legal history in England seems to show, conclusively, that the penalty 
of death for rape is inappropriate. 
 46. POTTER, supra note 23, at 43; see also Bailey, supra note 43, at 307. 
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B. Execution Procedures and Public Hanging 
1. Execution Procedures in England 
Hanging was the most popular method of capital punishment in Eng-
land until the death penalty was abolished.47  By the mid-1700s, most other 
execution methods were discontinued, although the punishment for women 
of burning at the stake was not abolished until 1790.48  The Murder Act of 
1752 allowed judges to dissect or gibbet49 the bodies of murderers after 
execution to increase the alleged deterrent effect and distinguish murderers 
from other petty criminals who received the death penalty.50 
Further, the 1752 Act set the timeline for the execution of murderers.  
Criminals convicted of murder would be hanged “within forty-eight hours 
of being sentenced.”51  This differed from other condemned felons who 
were generally hanged within a week following sentencing.52  This proce-
dure was not changed until 1836, when the period between sentencing and 
execution was changed from fourteen to twenty-seven days for murder-
ers.53  The Court of Criminal Appeal in England was not even established 
until 1907; before its establishment, a convicted murderer could only hope 
for a reprieve that was very seldom given.54 
Until the mid-1800s, hanging was a prolonged public spectacle.  The 
gallows at Tyburn, in use until 1783, could hang up to twenty-four crimi-
nals at once, usually with crowds of 100,000 watching.55  This macabre 
spectacle had the purpose of preventing murder and causing fright and 
  
 47. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 18. 
 48. POTTER, supra note 23, at 7.  The last recorded execution by burning of a woman was in 1789, 
for the offense of petty treason.  “From then on women would receive the same deserts as men, and be 
hanged.”  Id. 
 49. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 30. 
The Murder Act 1752 . . . encouraged judges to order the use of the gibbet, until then not 
recognized by statute, in which many tar-soaked bodies were publicly exhibited in iron 
cages, often for months, as a grisly warning to the lower orders.  Sometimes the cages 
would be hung on posts 30 feet high and spiked with thousands of nails to prevent the re-
covery of the bodies by relatives under cover of darkness.  Following the 1752 Act, at New-
gate after an execution the body would be taken to “The Kitchen” where it was put into a 
cauldron of boiling pitch prior to being placed in chains described as its “last suit.”  It was 
then gibbeted. 
Id.  Gibbeting would not be abolished until 1834.  POTTER, supra note 23, at 74. 
 50. POTTER, supra note 23, at 7–8. 
 51. Id. at 19. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 44. 
 54. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 66; Bailey, supra note 43, at 312. 
 55. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 28. 
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terror in the minds of the people watching, although it sometimes produced 
the opposite effect.56 
Criminals awaiting the gallows had various reactions to their impend-
ing fate: while some “flaunted their defiance and dressed as if on the way 
to a wedding,” others were not so brave.57  In one case, Walter Moore, 
convicted of a domestic murder and sentenced to death, was dissatisfied 
with his trial and did not follow the usual routine of admitting his sins and 
“finding God” before execution.58  On the eve of his execution, Moore 
climbed up a water closet and “plunged head first into a cistern a little 
more than a yard deep,” preferring suicide to judicial execution.  After a 
three day investigation, the chaplain in charge of Moore was severely rep-
rimanded because he allowed suicide to “compound[], rather than judicial 
sacrifice [to] expiate[], [Moore’s] sin.”59  Due to this affair, “[t]he gallows 
had been cheated of its prey.”60 
Around 1760, a new method of hanging was introduced—the long 
drop technique.61  This refinement made executions more efficient and 
more humane by making death supposedly instantaneous—death being by 
broken neck instead of asphyxiation.  This technique placed the criminal 
on top of a trap door on a scaffold, and when the trap door opened below, 
the criminal fell a predetermined length, based on his weight, thus breaking 
  
 56. Id. at 30 (the public execution “often provoked a self-protective reaction of irreverence and 
defiance in the watching crowds”). 
 57. Id. at 29. 
 58. POTTER, supra note 23, at 49–50. 
 59. Id. at 50. 
 60. Id.  This incident is similar to a case in the United States.  In 1999, the State of Washington 
attempted to seek the death penalty for inmate Mitchell Rupe for a third time: 
For Thurston County prosecutors, it simply doesn’t matter how Mitchell Rupe dies—
just so long as he does.  That’s why the county is pressing ahead with its efforts for a third 
sentencing hearing for Rupe, who has twice escaped death penalties on appeal for the 1981 
slaying of two Tumwater, Thurston County, bank tellers during a robbery.  Rupe’s attorneys 
find the process unseemly at best, and downright bizarre at its worst.  Rupe, originally saved 
from the gallows by his obesity, now is dying of liver disease.  Indeed, says Olympia de-
fense lawyer Roger Hunko, Washington has put forth “Herculean efforts” to save Rupe 
from a natural death just so it can kill him.  Rupe has been the beneficiary of medical treat-
ments that have slowed the liver disease that was so serious two years ago that doctors then 
predicted he would not live 18 months. 
Mike Carter, Elusive Inmate Targeted for Execution—Again, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at B1.  
Rupe was sentenced to be hanged, since at the time of his conviction, hanging was the only method of 
execution in Washington.  Id.  A year later, after his third sentencing trial, Mitchell Rupe was given a 
sentence of life imprisonment after one juror refused to vote for a death sentence.  Nancy Bartley, Rupe 
Spared Death Penalty for Final Time 1 Juror Holds Out for Life Term for the Killer of Two Bank 
Tellers, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000, at A1.  In 2006, Rupe died in prison at the age of fifty-one.  
Jennifer Sullivan & Maureen O’Hagan, Convicted Killer Dies in Prison: Rupe Originally Sentenced to 
Death but Court Ruled He Was Too Heavy to be Hanged, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at B3.  Once 
again, the “gallows had been cheated of its prey.” 
 61. POTTER, supra note 23, at 72. 
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his neck.  This method of execution would be used in England until the 
death penalty was abolished.62 
2. Juveniles and the Death Penalty 
Throughout early British history, children under seven years old could 
not receive the death penalty since they were thought too young to distin-
guish right from wrong.  Children between seven and fourteen could only 
be executed if malice was proved.  However, children over the age of four-
teen were treated as adults and could be executed under the law.63 
Although children under fourteen could be sentenced to death, this sen-
tence was rare and when given, was usually followed by a reprieve.  Only 
one person under the age of fourteen was executed in England in the nine-
teenth century, a thirteen-year-old for murder in 1831.64  In 1833, a four-
teen-year-old was hanged for stealing, the last juvenile executed in Eng-
land until the death penalty was abolished for children under sixteen by the 
Children Act of 1908.65  After 1887, it was standard practice in England to 
grant a reprieve to those under eighteen.66  The Children Act of 1908 and 
the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933, which abolished the death 
penalty for all persons under eighteen, codified what had been the practice 
in England since the beginning of the twentieth century.67 
A number of attempts were made to abolish the death penalty for per-
sons under twenty-one.  One of those attempts, a 1948 amendment made in 
the House of Commons to raise the minimum age for the death penalty, 
was quickly withdrawn for lack of support.68  The 1948 amendment was 
introduced in response to a 1930 report of the select committee, which 
stated that if Parliament decided to maintain the death penalty, “no-one 
  
 62. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 36–37.  This technique would be further refined 
throughout the years of hanging and the following procedure became commonplace: 
At each prison, the engineer, who looked after the scaffold and its equipment, handed the 
executioner details of the condemned man’s height and weight.  Tables were provided by 
the Home Office which calculated the drop needed based on the condemned man’s size, but 
the final decision was the executioner’s. 
When the drop was correct the neck was broken cleanly and death, or at least uncon-
sciousness, was instantaneous.  If the drop was too short the neck would not break and the 
man would be strangled; too long and the head would be torn off.  Most drops were about 
six feet.  Before the precise length of the drop was decided the executioner would need to 
view the prisoner. 
Id. at 13. 
 63. Id. at 22; POTTER, supra note 23, at 6–7. 
 64. POTTER, supra note 23, at 7. 
 65. Id.; see also Children Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 67 (Eng.). 
 66. POTTER, supra note 23, at 109; Bailey, supra note 43, at 305 n.1. 
 67. POTTER, supra note 23, at 109; Bailey, supra note 43, at 305 n.1; see also Children and Young 
Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12 (Eng.). 
 68. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 113. 
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should be sentenced to death below the age of 21, the age of full responsi-
bility.”69 
During the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, ninety 
percent of convicts executed were under the age of twenty-one.70  How-
ever, by the 1930s, persons under twenty-one were rarely executed.  Be-
tween 1926 and 1931, only one person under twenty-one was executed.71  
Despite this trend not to execute those under twenty-one, the minimum age 
of hanging was never raised after 1933 and remained at eighteen until the 
death penalty was completely abolished. 
3. Dickens and the Prohibition of Public Hanging 
In 1840, a man went to see the hanging of Francois Courvoisier, “one 
of the most celebrated murderers of the time,” outside Newgate Gaol in 
London.72  Watching the hanging from above in a private balcony, this 
man later described the incident as void of emotion: “No sorrow, no salu-
tary terror, no abhorrence, no seriousness, nothing but ribaldry, debauch-
ery, levity, drunkenness and flaunting vice in 50 other shapes.  I should 
have deemed it impossible that I could have ever felt any large assemblage 
of my fellow-creatures to be so odious.”73  He was disgusted with what he 
saw, but this did not keep him away from other public hangings.74  Five 
years later he witnessed a beheading in Rome75 and in 1849 another hang-
ing in London.76  This man, Charles Dickens, would later become a major 
proponent for the prohibition of public executions.77 
  
 69. Id. at 93.  This was not the main finding of the report, though—the under twenty-one finding 
was only conditional on Parliament retaining the death penalty.  Id.  The report gave three other condi-
tional recommendations: the insanity rules should be revised, the death penalty should apply equally to 
women as to men, and the royal prerogative of mercy should be extended.  Id.  The definite recommen-
dations of the committee were that the death penalty should be abolished for an experimental period of 
five years during peace time and that life imprisonment should be substituted as punishment.  Id. at 94.  
The fact of Parliament’s compromise in 1933 in view of the 1930 report, abolishing the death penalty 
for those under eighteen in the Children and Young Persons Act, was only a minor victory for aboli-
tionists since no juvenile had been executed in England for some time.  Id. at 98. 
 70. POTTER, supra note 23, at 7.  In fact, in 1785 it was stated that “out of every 20 offenders exe-
cuted in London, 18 were under the age of 21.”  BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 23. 
 71. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 97. 
 72. POTTER, supra note 23, at 64.  The site for hangings in London was moved from Tyburn Tree to 
outside Newgate Gaol in 1783, where public executions would be performed until 1868.  BLOCK & 
HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 28. 
 73. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 60.   
 74. Id.; see also POTTER, supra note 23, at 66. 
 75. POTTER, supra note 23, at 66. 
 76. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 60.  “It looks as though Dickens himself was one of 
those attracted to the sight of seeing people hang, and at the same time repelled by his own fascina-
tion.”  POTTER, supra note 23, at 70. 
 77. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 60.  William Thackeray (another British literary leg-
end) was also present at this same execution and would later write the essay Going to See a Man 
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Although Dickens did not necessarily believe the death penalty should 
be abolished, he strongly favored private executions.78  His beliefs were 
not the result of sympathy for the criminal,79 but due to the effect public 
executions had on the general population.80  Dickens argued that public 
hangings did not have a deterrent effect on criminals, but in fact had a bru-
talizing effect on society: 
Present this black idea of violence to a bad mind contemplating 
violence; hold up before a man remotely compassing the death of 
another person, the spectacle of his own ghastly and untimely 
death by man’s hands; and out of the depths of his own nature you 
shall assuredly raise up that which lures and tempts him on.81 
This brutalization theory was backed up by several reports saying that 
the most regular attendees of public executions were thieves and felons.82  
In one report from a prison chaplain who had talked to 167 criminals 
awaiting the gallows, only three were found to not have attended a previ-
  
Hanged as a result of his outrage and revulsion with what he witnessed.  POTTER, supra note 23, at 64–
65. 
 78. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 61.  In 1845, Dickens wrote advocating the “total 
abolition of the Punishment of Death, as a general principle, for the advantage of society, for the pre-
vention of crime, and without the least reference to, or tenderness for any individual malefactor what-
ever.”  POTTER, supra note 23, at 67. 
 79. Id. at 77.  Dickens was quick to dissociate himself with people who were “soft” on criminals.  
Id.  He believed that one “danger of hanging or at least of public hanging was that it engendered pity 
for those who were contemptible.”  Id. 
 80. Id. at 66.  Writing about public executions, Dickens said that the hangings themselves were 
worse than the crimes committed: “[I]t was so loathsome, pitiful, and vile a sight, that the law appeared 
to be as bad as he, or worse.”  Id. 
 81. Id. at 69.  A brutalization effect is also discussed regarding the death penalty in the United 
States.  In a study done by Joanna M. Shepherd, published in 2005, she found that whether capital 
punishment produces a deterrent or brutalization effect depends on how many executions are performed 
in the state—few executions and the murder rate either stays the same or increases, but when the num-
ber of executions reaches nine, the murder rate decreases.  Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus 
Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 240 
(2005).  She writes: 
It has been theorized that executions might increase murder, not deter them, and that the 
brutalization effect is the consequence of the beastly example that executions present.  Exe-
cutions devalue human life and “demonstrate that it is correct and appropriate to kill those 
who have gravely offended us.”  Thus, the lesson taught by capital punishment may be “the 
legitimacy of lethal vengeance, not of deterrence.” 
My results suggest that a substantial brutalization effect is generally present after an 
execution, regardless how many executions the state has already conducted recently. 
Id.  Shepherd further states that in Oregon, results indicated that a single execution induced 175 mur-
ders.  Id. at 241; see also Frederick C. Millett, Part II: Practical Reasons, Apr. 8, 2002, http://www. 
msu.edu/~millettf/DeathPenalty/practical.html (discussing a brutalization effect for the death penalty 
found in Oklahoma, Texas, and California). 
 82. They were “‘drawn by a fascination or attraction for scenes of blood, or strong excitement.’  
They came ‘to see their late associates die, as they call it, manfully, and to learn how to die in like 
manner themselves.’”  POTTER, supra note 23, at 69. 
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ous public execution.83  For these reasons, Dickens argued for private exe-
cutions, since the “issue now was how to refine capital punishment, not 
how to abolish it.”84 
Others did not agree with Dickens.  Retentionists thought public hang-
ings were a deterrent to murder and could ensure “useful terror and a con-
venient humility.”85  Abolitionists preferred total abolition of the death 
penalty instead of the switch to private executions, thinking that private 
executions would jeopardize total abolition and cause the abolitionist 
movement to lose steam.86 
Because of this controversy, the House of Lords appointed a select 
committee in 1856, which recommended private executions.87  The Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment (1864–1866) was appointed by the 
government in 1864 after public pressure increased, which again recom-
mended private executions.88  Public executions were finally prohibited in 
1868.89 
C. Early Attempts to Abolish the Death Penalty 
The abolition of capital punishment in England is a story of adversity, 
of overcoming centuries of tradition, as well as centuries of thought about 
religion, retribution, and deterrence.  It is a story about a slow reform of 
criminal justice—reform that would take many years, many governments, 
and many attempts in Parliament to change.  But most importantly, this is a 
story about a few men who believed that change could be made—a few 
men, who rose up outnumbered, against public opinion, and made it their 
mission to abolish capital punishment in England.  It would take many 
years and many failures, but these men would eventually reach their goal. 
  
 83. Id.  In other reports, a governor of Newgate said that “in his fifteen years experience he had 
never known but one criminal hanged for murder who had not witnessed an execution.”  Id.  Another 
person reported that out of forty men executed at Winchester Gaol, thirty-eight of them had previously 
attended an execution.  Id. 
 84. Id. at 79. 
 85. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 61. 
 86. POTTER, supra note 23, at 78.  Roger Hood says the following about this theory: 
The question of right of access . . . has provoked considerable controversy.  Indeed, some 
advocates of abolition believe, just as abolitionists in Britain believed when the Capital Pun-
ishment within Prisons Act was passed in 1868, that it would speed the cause of abolition if 
the general public were to be allowed to witness what was being done in their name: the 
cold and deliberate judicial execution of an offender.  This view has recently received the 
imprimatur of a leading campaigner for abolition in the United States, Professor Austin 
Sarat. . . . But, as David Garland has pointed out, one cannot think of anywhere in the world 
where such shock tactics have worked. 
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 103 (3d ed. 2002). 
 87. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 61. 
 88. Id. at 63. 
 89. Id. at 73–74. 
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1. 1868–1918: A Time of Little Progress 
The story of abolition got off to a slow start in the twentieth century, 
with little progress after public hangings were prohibited in 1868.  The 
other finding of the royal commission in 1864 that recommended private 
executions, was to divide murder into degrees—where only the most egre-
gious murderers would receive death—all others would get life imprison-
ment.  Several attempts in Parliament to divide murder into degrees in the 
late nineteenth century failed.90  One event of importance during this pe-
riod was the formation of a new political party, the Labour Party in 1906—
which would become the principal opponent to the Conservative Party, 
especially on the issue of capital punishment.91  Little happened during the 
First World War—with millions of men dying in the battlefield, no one 
cared about a few criminals per year being hanged.92 
2. The Report Between the Wars 
After World War I, the issue of capital punishment took center stage 
with the first Labour governments of the 1920s.93  In 1928, a bill to abolish 
the death penalty was introduced in the House of Commons and was car-
ried to a second reading by a vote of 119–118.94  This led to a select com-
  
 90. POTTER, supra note 23, at 97; Bailey, supra note 43, at 307. 
 91. Bailey, supra note 43, at 307. 
 92. Id.; see also POTTER, supra note 23, at 120. 
 93. Bailey, supra note 43, at 307. 
 94. Id. at 314; see also BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 90–91.  It might be worthwhile 
here to explain a little bit about the structure of government in England: 
The business of Parliament takes place in two Houses: the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords.  Their work is similar: making laws (legislation), checking the work of the 
government (scrutiny), and debating current issues. . . . Generally, the decisions made in one 
House have to be approved by the other. In this way the two-chamber system acts as a check 
and balance for both Houses. . . . The Commons is publicly elected.  The party with the larg-
est number of members in the Commons forms the government.  Members of the Commons 
(MPs) debate the big political issues of the day and proposals for new laws.  It is one of the 
key places where government ministers, like the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, and the 
principal figures of the main political parties, work. . . . Members of the House of Lords are 
mostly appointed by the Queen, a fixed number are elected internally and a limited number 
of Church of England archbishops and bishops sit in the House.  The Lords acts as a revis-
ing chamber for legislation and its work complements the business of the Commons.  The 
House of Lords is also the highest court in the land: the supreme court of appeal.  A group 
of salaried, full-time judges known as Law Lords carries out this judicial work. 
UK Parliament—The Two-House System, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2007); see also UK Parliament—Acts, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/ 
acts.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) (“An Act of Parliament creates a new law or changes an existing 
law.  An Act is a Bill approved by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords and formally 
agreed to by the reigning monarch (known as Royal Assent).  Once implemented, an Act is law and 
applies to the UK as a whole or to specific areas of the country.”).  For more information on British 
Parliament, visit http://www.parliament.uk/. 
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mittee95 appointment in 1930 to consider the issue of abolishing the death 
penalty in England.  The committee, in a controversial report, recom-
mended the abolition of the death penalty for a temporary period of five 
years.96  However, the only immediate parliamentary responses to the re-
port were the Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act of 1931, abolish-
ing the death penalty as a punishment for pregnant women, and the Chil-
dren and Young Persons Act of 1933, abolishing the death penalty for 
those under eighteen.  The report recommended, in the least, to raise the 
minimum age for the death penalty to twenty-one and impose it equally to 
women as to men; however none of these recommendations were taken.97 
In 1938, a motion to consider legislation to abolish the death penalty in 
the House of Commons was passed, by a vote of 114–89, but with “the 
onset of war less than a year away and the change of government to a na-
tional coalition, the Bill progressed no further.”98  An amendment to the 
Criminal Justice Bill of 1938 was then proposed, but it did not get past 
committee.  A poll taken at about the same time suggested that public opin-
ion was split on the death penalty debate.  The poll showed that forty-nine 
percent wanted the death penalty retained, forty percent wanted it abol-
ished, while eleven percent were undecided.  However, with the start of the 
Second World War, no further action was taken for some time.99 
3. Silverman’s First Attempt to Abolish 
After World War II, there was “a floodtide of popular support for a 
juster, more humane society.”100  In fact, this was the opinion throughout 
Europe.  The death penalty was abolished in Italy in 1944 and in Germany 
in 1949—due in large part to the grief and horror caused by the govern-
ments in those countries during the war.101 
In 1945, the first Labour government with a majority in Parliament 
was elected and in 1947, the Criminal Justice Bill, which was originally 
debated before the war, was reintroduced in the Commons.102  Sydney 
  
 95. “Select Committees work in both Houses.  They check and report on areas ranging from the 
work of government departments to economic affairs.  The results of these inquiries are public and 
many require a response from the government. . . . There is a Commons Select Committee for each 
government department, examining three aspects: spending, policies and administration.”  UK Parlia-
ment—Select Committees, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/select.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2007). 
 96. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 93–94. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 100. 
 99. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 100; POTTER, supra note 23, at 141. 
 100. Bailey, supra note 43, at 307. 
 101. HOOD, supra note 86, at 23. 
 102. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 109–10; Bailey, supra note 43, at 307. 
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Silverman103 proposed inserting a clause to the bill, which would suspend 
the death penalty for five years.104  Around this time, public opinion polls 
showed a high percentage of the population supported capital punish-
ment—sixty-nine percent agreed that hanging should be retained for mur-
der.105  Nonetheless, the Criminal Justice Bill was passed by a free vote106 
in the Commons, with the clause to abolish the death penalty passing by a 
vote of 215–74.107  When the bill went to the Lords, however, it met strong 
resistance, and the amendment to abolish the death penalty was rejected by 
a vote of 181–28.108 
Silverman’s first attempt failed; as a compromise, the government set 
up a royal commission to research the issue, but limited the scope of the 
commission’s inquiries solely to modifications of the death penalty.109  
However, while the commission was sitting, three controversial executions 
in a span of seven years changed the debate on capital punishment. 
  
 103. Lord Callaghan, Foreword to BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at vii (“The undoubted 
hero of the campaign was Sydney Silverman—small in stature, uptilted head, erect carriage, a quick 
pattering footstep and a prominent pointed beard which was almost a weapon in itself.  In the Com-
mons he always perched himself (perched is the word) on the corner seat just below the gangway 
adjoining the Government Front Bench, his feet hardly touching the ground.  From that advantageous 
position he was always ready to jump to his feet at any moment.  He was fearless in the face of hostil-
ity, of which there was plenty, and coupled this with great skill as a Parliamentarian and with consider-
able legal knowledge and practical experience, brought from his profession as a solicitor.  He carried a 
formidable armoury that convinced many of us just back from the war in the late 1940s that hanging 
should go.”). 
 104. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 109–10. 
 105. POTTER, supra note 23, at 145; Bailey, supra note 43, at 328. 
 106. “If a free vote is announced, MPs and Members of the Lords are allowed to vote as they wish 
and are not controlled by the parties’ whips.”  UK Parliament—Glossary: Parliamentary Jargon Ex-
plained, http://www.parliament.uk/about/glossary.cfm?ref=freevot_4177 (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).  
“Whips are MPs or Lords appointed by each party in Parliament to help organise their party’s contribu-
tion to parliamentary business.  One of their responsibilities is making sure the maximum number of 
their party members vote, and vote the way their party wants.”  See UK Parliament—Whips, 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/principal/whips.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).   
 107. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 114.  During the debates in the Commons, the 
events/experiences of World War II were at the forefront of discussion.  Retentionists based their 
arguments on the Nuremberg trials, “if it was morally right to hang war criminals, then it was right to 
use the death penalty for murderers at home.”  Bailey, supra note 43, at 333.  Abolitionists countered 
this argument with one of their own: “‘It is not insignificant,’ said Elwyn Jones, who had been a mem-
ber of the prosecution team at Nuremberg, ‘that one of the first acts of the Nazi Government was to 
restore the death penalty. . . . Our democracy is a democracy that does not need the terror of the death 
penalty.’”  Id. at 333–34.  “[T]he capital punishment debate in 1948 had a strong moral tone, whether 
retributive or humanitarian in sentiment.”  Id. 
 108. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 119; Bailey, supra note 43, at 340. 
 109. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 122. 
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D. The Trilogy: “Evans-Bentley-Ellis”110 
The 1950s was a critical decade for the death penalty in England.  Not 
only was significant progress made in Parliament for abolition, but three 
sensational murder cases shocked the public conscience and changed the 
attitudes of many politicians.111  Each of these three cases raised a different 
problem with capital punishment.  Timothy Evans was possibly executed 
for a crime he did not commit.  However, in the other cases, guilt was not a 
question.  Derek Bentley and Ruth Ellis were both guilty of the crime they 
committed—the question was whether the punishment of death was too 
severe. 
1. Timothy Evans 
In December 1949, Beryl Evans and her baby daughter, Geraldine, 
were found strangled at 10 Rillington Place in London.112  The prime sus-
pect, who was later convicted for the murder of his daughter,113 was Timo-
thy Evans, Beryl’s husband.  Evans was convicted and sentenced to death 
based primarily on his confession,114 his testimony,115 and the testimony of 
  
 110. See id. at 164 (“The night before the scheduled execution police reinforcements were called to 
control the crowds outside Holloway gaol who were ‘demanding to see’ Ruth Ellis, and a further peti-
tion had been presented to the home secretary signed by 35 members of the London County Council.  
One section of the crowd began chanting ‘Evans-Bentley-Ellis’ and the chorus was taken up by all 
those watching, which indicated that the public were realising that some executions were unjust and 
possibly that they should be done away with altogether.  The crowd did not disperse until 11.30 p.m. 
and Ruth Ellis was duly hanged at 9 a.m. next morning.”). 
 111. James B. Christoph, Capital Punishment and British Party Responsibility, 77 POL. SCI. Q. 19, 26 
(1962). 
 112. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 143. 
 113. Evans was only tried for the death of his daughter, “for under English law even if a man has 
been committed for trial on more than one charge of murder he is only tried for one such offense at a 
time.”  F. Tennyson Jesse, Introduction to TRIALS OF EVANS AND CHRISTIE, at lvi (F. Tennyson Jesse 
ed., 1957).  “The Prosecution had decided to proceed only with the charge concerning the baby Gerald-
ine.  The assumption was that for the murder of Beryl Evans there might have been provocation, 
whereas the murder of a helpless baby could have no excuse.”  Id. at xxi.  This would be an important 
point in the later debates of Evans’s innocence, since John Christie would later admit to murdering 
Beryl Evans, but not the child.  BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 144–45. 
 114. See Jesse, supra note 113, at xvii (“Evans up till then had shown no emotion, no signs of dis-
tress, but, with the two piles of familiar clothing at his feet, he stared and the tears came into his eyes 
and he picked up the tie.  Mr. Jennings went on: ‘Later to-day I was present at Kensington Mortuary 
when it was established that the cause of death was strangulation in both cases.  I have reason to be-
lieve you were responsible for their deaths.’  Without any hesitation, Evans said ‘Yes.’  Then he started 
to pour out a confession.  It was as though he said to himself: ‘Oh well, they are on to me, the game is 
up.’  With the air of getting something off his chest with enormous relief he confessed to both mur-
ders.”). 
 115. See Id. at xxiv (“Timothy Evans was the sole witness called for the Defence.  He was most 
patently a liar, and though lying does not establish that a man is a murderer it does add to the difficul-
ties of establishing that he is not a murderer.  I have seen innocent people save themselves in the box 
and guilty men hang themselves.  Innocent or guilty, Evans hanged himself.”). 
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John Christie, his neighbor at 10 Rillington Place.116  Three years after the 
execution of Evans, Christie was found to be a serial murderer.  He was 
convicted of murdering his wife and five other women both before and 
after the deaths of Beryl and Geraldine Evans.117 
On November 30, 1949, Timothy Evans walked into the police station 
at Merthyr Vale in South Wales and told the detective that he had “dis-
posed” of his wife and “put her down the drain.”118  This was only the first 
of many lies Evans would tell the police.119  When the London police went 
to 10 Rillington Place, they did not find any body in the drain and found it 
impossible for one person to lift the manhole—it took three police officers 
to do it that night.120  When told that the body was not there, Evans then 
said he was protecting “a man called Christie.”121 
In Evans’s second statement he told the detective that he talked to his 
neighbor, John Christie, about his wife wanting an abortion.  Christie told 
Evans that he could perform a procedure because he was training to be a 
doctor before the war.  When Evans got back from work the next day, 
Christie met him and said: “It’s bad news.  It didn’t work.”  Christie then 
showed the body of Beryl to Evans, and told Evans that he would get rid of 
the body for him.  The next day, Christie told Evans that he knew of a cou-
ple that could look after his baby, Geraldine, for him and that they would 
take the baby away in a few days.122  He would later correct this second 
statement and say that he helped Christie remove Beryl’s body from the 
apartment.123 
On December 2, London police searched the premises of 10 Rillington 
Place and found the bodies of Beryl and Geraldine Evans in a wash-house 
in the backyard.  The police again questioned Evans, told him the bodies 
were found, and showed him the clothes of his wife and daughter.  He then 
confessed to both murders and told the police that he lost his temper, stran-
gled his wife and daughter, and hid both bodies in the wash-house.124 
Evans’s trial began on January 11, 1950 for the murder of his daughter, 
Geraldine.125  The main witness for the prosecution was Christie; the only 
  
 116. Id. at xxi (“The chief witness for the Prosecution was Mr. John Reginald Halliday Christie and, 
without waiting for his character to be impugned, the unusual course was taken by Counsel for the 
Crown of presenting Christie immediately to the jury as a man who had done honour both to the Army 
and the Police Force, a man to be trusted.”). 
 117. Id. at lviii. 
 118. Id. at viii. 
 119. Id. at ii. 
 120. Id. at x. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at x–xii. 
 123. Id. at xiv. 
 124. Id. at xv, xvii. 
 125. Id. at xxi. 
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witness for the defense was Evans.  Evans reverted back to his second 
statement and implicated Christie at trial—the jury had to decide whether 
to believe Evans, who had lied so often that no one could know if he was 
telling the truth, or Christie, who had a criminal record twenty years ago, 
but had “done honour both to the Army and the Police Force” since that 
time.126  Malcolm Morris, Evans’s counsel, had the impossible task of pin-
ning the murder on Christie at trial,127 but in the end the jury chose to be-
lieve Christie and found Evans guilty of murder on January 13.128  Evans 
was hanged on March 9, 1950.129 
On March 24, 1953, over three years after Evans was hanged, the body 
of Mrs. Christie was found at 10 Rillington Place along with three other 
  
 126. Id.  Christie had, in fact, been convicted four times in the 1920–30s for offenses of dishonesty—
for stealing postal orders in 1921, for false pretenses in 1923, for stealing material and goods in 1924, 
and for stealing a motor car in 1933.  He was also convicted and imprisoned six months for a malicious 
wounding charge in 1929.  However, all these offenses occurred nearly twenty years earlier.  TRIALS OF 
EVANS AND CHRISTIE 38–39 (F. Tennyson Jesse ed., 1957).  More importantly, Christie served in the 
army in World War I and, since those charges, served in the War Reserve Police for many years during 
World War II and was commended on two occasions.  Id. at 40. 
 127. The following critical (and ironic) exchange took place during Evans’s cross-examination by 
prosecutor Christmas Humphreys during his trial: 
MR. HUMPHREYS: [questioning Evans about Christie] And therefore you make an allegation 
in terms through your counsel against a perfectly innocent man that he caused the murder— 
MR. MALCOLM MORRIS: Well, my lord, is that the proper way of asking the question, with 
the greatest respect? 
MR. JUSTICE LEWIS: Presumably it was done on his instructions, Mr. Morris. 
MR. MALCOLM MORRIS: Yes, certainly, my lord; this witness now says that he was not re-
sponsible for the murder of his wife and his child, and my learned friend says, “Therefore 
you make an allegation against a perfectly innocent man.”  My learned friend has no right to 
say that. 
MR. JUSTICE LEWIS: He wishes to know whether or not it was owing to his being upset he 
was making an allegation against an innocent man. 
MR. MALCOLM MORRIS: My lord, it was nothing of the kind. 
MR. JUSTICE LEWIS: Well, the jury can judge as to that.  They have listened to your cross-
examination of Mr. Christie, and if they think that is not a suggestion that Mr. Christie mur-
dered the wife and the daughter I do not know what is. 
MR. MALCOLM MORRIS: Of course, it is, and I hope I never shirk any issue of that sort; but 
for my learned friend to say now, “You make an allegation against a perfectly innocent 
man,” can only be a question which is based on the assumption that his witness is innocent 
and my witness is not.  My friend has no right to incorporate that into a statement.  He can 
say, “And now you make an allegation that Mr. Christie had done it,” but he cannot describe 
Mr. Christie as a perfectly innocent man. 
MR. JUSTICE LEWIS: Why not? 
MR. MALCOLM MORRIS: Well, it can only be done for the purpose of prejudice, in my sub-
mission. 
MR. HUMPHREYS: I crave leave not to have to believe that everything the accused says is 
true. 
Id. at 76–77.  Morris definitely had the evidence stacked against him to try and convince a jury that 
Evans was innocent. 
 128. Jesse, supra note 113, at xxviii. 
 129. Id. at xxx. 
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bodies.130  All four women were strangled.131  Later, two more skeletons 
were found buried in Christie’s garden—their deaths dating back to before 
Beryl and Geraldine’s deaths.132  The main suspect was John Christie.133 
Christie’s trial began on June 22, 1953.  It “lasted four days and it was 
interesting simply because it was unexampled in the history of British 
crime.”134  His defense was Guilty but Insane, and although he was only 
being tried for the murder of his wife, his defense attorney attributed every 
murder to Christie.135  Christie testified to murdering Beryl Evans, but 
never admitted to killing the child.136  On June 22, 1953, Christie was 
found guilty but not insane and sentenced to death; he did not appeal his 
conviction.137 
Shortly after Christie’s trial ended, an unease which had been creeping 
up since all the bodies were found at 10 Rillington Place about a possible 
miscarriage of justice took center stage.138  Home Secretary Sir David Pat-
rick Maxwell Fyfe139 appointed John Scott Henderson to review the evi-
dence from the two cases and write a report.  This controversial report was 
written in less than two weeks, was referred to as “unsatisfactory,”140 “offi-
cial whitewashing,”141 and “carried little conviction with the educated pub-
lic.”142  Henderson concluded that no doubt existed as to the guilt of Timo-
thy Evans and that Evans was responsible for both the deaths of Beryl and 
Geraldine.143 
Very few people believed this report and it only caused more debate 
and unrest about Evans’s execution.144  It took many years before the Brit-
  
 130. Id. at xxxiv–xxxv. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at xxxviii–xxxix. 
 133. Id. at xxxix. 
 134. Id. at lvi; see also BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 144. 
 135. Jesse, supra note 113, at lvi–lviii. 
 136. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 144–45. 
 137. Jesse, supra note 113, at lxiv. 
 138. Id. at lxv. 
 139. “The nearest thing to death in life” as the jingle went, probably because of his strong pro-death 
penalty stance.  POTTER, supra note 23, at 167.  Fyfe was also home secretary (the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, responsible for internal affairs including the criminal justice system) when 
Derek Bentley was executed, the man “who had let the law take its course” with Bentley, and who 
believed that Timothy Evans was guilty despite all the evidence showing otherwise.  BLOCK & 
HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 154; POTTER, supra note 23, at 201.  Later, as Lord Kilmuir, he was 
instrumental in the House of Lords defeating numerous bills from the Commons that would have abol-
ished the death penalty.  In 1965, he opposed the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in the Lords 
and debated heavily against it becoming law.  BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 246. 
 140. Id. at 148. 
 141. Jesse, supra note 113, at lxvii. 
 142. POTTER, supra note 23, at 167. 
 143. Jesse, supra note 113, at lxvii. 
 144. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 148 (“It is possible that if Scott Henderson had had 
more time the report would have been more thorough but the main criticism was that even on the evi-
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ish government admitted there was a problem with the Evans case.  In No-
vember 1965, a new inquiry was opened and an October 1966 report con-
cluded that Evans probably murdered his wife, but not his baby.  This re-
port was referred to as “scarcely credible” since Evans was not even tried 
for the murder of his wife.145  Later in 1966, Evans received a posthumous 
free pardon.146 
Was Evans innocent?  Sir David Maxwell Fyfe thought it impossible 
that an innocent man could be hanged.147  Chuter Ede,148 the home secre-
tary during Evans’s trial and execution, who decided not to give Evans a 
reprieve, thought it not only possible, but that Evans and other innocent 
people had been executed.149  It is hard to believe that there could be two 
murderers who lived in the same house at the same time who killed in the 
same identical way, but then again, it is also hard to believe that Evans was 
completely innocent.150  The British public and politicians were more con-
cerned with the fact that a miscarriage of justice could happen.  The case 
against Evans during his trial was overwhelming, yet because of facts dis-
covered years later, it is very probable that Evans did not murder his wife 
and child. 
2. Derek Bentley 
While the case of Evans was a potential failure of the British court sys-
tem, the case of Bentley was a failure of the government reprieve sys-
tem.151  Bentley was guilty, but his crime did not deserve death.152 
  
dence that Scott Henderson had accumulated in the time available he had come to some bizarre conclu-
sions.  Also, he did not seem to have addressed the possibility that if Christie had been lying at Evans’ 
trial—he had, after all, strangled at least six women and had a considerable criminal record—then 
Evans may have been telling the truth.”). 
 145. Id. at 154–55. 
 146. Id. at 155.  
 147. Id. at 154.  
 148. See Bailey, supra note 43, at 331 (“Ede was a moderate, cautious, and practical politician, cer-
tainly no innovator, and, as such, likely to listen to his permanent officials.  He tended to steer clear of 
controversy within the party, preferring the part of conciliator, and the capital punishment debate can-
not have been to his liking.  It is a telling point against him, moreover, that he was abolitionist both 
before and after his stint as home secretary, but retentionist when in office.”).  After refusing to give 
Timothy Evans a reprieve, Ede became a staunch abolitionist.  BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, 
at 154.  He later said that he made a mistake in the Evans case and “hoped that no future home secre-
tary would ever have to feel as he did: that he had done his best but had sent an innocent man to the 
gallows.”  Id. at 162.  Later, Lord Chuter Ede was instrumental in the vote in the House of Lords to 
abolish the death penalty.  Id. at 246. 
 149. Id. at 154. 
 150. Jesse, supra note 113, at lxxx–lxxxi. 
 151. POTTER, supra note 23, at 168. 
 152. There was no question of his guilt during trial and afterwards; however, questions of a mistrial 
based on the inaccurate summing up by the judge to the jury would come up many years later.  On 
appeal in 2001, the court found: 
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On November 2, 1952, policeman Sydney Miles was shot dead on the 
roof of a warehouse in London.  Christopher Craig, age sixteen, and Derek 
Bentley, age nineteen, would later be convicted of the murder of Miles, 
although Craig was the only one to shoot.153  The police were responding 
to a call from a neighbor who saw two suspicious young men climb over a 
gate and try to break in to a warehouse.154 
When the police arrived, the suspects were on the roof of the ware-
house and the police had to climb up the warehouse to apprehend them.  
Detective Fairfax was the first one up and he rushed over and grabbed 
Bentley.  Craig got away and Bentley allegedly yelled to Craig, “Let him 
have it, Chris,” which was followed by Craig shooting at Fairfax and injur-
ing him.155  When more officers arrived on the roof, they asked Fairfax 
what kind of gun he thought Craig had—to which Bentley allegedly inter-
jected: “He’s got a .45 Colt and plenty of bloody ammunition, too” and “I 
told the silly bugger not to use it.”156  A few more police went up to the 
roof via an internal staircase and when they opened the door that led to the 
roof, Craig fired at them, hitting Miles between the eyes, killing him in-
stantly.  The police then took Bentley down the stairs, to which Bentley 
shouted: “They’re taking me down, Chris.”  Craig fired once more and 
then jumped off the roof, fracturing his spine, breastbone, and left fore-
arm.157 
At trial, Bentley and Craig were tried simultaneously for murder.158  
The prosecution’s theory was that Bentley and Craig were on a joint ven-
ture; that Craig “deliberately and willfully murdered” Miles; that Bentley 
“incited Craig to begin the shooting; and, although technically under arrest 
at the time of the killing of Miles, was party to that murder and equally 
responsible in law.”159 
  
For all the reasons given in this section of the judgment we think that the conviction of the 
appellant was unsafe.  We accordingly allow the appeal and quash his conviction.  It must 
be a matter of profound and continuing regret that this mistrial occurred and that the defects 
we have found were not recognised at the time. 
R v. Bentley (Deceased), [2001] 1 Crim. App. 307, 332 (Eng.). 
 153. Id. at 308; BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 139–40. 
 154. Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 310–11. 
 155. Id. at 311.  There was some dispute at trial among the officers about how far away Craig was 
when he shot at Fairfax and how long a period elapsed after Bentley yelled “Let him have it, Chris” 
that Craig fired the gun.  The time varied between a few seconds and a matter of minutes depending on 
the testimony.  It was most likely under a minute.  Craig was also most likely six feet away from Fair-
fax when firing the gun.  Id. at 311–12. 
 156. Id. at 314. 
 157. Id. at 314–15. 
 158. Id. at 308–10. 
 159. Id. at 309.  The judge’s summing up on this law was: 
[W]here two people are engaged on a felonious enterprise,—and warehouse-breaking is a 
felony—and one knows that the other is carrying a weapon, and there is agreement to use 
such violence as may be necessary to avoid arrest, and this leads to the killing of a person or 
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Craig insisted at trial that the killing of Miles was only an accident and 
that, although he fired his weapon, he only intended to scare the police, and 
thus should only receive a manslaughter charge, not murder.160  However, 
under the doctrine of constructive malice (a few years later to be changed 
by the Homicide Act 1957), “malice aforethought sufficient to support a 
charge of murder was in certain circumstances imputed to a defendant who 
committed an act causing death in the course of committing a felony or 
when resisting an officer of justice.”161  This was one of those circum-
stances—the case against Craig was overwhelming and “any verdict other 
than guilty of murder in this case would have been perverse.”162  Craig was 
convicted of murder, but because he was only sixteen, was not sentenced to 
death.163 
Bentley’s case was a little more complicated.  His use of the phrase, 
“Let him have it, Chris” was thought to be a “deliberate incitement to mur-
der.”164  However, he denied saying this and all other phrases at trial.  He 
further said that he did not know Craig had a gun until the first shot was 
fired and did not know that they were going to break into a warehouse until 
Craig jumped over the gate.  Finally, Bentley did not participate in the 
murder—he was in fact in the custody of the police when Craig shot 
Miles.165  On the other hand, Bentley was found to have two knives in his 
  
results in the killing of a person, both are guilty of murder, and it is no answer for one to say 
I did not think my companion would go as far as he had. 
Id. at 328. 
 160. Id. at 309. 
 161. Id. at 327.  Constructive malice is the equivalent of felony murder in the United States. 
 162. Id. at 309.  Under constructive malice, even if Craig’s account was believed by the jury, he 
would still have no defense to murder.  Id. 
 163. Id. at 308; see also Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12 (Eng.). 
 164. Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 309.  Similarly, in a case decided in 1940, R v. Appleby, (1940) 
28 Crim. App. 1 (Eng.), the phrase “Let him have it” was used by the defendant before the other shot a 
police officer.  Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 312.  The facts were eerily similar to the present case.  
In that case, the defendants were committing the same offense, warehouse-breaking, and were surprised 
by police officers.  They attempted to escape, one of the defendants yelled “Let him have it,” and the 
other defendant killed one of the officers.  The only distinguishable fact seemed to be that neither 
defendant was in custody of the police when the shot was fired.  Id. at 329.  This coincidence was 
brought up at trial, that the police made up the piece of evidence of Bentley saying, “Let him have it, 
Chris” based on the Appleby case.  However, the court ruled that this was a common expression and 
there was no reliable evidence that the police were lying about that statement.  Id. at 312. 
Further, the 1991 British film, Let Him Have It, which gives a reasonably accurate description of 
the facts of the Bentley case, portrays the phrase “Let him have it” said by Bentley to mean that Bentley 
wanted Craig to let the policeman have the gun.  There is no proof of this meaning of the phrase, but it 
does make for a good film.  See id. at 313 (“[The phrase] could bear an innocent meaning, being an 
encouragement by the appellant to Craig to hand over his weapon.  That is admittedly an improbable 
construction if it was said when the appellant moved away from D.C. Fairfax . . . .”). 
 165. Id. at 310. 
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pockets,166 more than likely knew that Craig had a gun,167 and likely lied to 
the jury about his intentions.168  On December 11, 1952, the jury found 
Bentley guilty of murder by joint venture and because he was over eight-
een, he was sentenced to death.169  The jury recommended mercy, but that 
was up to the current British Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe.170 
A few days later, Bentley appealed his conviction, arguing that the law 
on joint venture did not apply to him and that the judge’s summing up was 
prejudicial to him.171  His appeal was dismissed on January 13, 1953172 and 
a week later, the home secretary announced that he would not give Bentley 
a reprieve, finding no sufficient grounds for one.173  This decision created 
much public unrest.  After Bentley’s arrest, an IQ test revealed that he was 
“borderline feeble-minded” with a score of seventy-seven, he was said to 
be illiterate, and his mental age was much lower than his actual age.174 
Despite pleas for mercy and demonstrations outside Parliament,175 
Bentley was executed on January 28, 1953.176  The public and politicians 
would not rest easy about this execution for over forty years—how could a 
  
 166. Id. at 316 (“Although he did not attempt at any time to make use of either of the weapons, his 
possession of them coupled with the decidedly feeble explanations for such possession could well have 
persuaded the jury that the pair of them had had violence in mind that night.”). 
 167. Id. at 313. 
 168. Id. at 316 (“The appellant faced the problem that the jury was likely to find that he had told 
some lies.  His evidence that he was wholly unaware that Craig was intent on any warehouse breaking 
until he climbed over the gate was difficult to reconcile with the evidence . . . and in our view unlikely 
to be believed.”). 
 169. Id. at 308. 
 170. Id. 
Goddard [the judge] had had no choice, fettered by the law, he had to sentence Bentley 
to death.  But in pointing out publicly that he would tell the home secretary how dangerous 
Craig was, and that he was the more guilty of the two, he was implicitly stating that Bentley 
had taken a lesser role.  Sir David Maxwell Fyfe had total, unfettered choice: he chose 
death. 
BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 142. 
 171. Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 316. 
 172. Id. at 308.  But see infra note 179 and accompanying text (finding that the judge’s summing up 
to the jury was unsound). 
 173. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 141–42 (“Of course, had he been inclined to find 
grounds there were plenty to be found: Bentley’s age, his mental age, the fact that he did not fire the 
shot and had no gun, the fact that he was under arrest when the shot was fired, and, not least, the jury’s 
recommendation for mercy.  Singly, any one of these could be considered as a ground, but collectively 
they could have been considered irresistible.”). 
 174. Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 337.  Tests done in 1948, when Bentley was fifteen years old, 
revealed that he had an IQ of sixty-six, a mental age of ten, and a reading age of four.  Id. at 335. 
 175. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 142 (“A demonstration of about 300 people gathered 
outside Parliament chanting ‘Bentley must not die’; they then marched to the Home Office and finally 
to Sir David’s home in Great Peter Street.”). 
 176. Id.; see also Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 308.  “Derek Bentley had to die for the sins of his 
generation, to deter other hoodlums from hiding their murderous intent behind perpetrators too young 
to hang. . . . He had been executed as an example, and had become a martyr.”  POTTER, supra note 23, 
at 168. 
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man be executed when he did not even pull the trigger?177  The fact that 
Bentley was hanged for being nineteen and being present at the scene in a 
joint venture, while Craig was only imprisoned, despite murdering the offi-
cer, because he was only sixteen years old seemed an injustice to most 
people. 
In 1993, Bentley was given a royal pardon for his sentence of death.178  
Later, in 2001, his case was reheard on appeal and it was found that there 
were significant problems with the judge’s summing up to the jury during 
his trial.179  As a result, Bentley’s conviction was quashed—a just end for 
an unjust execution.180 
  
 177. A similar case to Bentley’s almost occurred in the United States—the case of LaSamuel Gamble 
in Alabama.  Gamble was involved in an armed robbery in 1996 where his accomplice, Marcus 
Pressley, murdered the owner and employee of a pawnshop.  Gamble v. State, 791 So. 2d 409, 415–16 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000).  Both defendants were sentenced to death in 2000, but after Roper v. Simmons, 
which ruled the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles, Pressley, who was sixteen at the time of 
offense, had his sentence reduced to life imprisonment.  Gamble, 791 So. 2d at 416 n.1; A Question of 
Fairness, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 11, 2006, at 2 [hereinafter Fairness]. 
Unlike Bentley, Gamble was not in police custody at the time of the murder and was arguably 
more involved in the killings.  Nancy Wilstach, D.A. Backs Off Death Sentence Stance, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS, June 8, 2006, at 1 (“Owens [the prosecutor] described how calm Gamble appeared on the video-
tape and how he carefully picked up shell casings and then leaned over a railing to look at Burleson’s 
splattered brains without reacting.”).  However, video evidence conclusively proved that Gamble was 
not the triggerman.  Id.  Similar to Bentley, Gamble was on death row because he was nineteen at the 
time of offense, while his accomplice, who actually pulled the trigger, was not on death row because he 
was only sixteen.  Further, Gamble had no prior criminal convictions before he committed this robbery, 
while Pressley was wanted, and convicted, for a previous murder in addition to the two committed 
during the 1996 robbery.  Gamble, 791 So. 2d at 416 n.1; Appeals Panel Backs Death Row Verdicts, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 5, 2000, at 11.  After Pressley’s sentence was commuted to life, the prosecu-
tor for both defendants back in 2000 said he did not think that it is “fair to execute Gamble if Pressley 
can’t also be put to death.  ‘Both deserve to be on Death Row, but it is simple equity—it is not fair to 
leave the person on Death Row who didn’t kill anyone and take the person off Death Row who did.’”  
Fairness, supra. 
Thanks to the attorneys at the Southern Center for Human Rights, Gamble’s death sentence was 
reversed on September 7, 2007, based on the lesser sentence given to Pressley and an ineffective assis-
tance of council claim.  See Gamble v. State, No. CC-96-813.60 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 2007).  This 
decision has caused much controversy in Alabama—Troy King, the Alabama Attorney General, re-
moved the district attorney from the case who stated that it would not be fair to execute Gamble and 
has promised an appeal of the circuit court’s decision.  Nancy Wilstach, Shelby D.A. Gets Support After 
Blast by State A.G., BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 14, 2007, at 1; see also Kim Chandler, D.A. Group 
Leader Takes Aim at King Says A.G. ‘Has No Idea’ on Death Penalty Cases, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, 
Sept. 21, 2007, at 5; Troy King, Alabama Voices: DAs Wrong on Law, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, 
Sept. 27, 2007.  On this issue, the United States may be learning from England’s past mistakes. 
 178. Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. at 308. 
 179. Id. at 320–22, 327.  The court found problems with the judge’s statement of the standard of 
proof, statement of the burden of proof at trial, the balance of the summing up, and about the judge’s 
observations on the treatment of police evidence.  Id. 
The killing of PC Miles had, very understandably, aroused widespread public sympathy for 
the victim and his family and a strong sense of public outrage at the circumstances of his 
death.  This background made it more, not less, important that the jury should approach the 
issues in a dispassionate spirit if the defendants were to receive a fair trial, as the trial judge 
began by reminding them.  In our judgment, however, far from encouraging the jury to ap-
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3. Ruth Ellis 
If the executions of Evans and Bentley were not enough, after the exe-
cution of Ruth Ellis, the last woman to be executed in England, the British 
public had had enough.  Ruth Ellis was hanged for the impulsive murder of 
her ex-lover, David Blakely.  In France, such crime was called a “crime 
passionnel,” punishable by a sentence of two or three years imprisonment 
at most.181  Even at trial, Ruth Ellis did not deny her guilt, but that did not 
make her punishment fit her crime. 
On April 10, 1955, Ruth Ellis fired four shots from a pistol into the 
body of David Blakely, killing him outside of Magdala’s—a London pub-
lic house.182  The murder was in cold blood and there was no disputing 
Ellis’s intention—however, the story behind the murder is what makes it so 
fascinating. 
Ruth Ellis was a club hostess for most of her life—at an early age she 
learned that she could use her good looks to attract men and make 
money.183  It is at these clubs where she met most of her lovers throughout 
the years: the Canadian soldier Clare, her first love;184 George Ellis, the 
alcoholic dentist and her first husband;185 David Blakely, the man she 
would kill; and Desmond Cussen, the man that possibly gave her the gun.  
Of these last three relationships, Cussen was the only one who did not 
physically abuse Ruth—she seemed to be a magnet for abusive relation-
ships and was not unknown to hit back.186  Her relationship with Blakely 
was particularly violent.  They were known to quarrel with each other in 
public, yelling and hitting each other throughout their relationship.187  It 
was these violent encounters and Blakely’s infidelity that would drive Ellis 
to kill him—two of these encounters are worth mentioning here.188 
A few days before the murder, Ruth called Blakely, who was staying 
with his friends, the Findlaters, and allegedly heard a woman giggling on 
  
proach the case in a calm frame of mind, the trial judge’s summing up . . . had exactly the 
opposite effect. 
Id. at 327.  Although, the court also mentioned the following about Bentley’s conviction, if the sum-
ming up had been correct: “On the evidence presented to the court we conclude that a properly directed 
jury would have been entitled to convict.  The case against [Bentley] was, as it seems to us, a substan-
tial one, albeit not, in contrast to that of Craig, overwhelming.”  Id. at 316. 
 180. Id. at 332. 
 181. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 164. 
 182. Id. at 163–64; LAURENCE MARKS & TONY VAN DEN BERGH, RUTH ELLIS: A CASE OF 
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY? 87–88 (1977). 
 183. MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 13, 22, 41. 
 184. Id. at 10. 
 185. Id. at 29. 
 186. Id. at 30, 32. 
 187. Id. at 37. 
 188. Id. at 79–82, 122–23. 
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Blakely’s end of the line.  Having already suspected Blakely of cheating on 
her, hearing this made her furious.189  She immediately drove to the Find-
laters’s home, knocked on their door, and insisted on talking to Blakely.  
When no one answered, she broke the windows of his car.  The police were 
called, and Ellis was told to go home.190  This was not the first time some-
thing like this happened between the two of them, and it was not the last. 
On a second occasion, shortly after Ellis discovered she was pregnant, 
they got into another violent fight.  Blakely hit her, as he usually did, but 
this time struck her in the stomach.  Ellis would testify at trial that she 
would later miscarry—the likely reason being this incident with Blakely.191 
Desmond Cussen’s role in this story is disputed.  He and Ruth met 
when Blakely was on a trip in Europe—their affair was anything but ordi-
nary and developed into a fatal love triangle between Ellis, Blakely, and 
Cussen.192  It was disputed whether Cussen was involved in the murder of 
Blakely, as there was evidence that Cussen was the one who gave Ellis the 
gun, taught her how to hold it, trained her how to shoot it, and even drove 
her to the public house where she would murder Blakely.193  It was also 
disputed whether Cussen gave Pernod, a form of absinthe, to Ellis right 
before she was driven out to kill Blakely—which would have put her in a 
state of mind where she was not responsible for her actions.194 
This evidence, though, was not presented at her trial—it was said that 
Ellis’s trial was “one of the most one-sided legal battles that was ever to be 
heard in the famous number one court.”195  Ruth Ellis wanted it this way.  
She was guilty and wanted to die so she could be with the man she 
loved.196  During her confession, she lied about where she got the gun and 
did not mention Desmond Cussen at all.197  During his cross-examination 
of Ruth Ellis, Christmas Humphreys asked only one question, and the an-
  
 189. Id. at 82 (“And all the time whilst she had been doing everything he wanted, he had been sleep-
ing and playing about with other women.  There had been the usherette; the girl to whom he had be-
come engaged; the American model; several hostesses who were friends of Ruth, and when he had 
promised marriage, he had only been acting out a farce without any intention of keeping his prom-
ises.”). 
 190. Id. at 79–81. 
 191. Id. at 122–23. 
 192. Peter Williams, Epilogue to MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 164. 
 193. MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 41. 
 194. Id. at 42. 
 195. Id. at 105–06 (“For those that have never been to the Old Bailey, Number One Court resembles 
a television set with a fourth wall.  The judge’s bench dominates the setting.  To the right of this is the 
witness box and the jury and press boxes.  To the left sit counsel.  Above them, in the gods as it were, 
is the public gallery.  Directly beneath are the ‘City Lands,’ a collection of green leather upholstered 
benches to which admission is by ticket only.  These are usually reserved for relatives of counsel—both 
prosecuting and defending.  Opposite the judge’s bench is the vast dock in which the defendant is 
placed, and it is reached by stairs connecting the cells below.”). 
 196. Id. at 99. 
 197. Id. at 92–93. 
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swer was all he needed: “Mrs. Ellis, when you fired that revolver at close 
range into the body of David Blakely, what did you intend to do?”198  To 
which she replied: “It is obvious that, when I shot him, I intended to kill 
him.”199  This would be Humphrey’s shortest cross-examination ever and 
would cause the most damage.200  In one sentence, Ruth Ellis proved the 
prosecution’s case that she was guilty of murder. 
The jury deliberated for twenty-three minutes and came back with a 
verdict of guilty of murder.201  On June 21, 1955, after a two-day trial, Ellis 
was sentenced to death.202  She did not appeal her conviction.  She did not 
even want a reprieve; she just wanted to die.  It was not until a few days 
before her execution date that she finally thought about her son, and 
thought about staying alive.  By that time, it was too late.203 
As in the other two trials, there was much public unease about Ruth’s 
trial and death sentence.  Despite petitions signed by thousands of people 
delivered to the Home Office, the home secretary did not grant Ellis a last 
minute reprieve.204  The night before her execution hundreds of people 
gathered outside Holloway (HM Prison) demanding to see Ruth Ellis while 
chanting the phrase “Evans-Bentley-Ellis.”205  These people would not get 
  
 198. Williams, supra note 192, at 161.  Humphreys was also the prosecutor for the trials of Evans and 
Bentley.  MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 108. 
 199. Williams, supra note 192, at 161. 
 200. MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 125. 
 201. Id. at 130; BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 164. 
 202. R v. Ellis, [2003] EWCA (Crim.) 3556, [1] (Eng.). 
 203. MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 136.  Should Ellis’s counsel have pushed her to 
give more evidence at trial and forced her to appeal her conviction?  In the United States, the issue 
about who should have decisional control of criminal cases—the defendant or the lawyer—is still being 
debated.  In one article, Professor Chris Johnson gives arguments for both sides, and concludes that a 
rule where the lawyer has authority would be most fitting for criminal cases where the objective is the 
“discovery of truth” and where the lawyer generally will “recognize the best course of defense better 
than defendants.”  Christopher Johnson, The Law’s Hard Choice: Self-Inflicted Injustice or Lawyer-
Inflicted Indignity, 93 KY. L.J. 39, 132 (2004–05). 
In the balance of harms, the least damage is done by a rule committing all decisions to 
the lawyer, with the exception of those decisions invoking or waiving the adversary process 
and those decisions involving the defendant’s direct personal participation. So long as we 
rely on a system of adversary trials, and so long as prosecutors manage the government’s 
case unhindered by the commitment of decisions to victims or other emotionally-invested 
laypeople, maintenance of the system’s delicate partisan balance precludes giving to defen-
dants any greater authority to decide. 
Id. at 140–41.  Johnson notes that this is particularly true in capital cases in the United States, where 
defendants, for a variety of reasons, might not want to give evidence of mitigating circumstances to the 
jury to reduce their sentence from death to life imprisonment.  Id. at 136.  A rule where the lawyer has 
the right to choose what is best for the defendant may have helped Ruth Ellis either at trial, or after, to 
make an appeal or ask for a reprieve earlier. 
 204. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 164 (“Because of her age—she was 28—her children 
and the fact that the killing was impulsive rather than planned and, of course because she was a woman, 
there was a great deal of public sympathy for Ruth Ellis and many people believed that the home secre-
tary would relent at the last moment.”).  However, he did not relent.  Id. 
 205. Id.; MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 149. 
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their wish.  On July 13, 1955, Ruth Ellis, only twenty-eight years old, 
would become the last woman executed in England.206 
A few years later, the Homicide Act 1957 was passed in England—it 
introduced a doctrine of diminished responsibility that may have saved 
Ellis from the gallows had she committed her crime at a later date.207  As 
the Court of Appeal said in 2003, during a posthumous appeal of her con-
viction, “[i]f her crime were committed today, we think it likely that there 
would have been an issue of diminished responsibility for the jury to de-
termine but we are in no position to judge what the jury’s response to such 
an issue might be.”208  However, the court did not overturn her conviction, 
noting that “Ellis was properly convicted of murder according to the law at 
the time when she committed her offence.”209 
E. The Homicide Act 1957 and Final Attempts to Abolish 
1. The Royal Commission & Silverman’s Further Attempts 
In July 1953, during the time the Royal Commission on Capital Pun-
ishment (1949–1953) was determining possible modifications to the death 
penalty, Sydney Silverman introduced a bill to suspend the death penalty 
for five years.210  Silverman had new evidence that an innocent man was 
executed in Evans and wanted to take immediate action; however, many 
viewed his actions as premature because the royal commission’s report had 
not yet been published.211  Silverman’s motion failed in the House of Com-
mons by a vote of 256–195.212 
Finally, in September 1953, the royal commission’s report was pre-
sented to Parliament.  Since the report’s scope did not allow it to recom-
mend the abolition of capital punishment, it did not make this recommen-
  
 206. MARKS & VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 182, at 149. 
 207. R v. Ellis, [2003] EWCA (Crim.) 3556, [47], [89] (Eng.).  A British case of 1979 analyzed the 
doctrine of diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957 for the murder of a wife by a jeal-
ous husband.  R v. Vinagre, [1979] 69 Crim. App. 104 (Eng.).  In that case, a husband was convicted of 
murdering his wife after suspecting that she was cheating on him with a police officer.  Id. at 104–05.  
The defendant’s defense at trial was that he was suffering from “Othello syndrome,” a “morbid jeal-
ousy for which there was no cause.”  Id. at 105.  The court ruled that this satisfied the test under dimin-
ished responsibility as long as it could be proven that the husband’s jealousy would not be a recurring 
illness.  Id. at 107.  Thus, the defense of jealousy as a mental imbalance was used to successfully lower 
the defendant’s conviction to manslaughter.  Id.  Looking at the facts of Ruth Ellis’ case, it would seem 
that her case would fall under this theory as well, and her sentence could have been manslaughter under 
the Homicide Act 1957. 
 208. Id. at [89] (Eng.). 
 209. Id. (emphasis added). 
 210. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 145. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 146. 
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dation, although one could assume that abolition was the position the com-
missioners were taking.213  The report was 500 pages long and made many 
recommendations.  It recommended that the power to give the death sen-
tence should rest with the jury and the jury should allow for extenuating 
circumstances to justify a lesser sentence than death in individual cases.  It 
also recommended that England’s insanity rules should be changed so that 
the jury could decide if the defendant was of unsound mind and that lethal 
injection should be looked into as a possible substitute for hanging.214  Fi-
nally, it recommended, once again, that the minimum age for hanging 
should be raised from eighteen to twenty-one.  On the issue of deterrence, 
the report stated that there was no statistical evidence that existed showing 
that the death penalty actually deterred murder.215 
Silverman demanded a debate in the Commons; a debate in the House 
of Lords occurred in December, in which the Lords, as expected, rejected 
all recommendations of the report.216  Almost two years went by before 
Parliament seriously considered the report’s findings.217 
In February 1955, the Commons finally debated the royal commission 
report.  After a long debate, all the report’s recommendations were re-
jected.218  The debate then turned to the abolition of the death penalty.  
Silverman, for the third time, introduced an amendment that would tempo-
rarily abolish the death penalty for five years.  At the forefront of the dis-
cussion was the issue of miscarriages of justice and the fact that there was 
  
 213. POTTER, supra note 23, at 159.  Referring to the Commissioners, the author indicated:  
They had looked for a compromise and found none.  In so doing they had rendered the divi-
sion between retention and outright abolition all the starker.  Only with abolition, they 
seemed to be hinting, would all the anomalies and ambiguities of the present system, which 
the Commission had been set up to rectify, be put right. 
Id.  Sir Ernest Gowers, chairman of the Commission, entered the Commission with no feelings either 
way toward the death penalty, but ended as an abolitionist.  Id. 
 214. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 151. 
 215. Id.; see also POTTER, supra note 23, at 158 (“the commissioners came down as near as they 
could in favour of abolition, but ultimately could only tinker with the edifice of the criminal law”) 
(emphasis added).  The report rejected electrocution and the gas chamber as alternative methods.  It 
also rejected separating murder into two degrees and giving the judge discretion to impose the death 
sentence.  Finally, the report recommended abolishing the doctrine of constructive malice, the English 
common law doctrine where a killing committed during the act of another felony was deemed to be 
murder.  BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 151; POTTER, supra note 23, at 158. 
 216. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 152–54. 
 217. Id. at 160. 
 218. Id. at 160–63.  The first two recommendations, jury discretion to impose the death sentence and 
alternative insanity rules, were both rejected as unworkable.  The minimum age increase was rejected 
because the murder rate for young men between seventeen and twenty-one was very high at the time.  
Id. at 161.  The method of lethal injection was also rejected for three main reasons: (1) likely complica-
tions due to physical abnormalities of the inmates, (2) non-cooperation of the inmates, and (3) non-
cooperation of the medical profession, whose expertise was needed to successfully implement the 
procedure.  See Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at Constitutional 
Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 445, 451–52 (2007). 
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no proof that society would be harmed by abolition—that there was no 
evidence that an equally effective deterrent did not exist.219  Silverman’s 
amendment was again rejected in the Commons by a vote of 245–214.220 
2. The Homicide Act 1957 
In February 1956, the Commons once again debated the issue of capi-
tal punishment.221  Many MPs still did not believe an innocent man could 
be executed in England, stating that the risk was unlikely to occur because 
“the same mistake would have to be made by the police, the judge, the 
Court of Criminal Appeal and the home secretary. . . . If there was a scin-
tilla of doubt the home secretary would recommend a reprieve.”222  The 
other issues debated were deterrence, of course, and retribution: “[T]he 
reservation of the gravest punishment for the gravest crime” should be 
reserved for those who murder, to show the country’s abhorrence to that 
crime.223 
This time, Chuter Ede introduced an amendment that would suspend 
the death penalty for an experimental period.  To everyone’s surprise, the 
amendment passed after a free vote in the Commons by 293 votes to 262.  
Forty-eight Conservative MPs voted for the bill along with almost all the 
Labour MPs.224  The Conservative government now had to introduce legis-
lation for the abolition of the death penalty—a proposal which it did not 
believe in.225  Instead of introducing its own bill, the government strategi-
cally decided to resurrect Silverman’s Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill, 
which would suspend the death penalty for ten years.226 
  
 219. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 162–63.  Further, the fact that the death penalty pre-
sents a potential brutalization effect on society was brought up in the debate, since details about execu-
tions were published in newspapers around the country in depth.  Id. 
 220. Id. at 163. 
 221. Id. at 172. 
 222. Id. at 173. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 175.  Only seven Labour MP’s, out of over 200, did not vote for the amendment (MP: 
Member of Parliament).  Id.; see also POTTER, supra note 23, at 173; Christoph, supra note 111, at 27. 
 225. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 175. 
 226. Id. at 175–76.  This action by the government was its best remaining option to retain the death 
penalty: 
Two courses were open to the Government.  It could follow the expressed sentiment of the 
Commons by bringing in its own bill embodying the principle of abolition and giving it the 
full weight of its authority through all stages in both Houses, or it could refuse to sponsor 
legislation designed to implement a policy it considered abhorrent but instead give facilities 
to the almost-forgotten Silverman abolition bill that was now at the foot of the Private 
Members’ Bill queue.  To choose the second option would give the House a chance to carry 
an abolition bill forward, but at the same time it would deprive the measure of the usual 
whipping machinery and, if it passed the Commons at all, leave it defenseless in the Lords.  
After some soul-searching, the Government finally chose the latter course, exhumed the 
Silverman bill, gave it Government time, and promised a free vote on all its stages. 
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A second reading of Silverman’s bill was passed in the Commons by a 
vote of 286–262.227  The bill survived its third reading by a vote of 152–
133 and was on its way to the House of Lords.228  The main debate of the 
bill in the Lords focused on the death penalty’s deterrent effect.  Most peo-
ple still considered the death penalty to be an effective deterrent to mur-
der.229 
Public opinion polls released in 1956 also showed strong public sup-
port for the death penalty’s retention—although the percentage of the pub-
lic in support of the death penalty had declined.  Opinion polls in 1956 
showed support for the trial suspension of the death penalty at thirty-four 
percent.  This was up from thirteen percent in 1948.  Disapproval of sus-
pension had also declined from sixty-nine percent in 1948 to forty-five 
percent in 1956.230  Nevertheless, the abolition of the death penalty was 
again stopped in the House of Lords—the bill was rejected by a vote of 
238–95.231 
The government now had two options: it could reintroduce 
Silverman’s bill for another free vote in the Commons or it could introduce 
its own legislation, retaining the death penalty but amending it.232  This 
time, the government chose the second option.233  The government intro-
duced the Homicide Bill, a “skilful, lawful, desperate and shameful attempt 
by the government to scupper Silverman’s Bill and override the will of the 
Commons.”234  However shameful, the attempt worked and the Homicide 
Bill passed both houses of Parliament and became law in 1957.235 
The Homicide Act 1957 separated murder into two degrees—capital 
and non-capital.  It retained the death penalty for six types of murder: (1) 
murder done in the furtherance of theft, (2) murder by shooting or explo-
sion, (3) murder done in resisting arrest or escaping custody, (4) murder of 
a police officer, (5) murder of a prison officer by a prisoner, and (6) mur-
der of more than one person.  All other murders were punishable by life 
  
Christoph, supra note 111, at 27–28. 
 227. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 177. 
 228. Id. at 181 (“There were handshakes and back-slapping all round for Silverman, for his skilful 
handling and what many believed his ultimate victory.”). 
 229. Id. at 182–83. 
 230. POTTER, supra note 23, at 179; Christoph, supra note 111, at 27. 
 231. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 184; Christoph, supra note 111, at 28. 
 232. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 186; Christoph, supra note 111, at 28. 
 233. Christoph, supra note 111, at 28–29 (“The situation had gone so far that it had become essen-
tially a question of who was to make policy in this area—the majority party or a coalition of back-
benchers.  Once the nation’s political leaders came to see the problem in this light, they soon decided to 
bring in their own bill and give it top priority, and easily discovered ways to carry along the abolition-
ists on their side.”). 
 234. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 191. 
 235. Id. at 196; see also Christoph, supra note 111, at 31. 
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imprisonment.236  It also introduced three defenses to a charge of murder 
that, if successful, would lower the charge to manslaughter: provocation, 
diminished responsibility, and suicide pact.237 
3. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 
In the 1964 general election, the Labour Party won a majority of fif-
teen seats over the Conservatives in the Commons.238  Further, two well-
known abolitionists were appointed to prominent positions in government: 
Gerald Gardiner239 was appointed Lord Chancellor,240 and Sir Frank 
Soskice was named home secretary.241  It was only a few months before 
another bill to abolish the death penalty was debated in the Commons.242 
During the period since the Homicide Act 1957 became law and the 
election of 1964, twenty-nine people were executed under the Act—an 
average of three to four people a year.243  If anything, the Act helped show 
the arbitrariness of the death penalty in England, and even produced some 
notable findings on deterrence: 
[The Act] was not having the desired and expected deterrent effect 
on those categories of murder which were still capital.  The 1961 
Government Red Book, Murder, showed that the proportion of 
capital murders had gone up from 12.1% in 1952 to 18.7% in 
1960.  Nor had the fears of those who predicted an increase in the 
murder rate as a result of partial abolition been realised.  The Red 
Book showed no increase in murder and manslaughter on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility since 1957.  Indeed the pro-
portion of non-capital murders declined from 87.9% in 1952 to 
81.3% in 1960.244 
  
 236. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 (Eng.); see also Bailey, supra note 43, at 346 n.101. 
 237. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 (Eng.); see also BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, 
at 190 (“The first part of the Bill would abolish the doctrine of constructive malice and deal with the 
legal effects of provocation.  Killing as part of a suicide pact would become manslaughter rather than 
murder.”). 
 238. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 230. 
 239. As Lord Chancellor, Gardiner gave a key speech during the debate of the Murder (Abolition of 
Death Penalty) Bill in the House of Lords that led to a vote for a second reading.  This eventually led to 
the bill becoming law, abolishing the death penalty for murder in England.  Id. at 246–47. 
 240. “The Lord Chancellor sits in the House of Lords and presides over its proceedings from her or 
his position on the woolsack.”  BBC News—Lord Chancellor, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/ 
82530.stm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
 241. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 230. 
 242. Id. at 234–35.  
 243. POTTER, supra note 23, at 192. 
 244. Id. at 191–92. 
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In December 1964, Silverman presented a bill to the Commons for the 
abolition of capital punishment in England.245  The Murder (Abolition of 
Death Penalty) Bill passed through its second reading in the Commons by 
a vote of 355–170.246  The bill was both an achievement for Silverman and 
the British Labour Party.247  At the committee stage of the bill, it was 
pointed out that nearly seventy percent of the public still favored the death 
penalty.  This was quickly brushed aside, though, as it was said that “the 
public had no great depth of understanding of the problems surrounding 
the death penalty” and therefore, in essence, their opinion did not matter.248 
Despite a few minor problems in committee, the bill went to its third 
reading debate in the Commons, where it was carried by a vote of 200–
98.249  Later that same day the bill was taken to the House of Lords and 
read for the first time.  During the debate, the main issues on the table were 
deterrence, retribution, and public opinion.  This time, however, the Lords 
voted 204–104 for a second reading, and later passed the bill.250  On No-
vember 8, 1965, the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 re-
ceived royal assent and became law.251  It abolished the death penalty for 
all crimes except high treason and piracy with violence for a temporary 
period of five years.252  For all extensive purposes, the death penalty was 
finally abolished in England.253 
However, the death penalty debate was far from finished.  Public opin-
ion polls taken shortly after the death penalty was abolished showed that as 
high as eighty-five percent of the public favored reinstating hanging.254  
Perhaps this is why it was decided that before the temporary period ended, 
the abolition issue would once again be debated in Parliament.  It was de-
cided to debate it one year early so it would not become an election issue 
in 1970.255  Home Secretary James Callaghan256 led the debate in the 
  
 245. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 234. 
 246. Id. at 239.  
 247. Id. at 238–39 (“The debate on the second reading lasted for seven hours.  It was opened by 
Sydney Silverman who spoke for 74 minutes without notes.  He admitted that he had nothing new to 
say as all the arguments had been advanced many times before, and concluded by asking whether it 
was worth taking so much trouble over a Bill which might save two lives a year in a century that had 
already killed 80 million, and answering by saying ‘We can at least light this small candle and see how 
far its tiny gleam can penetrate the gloom.’”).  Id. at 239. 
 248. Id. at 240. 
 249. Id. at 244–45. 
 250. Id. at 246–48. 
 251. Id. at 249; POTTER, supra note 23, at 202. 
 252. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.). 
 253. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 249 (“The whole ghastly business was finished.”); 
Bailey, supra note 43, at 346 (“The shadow of the gallows no longer fell across the land.”). 
 254. POTTER, supra note 23, at 202. 
 255. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 262. 
 256. See Callaghan, supra note 103, at vii–viii (“I cannot say that . . . hanging had impinged on my 
thinking, and it was only when I reached Parliament in 1945 and was confronted by the need to take a 
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Commons and the vote to eliminate the five-year experimental period was 
carried 343–185.257  Lord Gardiner led the debate in the Lords and the ex-
perimental period once and for all was eliminated.  The Murder (Abolition 
of Death Penalty) Act 1965 became permanent in 1969.258 
4. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
Thirteen attempts were made after 1965 to reinstate the death penalty 
in England.  Two notable attempts were the attempt to reinstate the death 
penalty for acts of terrorism in 1982 and the murder of a child in 1987.259  
These attempts were defeated  
for the same reasons that the Homicide Act was scrapped; namely 
that to pick one or two classes of murder out as deserving of death, 
when there might be equally heinous offenses committed in cate-
gories of murder not subject to capital punishment, would inevita-
bly produce anomalies and a sense of injustice.260 
A number of wrongful convictions also helped keep the death penalty 
from being reinstated.  In 1974, a number of bombings by the IRA in re-
sponse to “Bloody Sunday” put British police under a lot of pressure to 
find those responsible.261  In October 1974, bombings of public houses in 
  
position, that I concluded that hanging should be abolished.  In the debates of 1948, I voted for aboli-
tion for the first time and after that decision, did so steadily thereafter, whenever the issue came before 
the House.”).  Lord Callaghan was also home secretary in 1965 when the death penalty was abolished 
temporarily for five years.  Id. 
 257. BLOCK & HOSTETTLER, supra note 15, at 266. 
 258. Id. at 267; POTTER, supra note 23, at 203. 
 259. HOOD, supra note 86, at 26; Robin Oakley, Parliament: Tory MPs Call for a New Look at the 
Death Penalty, TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 1986 (“More than 50 Tory MPs, led by the former Solicitor 
General, Sir Ian Percival, backed a Commons motion last night calling for another look at the reintro-
duction of the death penalty. . . . But, although the Prime Minister favours the death penalty, there is 
little prospect of any change in the law. . . . In July 1979, shortly after Mr Airey Neave was murdered 
by IRA terrorists, blown up in the Commons car park, the call for the return of the death penalty was 
defeated by 362 votes to 243, a majority of 119.”).  The Bill that would have made the killing of a child 
a capital offense was defeated by a vote of 175–110.  Parliament: Hanging Bill Is Rejected, TIMES 
(London), Jan. 14, 1987; see also MPs Reject Hanging by 123 Votes; Parliament, TIMES (London), 
June 8, 1988 (“MPs rejected the reintroduction of capital punishment. . . . The debate came during the 
report stage of the Criminal Justice Bill when Mr. Roger Gale . . . moved a clause to introduce capital 
punishment as the maximum sentence for murder and providing for juries to recommend the punish-
ment.”); Philip Webster, Death Penalty Rejected by 112 Majority, TIMES (London), Apr. 2, 1987 (“The 
House of Commons decisively rejected the restoration of capital punishment last night, with a 112-vote 
majority against introducing the death penalty for ‘evil’ murders.  Loud cheers greeted the announce-
ment of the sound rejection, by 342 votes to 230, of the second attempt by Conservative backbenchers 
in the present Parliament to restore capital punishment.”). 
 260. HOOD, supra note 86, at 26. 
 261. Lord Scarman, Justice in the Balance, TIMES (London), Mar. 5, 1991.  On January 30, 1972, 
British troops opened fire on Catholic civilians in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, killing thirteen 
people, an event later known as “Bloody Sunday.”  Army Kills Thirteen in Civil Rights Protest, BBC 
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Guildford and Woolwich killed seven people and injured eighty-nine.262  
Seven weeks later, in November, two more bombings of public houses in 
Birmingham killed twenty-one people and injured 150.263  The police ar-
rested four people, later called the “Guildford Four,” in connection with 
the Guildford bombings and six people, later called the “Birmingham Six,” 
in connection with the Birmingham bombings.  The ten men were con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment based on questionable forensic 
evidence, police testimony, and confessions.264 
In 1989, after fourteen years in prison, all of the Guildford Four’s con-
victions were quashed and they were freed.265  Evidence later suggested 
that the police had lied during their trial and that the confessions were false 
due to brutal police interrogations of the four.266  In 1991, the Birmingham 
Six were freed after sixteen years in prison based on similar evidence.267  
These ten men, including others, probably would have been sentenced to 
death and executed if the punishment was available.268 
The most recent debate on the reinstatement of the death penalty for 
murder occurred in 1994.269  The death penalty for all murders was rejected 
in the Commons by a vote of 403–159; it was also rejected for the murder 
  
NEWS, Jan. 30, 1972, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/30/newsid_2452000/ 
2452145.stm. 
 262. Lord Devlin & Lord Scarman, Justice and the Guildford Four; Alleged IRA Bombers, TIMES 
(London), Nov. 30, 1988; Richard Ford et al., Guildford Pub Bomb Police Face Charges, TIMES (Lon-
don), Oct. 18, 1989. 
 263. Devlin & Scarman, supra note 262.  
 264. Id.; Long Road of the Law; Birmingham Six, TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 1991; see also Devlin & 
Scarman, supra note 262 (“It is the task of the police to first find suspects and then to find the evidence 
that will convict them.  When they arrested the [Guildford Four] they had been searching for seven 
weeks during which the murders multiplied, the most shocking being at Birmingham on 21 November 
when 21 persons were killed and 150 injured.  The police were under the pressure of events to get 
results and, when they arrested the Guildford Four, they still had nothing.”). 
 265. Richard Ford et al., Appeal Reform Hint as Hill Is Free on Bail; Guildford Pub Bombings, 
TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 1989; Frances Gibb et al., Three Bomb Case Police Suspended; Guildford 
Pub Bombings, TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 1989.  
 266. Devlin & Scarman, supra note 262; Frances Gibb et al., supra note 265. 
 267. See Stewart Tendler, Judges Accuse Birmingham Six Police of Lying in Court, TIMES (London), 
Mar. 28, 1991; An Urgent Commission, TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 1991. 
 268. Hanging Is Laid to Rest Once and for All, Say MPs; Parliament, TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 1989 
(“The argument for capital punishment has been laid to rest once and for all by the miscarriage of 
justice for the Guildford Four, MPs said after the Home Secretary’s statement.”); Lord Scarman, A 
Safer Kind of Justice; Review of Legal System, TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 1989 (“First, thank God and 
Parliament for the abolition of the death penalty for murder.  Had it existed in 1975, some, if not all, of 
the Guildford Four would have been hanged.  The posthumous righting of a cruel wrong is not good 
enough.  How many people today remember the case of Timothy Evans, executed for a crime the 
murder of his baby which he did not commit?”). 
The Maguire Seven and Judith Ward were also released after many years in prison for terrorist 
offenses which they did not commit.  Richard Ford, “I Was Weak and Immature, a Bit of an Idiot”; 
Judith Ward, TIMES (London), June 5, 1992 (spending eighteen years in prison before released); see 
also An Urgent Commission, supra note 267. 
 269. HOOD, supra note 86, at 26. 
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of a police officer by a vote of 383–186.270  The main issues debated were 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty and the possibility of miscarriages 
of justice.271  The home secretary at the time, Conservative Michael How-
ard, who previously voted to restore the death penalty, changed his mind in 
this last debate, citing the recent cases of miscarriages of justice.272 
In 1986, an amendment to the Armed Forces Bill abolishing the death 
penalty for military offenses was rejected in the House of Lords by a vote 
of 116–76.273  In 1991, another attempt to abolish the death penalty for 
military offenses of “mutiny, serious misconduct in action and other seri-
ous wartime offences” was rejected in the Commons, 228–124.274 
Further, public opinion still favored reinstating capital punishment for 
murder.  According to one survey, sixty-six percent of the British public 
was in favor of the death penalty for murder in 1985; sixty-one percent in 
1990.275  The Police Federation in England overwhelmingly was in favor of 
bringing back capital punishment for murder as well.276  Nevertheless, in 
May 1998, the House of Commons voted 294–136 in a free vote to adopt 
two clauses of a European protocol that would abolish the death penalty in 
England completely.277  The resulting Crime and Disorder Act 1998 put an 
end to the death penalty in England for good, since reinstatement of capital 
punishment would now require England to denounce the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the treaties of the European Union.278 
III.  THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
A recent study . . . has confirmed that the American people know 
little about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an informed 
public would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of 
the consequences and effects of the death penalty.279 
  
 270. Id. 
 271. Alice Thomson, Commons Rejects Return of Death Penalty for Killers; Politics & Government, 
TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 1994, at 9. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Parliament: Death Penalty Retained, TIMES (London), May 20, 1986. 
 274. Forces Death Penalty to Remain; Parliament, TIMES (London), June 18, 1991. 
 275. HOOD, supra note 86, at 26 n.14. 
 276. Stewart Tendler, Police Reaffirm Support for Hanging, TIMES (London), May 22, 1992, at 3. 
 277. Andrew Pierce, Rebel MPs Rule Out Hanging, TIMES (London), May 21, 1998, at 2. 
 278. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37 (Eng.); see also HOOD, supra note 86, at 24. 
 279. Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
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A. Early History 
The earliest known set of capital offenses in the United States dates 
back to 1636, from the Massachusetts Bay Colony: 
This early codification, titled “The Capitall Lawes of New-
England,” lists in order the following crimes: idolatry, witchcraft, 
blasphemy, murder (“manslaughter, committed upon premeditate 
malice, hatred, or cruelty, not in a man’s necessary and just de-
fense, nor by mere casualtie, against his will”), assault in sudden 
anger, sodomy, buggery, adultery, statutory rape, rape (punishment 
of death optional), man-stealing, perjury in a capital trial, and re-
bellion (including attempts and conspiracies).  Each of these 
crimes was accompanied in the statute with an Old Testament text 
as its authority.280 
Massachusetts would later reduce this list to nine capital offenses by 1785.  
On the other hand, states such as North Carolina had a much stricter capital 
code.  Even in 1837, North Carolina required the death penalty for stealing 
bank notes, dueling if death ensues, concealing a slave with intent to free 
him, the second offense of forgery, or circulating seditious literature 
among slaves, among the more typical capital offenses.281 
The Southern colonies during the early years of our history typically 
had more capital offenses than the Northern colonies.  Since property was 
distributed similarly as that of England and “Southerners also tended to 
come from regions of England that were more violent than the regions 
from which northerners emigrated,” the Southern colonies followed the 
same capital code as England during the 1600s and 1700s.282 
The types of capital offenses often varied as well—because of the reli-
gious origins of many of the Northern colonies, many of the capital crimes 
were for crimes against morality.283  In the South, because of the large 
number of slaves, “[h]arsh punishments were obviously useful to those in 
power for disciplining a captive labor force.”284  Hence, it was a capital 
offense for a slave to burn or destroy any manufactured good, entice other 
slaves to run away, or to maim or bruise whites.  In Virginia, it was even a 
capital crime for a slave to prepare or administer medicine.285 
  
 280. Hugo Adam Bedau, General Introduction to THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5 (Hugo Adam 
Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). 
 281. Id. at 6–7.  
 282. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (2002). 
 283. Id. at 6.  Examples of these offenses included blasphemy, idolatry, sodomy, and bestiality.  Id. 
 284. Id. at 9. 
 285. Id.  
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However, by the time of the Revolutionary War, when England’s 
Bloody Code listed over 200 capital crimes, the colonies recognized only 
the following crimes as capital offenses: murder, treason, piracy, arson, 
rape, robbery, burglary, sodomy, counterfeiting, horse-theft, and slave re-
bellion.286  History indicates that “capital punishment was carried from 
Europe to America but, once here, was tempered considerably.”287 
Around the same time Dickens and England were debating about 
whether the death penalty should be performed in public or private, Michi-
gan became the first jurisdiction in modern times to completely abolish the 
death penalty for murder.288  Six years later, in 1852, Rhode Island abol-
ished the death penalty for all crimes, as did Wisconsin in 1853.289  Four 
other states abolished the death penalty during the 1800s: Iowa, Colorado, 
and Kansas in 1872 and Maine in 1876.  Each of these states restored it 
shortly after, though, and only Maine completely abolished the death pen-
alty again in 1887.290 
By the start of the twentieth century, four states had abolished the 
death penalty for all practical purposes (Michigan, Rhode Island, Maine, 
and Wisconsin) and many more states strictly limited its use.  However, the 
disparity between North and South became much wider.  While the North-
ern states were abandoning the death penalty or limiting its use, the South-
ern states still used capital punishment for a wide range of offenses.291  
Slavery caused the South to not debate the imposition of capital punish-
ment and “produced a wide cultural gap between the northern and southern 
states in attitudes toward capital punishment.”292 
Four reforms to the death penalty in the United States helped to temper 
it and maintain its use, even in the Northern states: (1) the use of more hu-
mane methods of execution, (2) the prohibition of public executions to 
protect the public from exposure to the death penalty, (3) the development 
of “degrees” of murder where only the highest degree of murder received 
  
 286. Bedau, supra note 280, at 6. 
 287. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 341 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 288. Id. at 338; see also HOOD, supra note 86, at 9; POTTER, supra note 23, at 71.  Michigan still 
retained the death penalty for treason—they completely abolished the death penalty in 1963.  HOOD, 
supra note 86, at 63. 
 289. Furman, 408 U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Bedau, supra note 280, at 9.  Rhode 
Island would restore the death penalty in 1882 for the murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence—
they would completely abolish it again in 1984.  HOOD, supra note 86, at 63. 
 290. Furman, 408 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Bedau, supra note 280, at 10.  
Maine restored the death penalty in 1883, Iowa restored it in 1878, and Colorado restored it only a few 
years after abolishing it.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Bedau, supra 
note 280, at 10.  Kansas abolished the death penalty by law in 1907 and later restored it in 1935.  
Furman, 408 U.S. at 339, 339 n.72 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 291. BANNER, supra note 282, at 143. 
 292. Id. 
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the death penalty, and (4) the use of jury discretion to choose the death 
penalty instead of the mandatory sentence of death.293  It is disputed 
whether these were actual improvements to the death penalty, but there is 
no question that these modifications allowed the death penalty to remain a 
part of criminal law during the early years of this country. 
The most common form of execution in the early years of the colonies 
and the United States was hanging.294  However, even in the eighteenth 
century, the death penalty was also inflicted by pressing to death, drawing 
and quartering, and burning at the stake.295  In 1888, the electric chair was 
introduced in New York “on the theory that in all respects, scientific and 
humane, executing a condemned man by electrocution was superior to 
executing him by hanging.”296  In 1890, after the Supreme Court declared it 
constitutional, William Kemmler was the first to die by electrocution.297  
The electric chair would continue to be a popular method of execution, 
used by as many as twenty-four states by the 1960s.298  Along with the 
methods of firing squad,299 hanging, and electrocution, Nevada introduced 
the gas chamber in 1921.300  These methods were the most widely used 
  
 293. Bedau, supra note 280, at 15. 
 294. Id. at 6. 
 295. Id. at 15.  These punishments would practically disappear by 1789 and were never really popular 
in the States.  Id. at 16–17.  The punishment of pressing to death, in particular, was rarely used: 
Originally, the purpose of peine forte et dure (pressing to death) was to force an ac-
cused person to plead to an indictment.  Such tactics became necessary because anyone who 
refused to plead to a felony indictment (that is, refused to plead either guilty or innocent) 
could avoid forfeiture even if he was later found guilty.  The effect of pressing on an unco-
operative accused was, and was intended to be, fatal.  As early as 1426, pressing was used in 
England, though it never seems to have enjoyed wide popularity with the courts.  Its sole re-
corded use in this country seems to have been during the notorious Salem witchcraft trials, 
in 1692, when one Giles Cory was pressed to death for refusal to plead to the charge of 
witchcraft. 
Id. at 15–16. 
 296. Id. at 17. 
 297. Id.; see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (upholding New York’s finding that 
while electrocution may be unusual because it had never been used before, it was not cruel because it 
was a more humane method than hanging); infra Part II(B)(1). 
 298. Bedau, supra note 280, at 18.  Nine states still allow death by electrocution today, even when 
new studies and several botched executions have put in to doubt the constitutionality of this punish-
ment.  In fact, the Nebraska Supreme Court recently declared the electric chair “cruel and unusual 
punishment” on February 8, 2008—Nebraska was the only state requiring that method of execution.  
Adam Liptak, Nebraska’s Top Court Forbids Electrocution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at A9; Death 
Penalty Information Center, Methods of Execution, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arti-
cle.php?scid=8&did =245 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).  No method of execution is currently in place for 
the death penalty now in Nebraska.  Liptak, supra. 
 299. Death by shooting was used for certain military offenses, and after Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 
130, 134–35 (1878), its use was held constitutional as a method of execution for all offenses.  Bedau, 
supra note 280, at 16–17 n.24. 
 300. See Bedau, supra note 280, at 18 (“Not satisfied with shooting, hanging, or electrocution, the 
Nevada legislature passed a bill in 1921 to provide that a condemned person should be executed in his 
cell, while asleep and without any warning, with a dose of lethal gas. . . . Nothing much was done one 
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execution methods in the United States until lethal injection was intro-
duced in 1977, used in all but one state today.301 
Public executions were also popular during the early history of the 
United States, as capital punishment was thought to serve three main pur-
poses: deterrence, retribution, and repentance.302  This was the reason for 
having speedy trials and short periods between trial and execution—if the 
crime was still in the memory of the community, the purposes of deter-
rence and retribution were fulfilled.303  Further, making an execution a 
public spectacle was typically thought to deter people from committing 
crimes.304  Finally, executions were thought to expedite a criminal’s repen-
tance of their sins, so therefore public executions always had a religious 
aspect to them.305 
In 1830, Connecticut became the first state to prohibit public execu-
tions, with Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Massa-
chusetts, and New Hampshire all following suit by 1836.  Other states, 
however, especially those in the South, would not prohibit public execu-
tions until many years later.306  For example, in 1878 in Wilkerson v. Utah, 
the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional public shooting as a valid 
method of execution.307  In fact, the last recorded public execution in the 
United States was not until 1936.308  Even today, a limited number of wit-
nesses, including families of the accused and the victim are allowed to 
  
way or the other until one Gee Jon was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.  When the 
Nevada Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of lethal gas, a chamber was hurriedly constructed 
after practical obstacles were discovered in the original plan for holding the execution in the prisoner’s 
cell.  On February 8, 1924, Jon became the first person to be legally executed with a lethal dose of 
cyanide gas.”).  The gas chamber is still used by five states today.  Death Penalty Information Center, 
Methods of Execution, supra note 298. 
 301. Death Penalty Information Center, Part I: History of the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpe-
naltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did=410 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).  Oklahoma introduced the 
method of lethal injection in 1977, which is the most common method of execution used today.  It was 
first used in Texas in 1982.  Id. 
 302. BANNER, supra note 282, at 23. 
 303. Id. at 16 (“The link between cause and effect, between the commission of the crime and the 
imposition of the death sentence, was made as conspicuous as it could be.”). 
 304. Id. at 10. 
 305. Id. at 16. 
 306. Id. at 154. 
 307. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 131; see also infra Part II(B)(1). 
 308. Bedau, supra note 280, at 21. 
The execution that drew the greatest attention, and the one that ended the practice of 
public hanging in the United States, was that of Rainey Bethea, hanged for rape in Owens-
boro, Kentucky, in the summer of 1936.  Estimates of the crowd ran between ten and twenty 
thousand.  The town’s hotels were so full that thousands had to camp out overnight at the 
execution site.  Hot dog and drink vendors set up near the gallows.  Spectators jeered 
throughout, even while Bethea prayed.  As soon as the trap was sprung, before Bethea had 
been pronounced dead, souvenir hunters tore off pieces of the hood that covered his face.  
The event gave rise to a whirlwind of criticism in the national press. 
BANNER, supra note 282, at 156. 
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watch an execution.309  However, switching from public to private execu-
tions was generally seen as a better way to carry out the death penalty. 
Another modification to the death penalty in the United States was the 
separation of murder into “degrees.”  The common law of murder was car-
ried over from England to the colonies and defined as “all homicide not 
involuntary, provoked, justified or excused.”310  Under English law at the 
time, all murder carried the mandatory sentence of death.  Pennsylvania, in 
1794, was the first state to adopt degrees of murder, with only first degree 
murder punishable by death.  Virginia and Ohio would follow suit, in 1796 
and 1815 respectively.  By the 1960s, most states used this method as dis-
tinguishing between capital and non-capital murder.311 
The last important early modification to the death penalty in the United 
States was the use of jury discretion in imposing the death penalty.  Instead 
of murder carrying a mandatory death sentence as the common law pre-
scribed, many states decided to allow the jury discretion in sentencing the 
accused to death or life imprisonment.312  This “optional death penalty” 
became widely accepted both with legislatures and the public and later was 
the reason for abolishing (and reinstating) the death penalty.313 
By 1917, twelve states had abolished the death penalty, though “under 
the nervous tension of World War I, four of those States reinstituted” it.314  
By the end of World War II, “[t]he manner of inflicting death changed, and 
the horrors of the punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the 
minds of the general public” and, as a result, nothing much happened until 
many decades later.315  Between the years 1900 and 1966, an estimated 
7226 judicial executions were carried out in the United States.316  In addi-
tion, by the end of the 1960s, forty-one states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government all allowed the death penalty for at least one 
crime.317  As late as the 1960s, crimes punishable by the death penalty in at 
least two states included the following crimes: murder, treason, kidnap-
ping, rape, statutory rape, robbery, bombing, assault with a deadly weapon 
  
 309. Bedau, supra note 280, at 22. 
 310. Id. at 24. 
 311. Id.  Also included in the definition of first degree murder was the concept of “felony murder,” a 
doctrine carried over from English law similar to constructive malice, defined as “killings in the course 
of a felony.”  Id. at 26. 
 312. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 339 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 313. Bedau, supra note 280, at 30; see also infra Part II(B)(2). 
 314. Furman, 408 U.S. at 339–40 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 315. Id. at 340. 
 316. This may be an underestimate.  Hugo Adam Bedau, Introduction: The Laws, The Crimes, and 
The Executions, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 280, at 35–36. 
 317. Furman, 408 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring).  The States that had abolished the death 
penalty by the end of the 1960s were: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. at 340 n.79. 
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by a life term prisoner, train wrecking, burglary, arson, perjury in a capital 
case, espionage, machine gunning, and other particular forms of assault.318  
Notwithstanding, the number of executions in the 1960s began to decline: 
twenty-one in 1963, fifteen in 1964, seven in 1965, and only three between 
1966 and 1967.319  After the Supreme Court heard two cases in the 1960s 
on the death penalty, an unofficial moratorium on executions in the states 
began in 1967.320 
B. Furman & Gregg: The Eighth Amendment Analysis 
1. Early Eighth Amendment Cases 
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”321  Two Supreme Court cases in 
the nineteenth century, Wilkerson v. Utah322 and In re Kemmler,323 ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the death penalty in terms of the Eighth 
Amendment.  In Wilkerson, the Court ruled that public shooting was a 
common method of execution, as it had been used for many years as a 
  
 318. Hugo Adam Bedau, Offenses Punishable by Death, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra 
note 280, at 40–44.  Fifteen other offenses were punishable by death in only one state as late as the 
1960s: insurrection (Georgia), forcing a woman to marry (Arkansas), second conviction for selling 
narcotics to a minor (Colorado), intentionally interfering with the war effort (Florida), committing any 
felony on a train after boarding with such intent (Wyoming), desecration of a grave (Georgia), castra-
tion (Georgia), attempt to kill the President or a foreign ambassador (Connecticut), instigation of a 
minor by a relative or spouse to commit a capital crime (Texas), destruction of vital property by a 
group during wartime (Vermont), abducting anyone during a bank robbery (federal), third conviction of 
any offense (South Carolina), piracy of interstate or foreign commercial aircraft (federal), supplying 
heroin to a minor (federal), and certain espionage violations of the Atomic Energy Act (federal).  Id. at 
44–45. 
 319. Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also HOOD, supra note 86, at 62. 
 320. HOOD, supra note 86, at 62–63.  The two Supreme Court decisions were United States v. Jack-
son, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).  In Jackson, the Federal 
Kidnapping Act, which permitted only the jury to render a death sentence and not the judge, was held 
unconstitutional because it effectively discouraged a defendant from exercising his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.  By pleading guilty to an offense under the Act, a defendant could escape the possi-
bility of receiving the death penalty if convicted by a jury.  Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.  In Witherspoon, 
the prosecution challenged forty-seven potential jurors for cause because of the mere fact that they had 
reservations about the death penalty.  391 U.S. at 514.  The Supreme Court ruled this action unconstitu-
tional: 
Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed 
or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they 
voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scru-
ples against its infliction.  No defendant can constitutionally be put to death at the hands of a 
tribunal so selected. 
Id. at 522–23. 
 321. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
 322. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
 323. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
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form of punishment in the military.324  Wilkerson seemed to suggest that a 
severe punishment is not cruel and unusual if it had been commonly per-
formed in the past.325 
On the other hand, In re Kemmler seemed to suggest that although an 
execution method is unusual, or uncommon, it is still constitutional if en-
acted by the legislature as a more humane way to administer the death pen-
alty.  In re Kemmler addressed the constitutionality of the electric chair as 
a method of execution; the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not 
apply to the states and, therefore, reviewed the case only for due process 
violations of the defendant.326  In dicta, the Court stated that 
“[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, 
but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as 
used in the constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barba-
rous,—something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”327 
The next Supreme Court decision addressing the death penalty, Louisi-
ana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,328 was not decided until 1947.  In Reswe-
ber, the defendant was sentenced to death by electrocution, but because of 
a botched execution, did not die.  Louisiana scheduled a second execution 
for the defendant and he appealed, citing violations of the Fifth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.329  Eight Justices 
acknowledged the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to the states; how-
ever, they split 5–4 on whether that case was cruel and unusual punish-
ment.  The majority ruled that it was not—seeming to adopt the reasoning 
in In re Kemmler that if a punishment is thought to be humane, then inad-
vertent suffering would not render a method of execution cruel and un-
usual.330 
In Weems v. United States,331 the Court addressed the question of 
whether the punishment of cadena temporal, twelve to twenty years im-
prisonment with hard and painful labor while wearing a “chain at the an-
kle, hanging from the wrists,” was cruel and unusual punishment within 
  
 324. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134–35. 
 325. Id. (“Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but . . . the punishment 
of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not 
included in that category, within the meaning of the eighth amendment.”). 
 326. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447. 
 327. Id. 
 328. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
 329. Id. at 460–61. 
 330. Id. at 463–64 (“Even the fact that petitioner has already been subjected to a current of electricity 
does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other 
execution.  The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in 
the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish 
life humanely.”). 
 331. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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the Eighth Amendment for creating a false entry in a public record.332  The 
Court ruled that it was—citing for the first time the proposition that not 
only torturous and inhuman punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, 
but also punishments that are disproportionate to the crime.333 
In Trop v. Dulles,334 a plurality opinion, the Court ruled that denation-
alization for the crime of desertion during war time was prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment.335  Citing Weems, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”336  The Court looked 
to two facts to aid their decision.  First, the Court noted that this was a rela-
tively new, and therefore unusual, punishment since it was not enacted 
until 1940 and its constitutionality was never tested until this decision.337  
Second, the Court looked to international modes of punishment and noted 
that denationalization for desertion during war time was only a crime in 
two countries in the world: the Philippines and Turkey.338  Based on this 
analysis, the Court ruled that the punishment was cruel and unusual.339 
2. The Furman Decision 
By 1972, the de facto moratorium on the death penalty in the United 
States was already in its fifth year.  Forty states plus the District of Colum-
bia and the federal government maintained the death penalty in their statute 
books for at least one offense, though no one had been executed since 
1967.  In 1971, the Supreme Court held that there was no Fourteenth 
Amendment due process violation in giving the jury discretion in a capital 
trial to determine a defendant’s guilt and punishment within a single trial 
and a single verdict.340  Further, the death penalty was assumed to be con-
stitutional based on previous dicta by many Supreme Court Justices.  So 
when Furman v. Georgia341 was decided in 1972, basically invalidating 
forty-two death penalty statutes in the United States, it was anything but an 
ordinary decision by the Supreme Court. 
In a one paragraph per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that 
the death penalty statutes of Georgia and Texas were unconstitutional, in 
  
 332. Id. at 363–64. 
 333. Id. at 368. 
 334. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 335. Id. at 101. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 102–03. 
 339. Id. at 126–27. 
 340. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971). 
 341. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.342  The decision was 
5–4; each Justice wrote a separate opinion and none of the Justices in the 
majority joined in the opinion of another Justice.343  Justices Douglas, 
Stewart, and White found that as applied, the death penalty in the United 
States was unconstitutional, but did not believe the death penalty was per 
se unconstitutional.  Justices Marshall and Brennan concluded that the 
death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
Justice Douglas traced the history of the Eighth Amendment and the 
recent precedent discussing the amendment and concluded that the death 
penalty, as it was currently being imposed, carried an unconstitutional risk 
of discrimination against those who are poor and those who are of a minor-
ity because there existed no limit on jury discretion.344  He held that the 
statutes were cruel and unusual in their operation, but failed to say whether 
he believed mandatory death penalty statutes would be constitutional.345 
Justice Brennan also traced the history of the Eighth Amendment and 
concluded that to be constitutional, a punishment must not be degrading to 
human dignity.  Brennan’s test required four principles: (1) the punishment 
must not be unusually severe, (2) the punishment must not be arbitrarily 
inflicted, (3) the punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary 
society, and (4) the punishment must not be excessive.346  Brennan then 
concluded that the punishment of death, based on the cumulative principles 
above, was cruel and unusual.347 
Justice Marshall traced the history of capital punishment from England 
to the early history of the United States and noted that the use of the death 
penalty had been dwindling year by year.348  Marshall then reiterated the 
four-part test from the prior case law established by Brennan used to de-
termine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.349  To determine 
whether capital punishment is excessive or unnecessary, he listed six pur-
poses allegedly served by the death penalty: retribution, deterrence, pre-
  
 342. Id. at 239–40. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 255–56 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 345. Id. at 256–57. 
 346. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a 
punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is 
substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any 
penal purpose more than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment 
violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments 
upon those convicted of crimes.”). 
 347. Id. at 286. 
 348. See generally id. at 333–41 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 349. Id. at 330–32. 
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vention of recidivism, encouragement of confessions and guilty pleas, 
eugenics, and economic reasons.350 
First, Marshall concluded that retribution by itself could not justify the 
death penalty since it “has been condemned by scholars for centuries.”351  
Further, looking at all the studies and statistics, Marshall found no evi-
dence of a deterrent effect of the death penalty.352  On the issue of recidi-
vism, Marshall pointed out studies demonstrating that most murderers are 
first-time offenders, tend to be model prisoners, and usually are not repeat 
offenders.353  Further, if the death penalty was used to encourage confes-
sions and guilty pleas, it would be unconstitutional under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments.  If used for eugenic goals, then the death penalty 
would disregard all modern thought of a civilized society.354  Also, the 
belief that the death penalty is used because it is cheaper to execute a 
criminal than to imprison him is not only incorrect, but it is also not a con-
stitutional consideration.355 
Finally, Marshall threw out the public opinion polls showing that the 
American public supports the death penalty, stating that “American citi-
zens know almost nothing about capital punishment”356 and if they did 
know all the facts, “the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shock-
ing to his conscious and sense of justice.”357  The reasons the public would 
find it shocking are varied, but the main reasons are that the death penalty 
is not foolproof (there exists the possibility of executing the innocent) and 
the death penalty is race and gender biased.358  Based on all the facts 
above, Marshall concluded that the death penalty should be abolished, es-
  
 350. Id. at 342. 
 351. Id. at 343–45 (“The history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that retribu-
tion for its own sake is improper.”). 
 352. Id. at 353. 
 353. Id. at 355. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 355–58.  Even speaking at a time before bifurcated capital trials in the United States, 
studies showed that the death penalty is more expensive than life imprisonment for a number of rea-
sons.  Id. at 357–58.  Reasons include automatic appeals, extended and costly selection of jurors, costs 
for detecting and curing mental illness of an inmate before execution, and “an inordinate number of 
collateral attacks on the conviction and attempts to obtain executive clemency.”  Id.; see also Millett, 
supra note 81 (“In a study done in North Carolina, the death penalty costs them $2.16 million more 
than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  In Texas, the death penalty costs around $2.3 
million, nearly three times the cost of imprisoning someone in a maximum security jail for forty 
years.”). 
 356. Furman, 408 U.S. at 362. 
 357. Id. at 369. 
 358. Id. at 364–66. 
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pecially in a nation like the United States that stands for “justice and fair 
treatment for all its citizens.”359 
Justices Stewart and White found the death penalty “unusual” because 
it was infrequently imposed.360  Justice Stewart stated: “These death sen-
tences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning 
is cruel and unusual.”361  Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief 
Justice Burger dissented, finding the death penalty was not a cruel and 
unusual punishment.362  Although he personally abhorred the death pen-
alty, Justice Blackmun dissented because he believed the decision to abol-
ish it should rest with the legislature, not the judiciary.363 
After Furman only one thing was known for certain: as it currently 
stood, the death penalty was unconstitutional.  The reason for its unconsti-
tutionality was still in doubt—either it was applied discriminatorily, in a 
“wanton” or “freakish” manner, too infrequently, or all of the above.364  
The answer would not come until four years later with another string of 
Eighth Amendment capital punishment cases. 
3. The 1976 Decisions 
In response to Furman, the states had three practical options: (1) get 
rid of the death penalty completely; (2) rewrite their death penalty statute, 
making the death penalty a mandatory punishment for those convicted of a 
capital crime; or (3) rewrite their death penalty statute so that it was im-
posed in a less discriminatory, less “freakish” manner. 
Seven states decided not to rewrite their statutes on capital punish-
ment;365 ten other states decided to rewrite their statutes to impose a man-
datory sentence of death for those convicted of a capital crime.366  The 
  
 359. Id. at 371.  By abolishing capital punishment, Marshall concludes: “We achieve ‘a major mile-
stone in the long road up from barbarism’ and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world 
which celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity.”  Id. 
 360. Id. at 308–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 361. Id. at 309. 
 362. Id. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 363. Id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Burger expressed this sentiment as well.  Id. at 
375–76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 364. Id. at 415 (Powell, J., dissenting).   
 365. Four states rewrote their statutes after 1976: Oregon (1978), South Dakota (1979), New Jersey 
(1982), and Kansas (1994).  Three other states plus the District of Columbia never rewrote their statute 
and completely abolished the death penalty after Furman: Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Vermont.  
See Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Information, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
state/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (click on each state in drop-down menu).  Eight states had abolished 
the death penalty before the Furman decision: Wisconsin (1853), Maine (1887), Minnesota (1911), 
Alaska (1957), Hawaii (1957), Michigan (1846, except for treason, complete abolition: 1963), Iowa 
(1965), West Virginia (1965).  HOOD, supra note 86, at 63. 
 366. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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other twenty-five states adopted statutes which allowed juries to impose 
the death penalty, but guided this discretion.367  In 1976, a string of Su-
preme Court cases addressed the constitutionality of these statutes. 
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court held that the mandatory capi-
tal punishment statutes enacted after Furman were unconstitutional and in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.368  The plurality opinion traced the 
history of jury discretion in imposing the death penalty in the United 
States, noting that while the common law made death the exclusive and 
mandatory punishment for many offenses, many states, including North 
Carolina, enacted statutes giving juries discretion to impose the death sen-
tence.369  By 1963, every jurisdiction had replaced the mandatory death 
sentence with jury discretion.370  Further, the plurality explained that the 
mandatory death sentence did not allow consideration of individual fac-
tors.371  Thus, the Court ruled this statutory scheme violated the Eighth 
Amendment.372 
Decided on the same day, Gregg v. Georgia,373 the plurality opinion of 
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, held that for the crime of murder, 
“the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”374  
The plurality stated, however, that the punishment must accord with human 
dignity, meaning the death penalty must not be “excessive” for the crimes 
for which it was imposed.375  The plurality laid out the following two-part 
test for excessiveness: “First, the punishment must not involve the unnec-
essary and wanton infliction of pain.  Second, the punishment must not be 
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”376 
Since the death penalty was already assumed valid by the legislature, a 
presumption of validity existed that it was constitutional.  As a result, “a 
heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the repre-
sentatives of the people.”377  This, the plurality noted, was because legisla-
  
 367. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 313. 
 368. 428 U.S. at 305. 
 369. Id. at 289. 
 370. Id. at 291–92.  North Carolina enacted their statute in 1949.  Id. at 293. 
 371. Id. at 303–04. 
 372. Id. at 305; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331–32, 336 (1976) (ruling that although 
Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty statute differed from North Carolina’s, the Eighth Amendment 
“simply cannot tolerate the reintroduction of a practice so thoroughly discredited”). 
 373. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 374. Id. at 169.  The plurality ruled that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual per se.  They 
noted two key facts: the death penalty had been presumed valid in the past and after Furman, thirty-five 
states and the U.S. government rewrote their death penalty statutes to abide by that decision.  Id. 
 375. Id. at 173. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 175. 
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tive standards are an important assessment of contemporary thought on a 
form of punishment.378 
The plurality listed two key social purposes of the death penalty: retri-
bution and deterrence.379  Retribution was a valid social purpose, because, 
though unappealing to some people and not the dominant objective of pun-
ishment, the death penalty was the only adequate response to some crimes 
that are “so grievous an affront to humanity.”380  The plurality then stated 
that in some cases, “the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deter-
rent” even though no statistics exist showing that the death penalty actually 
deters murderers.381 
The plurality next considered whether the death penalty statute in 
Georgia had safeguards to prevent arbitrary and less capricious imposition 
of the death penalty.382  The new Georgia statute called for a “bifurcated 
procedure,” where the sentencing phase was determined by a jury in a 
separate proceeding after the defendant was convicted, based on certain 
statutory aggravating circumstances.383  Further, the statute required that 
the Georgia Supreme Court promptly review every death sentence and 
conduct a “proportionality review” to make sure the death penalty was not 
being applied in an excessive manner.384  This statutory scheme was 
deemed by the plurality to meet the constitutional requirements of the 
Eighth Amendment.385 
In Proffitt v. Florida,386 the plurality upheld the statutory scheme of 
Florida finding the statute constitutional despite Florida not conducting any 
proportionality review.387  Florida also required a bifurcated proceeding but 
placed the determination of imposing a death sentence on the trial judge.388  
Based on eight statutory aggravating circumstances and seven statutory 
mitigating circumstances, the statute required the jury to vote on whether 
to recommend the sentence of death to the trial judge.389  The trial judge 
must then put in writing his reasons for sentencing death, which is review-
able by the Florida Supreme Court.390 
  
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 183. 
 380. Id. at 183–84. 
 381. Id. at 185–86.  The plurality specifically mentioned two types of murders that would be deterred 
by the death penalty: murder for hire and murder by a life prisoner.  Id. 
 382. Id. at 194–95. 
 383. Id. at 190–91, 195. 
 384. Id. at 206. 
 385. Id. at 207. 
 386. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  
 387. Id. at 250–51.  
 388. Id. at 252.  
 389. Id. at 250. 
 390. Id. at 251–52.  
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In Jurek v. Texas,391 the Texas statutory sentencing procedure was also 
held to be constitutional, even though Texas did not provide any statutory 
aggravating circumstances.392  Instead, the Texas statute required a bifur-
cated trial where in the sentencing phase, the jury was required to answer 
three questions: (1) whether conduct that caused death was committed de-
liberately; (2) whether defendant would be a continuing threat to society; 
and (3) if raised by evidence, whether defendant’s conduct was an unrea-
sonable response to provocation.393  If the answer to all three questions was 
“yes,” a sentence of death was imposed.394  The decisions of Gregg, 
Proffitt, and Jurek provided the framework for a constitutionally valid 
death penalty statute. 
In sum, the 1976 Supreme Court cases allowed the death penalty for 
murder.  The death penalty was not unconstitutional per se as long as a 
state allows jury discretion and enacts specific guidelines for a jury/judge 
to follow in imposing a death sentence.  The ten-year moratorium on exe-
cutions ended in 1977 with the execution of Gary Gilmore in Utah by fir-
ing squad.395 
C. Restricting the Reach of Capital Punishment for Crimes 
1. Capital Punishment for Rape 
In Coker v. Georgia,396 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion writ-
ten by Justice White, held that the punishment of death for the rape of an 
adult woman is cruel and unusual punishment where the rape does not re-
sult in death.397  In reaching its conclusion, the plurality found the punish-
ment of death excessive for a crime that did not result in the death of the 
victim: “The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.  Life 
is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be 
nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond 
repair.”398 
The plurality based its decision primarily on recent legislative action.  
After the decision in Furman, thirty-five states enacted statutes to address 
the defects identified in Furman.  Only three states chose to include rape as 
  
 391. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).  
 392. Id. at 270.  
 393. Id. at 269.  
 394. Id.  
 395. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 301. 
 396. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 397. Id. at 592–93; see also Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (death penalty unconstitu-
tional for kidnapping where the victim was not killed). 
 398. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598. 
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a capital offense in their new statutes.399  While noting that the legislative 
action was not unanimous, “it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult 
woman.”400  Citing Trop, the plurality also noted the importance of interna-
tional opinion on the acceptability of a punishment, stating that “out of 60 
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death pen-
alty for rape where death did not ensue.”401  Thus, for the second time in an 
Eighth Amendment case, international opinion was used to confirm the 
conclusions of the Court. 
The importance of the Coker decision was that it more or less abol-
ished the death penalty in the United States for all offenses that did not 
result in the death of the victim.402 
2. Capital Punishment for Felony Murder 
The doctrine of felony murder was adopted from the common law of 
England and found its way into the definition of first degree murder in the 
1794 Pennsylvania statute.403  Felony murder was first defined as all 
“homicides in or in the attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery or bur-
glary.”  However, many states, when enacting their first-degree murder 
  
 399. Id. at 593–94.  Two of those states were North Carolina and Louisiana, which enacted manda-
tory death penalty statutes after Furman that were ruled unconstitutional in Woodson.  When re-
enacting their statutes after Woodson, both of these states only included murder as a capital offense, 
thus leaving Georgia as the only state still with rape on the books as a capital offense.  Id. at 594. 
 400. Id. at 596. 
 401. Id. at 596 n.10. 
 402. Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee statutes at the time authorized the death penalty for rape 
when the victim was a child—the plurality failed to address the constitutionality of the death penalty 
for that offense.  Id. at 596.  After Coker, though, these three states abolished the death penalty for the 
rape of a child.  David W. Schaaf, Note, What if the Victim Is a Child? Examining the Constitutionality 
of Louisiana’s Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 354–55 (2000); see also 
Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 402–03 (Miss. 1989) (finding the Mississippi statute at the time 
of offense precluded the sentence of death for rape of a child). 
In 1995, Louisiana enacted a statute providing the sentence of death for the rape of a child under 
the age of twelve.  Schaaf, supra at 348.  The Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue and as of July 
2007, six states now have a similar statute on the books.  Adam Liptak, Death Penalty in Some Cases 
of Child Sex Is Widening, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2006, at A9 (“Oklahoma became the fifth state to allow 
the death penalty for sex crimes against children yesterday, a day after South Carolina enacted a similar 
law.”); Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty for Offenses Other than Murder, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=2347 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (Texas passed a bill on July 
16, 2007, making the second conviction for rape of a child under fourteen eligible for the death pen-
alty—the two other states with similar laws are Florida and Montana). 
On June 29, 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the Louisiana legislature and de-
clared the death penalty a proportional punishment for the offense of child rape.  See State v. Kennedy, 
957 So. 2d 757, 793 (La. 2007).  The U.S. Supreme Court just granted certiorari on January 4, 2008 
and will hear the case to decide whether to expand or limit its decision in Coker.  See Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008) (granting petition for certiorari). 
 403. Bedau, supra note 280, at 26. 
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statutes, decided to allow the doctrine to encompass all possible felonies.  
Hence, if a killing occurred during the course of another felony, the “wil-
ful, deliberate and premeditated” nature of a first-degree murder charge 
was assumed and the defendant was charged with a more serious of-
fense.404  In most states, this more serious offense was death.405 
In Enmund v. Florida,406 the Court held that when a defendant “aids 
and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others 
but does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place 
or that lethal force will be employed,” the death penalty, as a punishment 
to that defendant, violates the Eighth Amendment.407  Aiding its decision, 
the majority relied on the analysis provided by Coker: research (1) the his-
torical development of the punishment at issue, (2) legislative judgments 
on the issue, (3) international opinion on the punishment, and (4) decisions 
juries have made on the punishment.408 
The majority first noted that out of the thirty-six state and federal ju-
risdictions that currently authorize the death penalty, only eight jurisdic-
tions authorize the death penalty where a defendant participated in a rob-
bery where a murder was committed but who did not intend a killing to 
take place.409  The Court then stated that this was not as compelling a situa-
tion as the legislative judgments in Coker, where only three states main-
tained the death penalty for rape, but it “nevertheless weighs on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.”410  The majority stated 
that jury sentencing decisions showed that very few people were actually 
sentenced to death for this offense and that no one over the past quarter 
century had been executed in the United States for felony murder.411 
The majority then turned to international opinion on felony murder:  
“The climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability 
of a particular punishment” is an additional consideration which is 
“not irrelevant.”  It is thus worth noting that the doctrine of felony 
murder has been abolished in England and India, severely re-
  
 404. Id. 
 405. The doctrine of felony murder has been highly criticized both by scholars in this country and in 
England.  Id. at 26–27. 
 406. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 407. Id. at 797. 
 408. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788–89. 
 409. Id. at 789, 792. 
 410. Id. at 792–93. 
 411. Id. at 795–96. 
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stricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth coun-
tries, and is unknown in continental Europe.412 
Looking at all the facts, the majority concluded that the punishment of 
death for a robber who does not take life is an excessive penalty.413 
To further its conclusion, the majority noted that the two primary so-
cial purposes of capital punishment, deterrence and retribution, were not 
served by punishing felony murder with death.  Imposing the death penalty 
on a defendant that had no intention of killing would not have a measur-
able deterrent effect.414  Further, retribution was usually based on a defen-
dant’s intention—absent “intentional wrongdoing,” the death penalty for 
the sake of retribution alone was excessive in this case.415 
In Tison v. Arizona,416 the Court held that when a defendant is a know-
ing, major participant in a felony that carries a grave risk of death, and 
shows a “reckless disregard for human life,” the death penalty does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment even when the defendant personally did not 
intend to kill.417  The Court acknowledged that the defendants in Tison did 
not intend for a killing to take place when committing their felony.  How-
ever, the Court determined that the defendants were “major participants” in 
the felony of breaking their father out of prison and hence were more cul-
pable for their actions.418 
To support this conclusion, the Court looked to recent legislative 
judgments on the issue to see if the state legislatures regarded the death 
penalty an excessive punishment for this crime.  After a controversial look 
at the state legislative decisions in the United States, the Court concluded 
that twenty-one jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for felony murder 
where the defendant had no intent to kill.419  Finding this number a major-
  
 412. Id. at 796 n.22.  O’Connor dissented, noting the following about its use of international opinion: 
“As the petitioner acknowledges, the felony-murder doctrine, and its corresponding capital penalty, 
originated hundreds of years ago, and was a fixture of English common law until 1957 when Parlia-
ment declared that an unintentional killing during a felony would be classified as manslaughter.”  Id. at 
816 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  She further mentioned in a footnote: “The English attitude toward 
capital punishment, as reflected in recent legislation, differs significantly from American attitudes as 
reflected in state legislation; in 1965, England abolished the death penalty for all murders.”  Id. at 817 
n.29. 
 413. Id. at 797 (majority). 
 414. Id. at 798–99. 
 415. Id. at 800. 
 416. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 417. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157–58.   
 418. Id. at 150–51. 
 419. Id. at 154. 
Four States authorize the death penalty in felony-murder cases upon a showing of culpable 
mental state such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life.  Two jurisdictions 
require that the defendant’s participation be substantial and the statutes of at least six more, 
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ity,420 the Court then held the death penalty was not a disproportionate 
penalty where the defendant was a major participant and showed reckless 
indifference to life.421 
D. Restricting the Reach of Capital Punishment for Types of Offenders 
1. Capital Punishment for the Insane 
In Ford v. Wainwright,422 the Supreme Court held that the death pen-
alty for an inmate who had become insane awaiting his execution was cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.423  The 
Court noted that the Eighth Amendment banned cruel and usual punish-
ments that were either: (1) “condemned by the common law in 1789” when 
the Bill of Rights was adopted, or (2) punishments that would now be con-
demned by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”424  The Court then concluded that “virtually no authority 
condoning the execution of the insane at English common law” existed.425 
English common law forbade the execution of the insane for two rea-
sons: it served no deterrent purpose, and had no retributive value.  The 
Court stated that the deterrent nature of capital punishment did not exist 
because the action offended humanity and provided no worthwhile exam-
ple to others.426  Further, the Court noted that “the community’s quest for 
‘retribution’—the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equiva-
  
including Arizona, take minor participation in the felony expressly into account in mitiga-
tion of the murder. 
Id. at 152–53.  Further, six states permit “capital punishment for felony murder simpliciter,” and an-
other three states “require some additional aggravation before imposing the death penalty upon a felony 
murderer” such as a showing of major participation.  Id. at 153–54. 
 420. As Justice Brennan’s dissent pointed out, twenty-one jurisdictions in the United States is not a 
majority.  The majority opinion did not consider the jurisdictions that have completely abolished the 
death penalty in its analysis.  If it had, the majority would have found that as many as three-fifths of the 
jurisdictions in the United States do not allow the death penalty for nontriggermen.  Id. at 175 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
 421. Id. at 157–58.  Since intent is not required after Tison to impose the death penalty, Enmund now 
only stands for the proposition that when a defendant does not intend to kill or does not show reckless 
indifference to life during the course of a felony, the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment 
when imposed on that defendant.  Addressing international opinion in a footnote, Justice Brennan 
noted: “Since Enmund was decided, the Netherlands and Australia have abolished the death penalty for 
all offenses, and Cyprus, El Salvador, and Argentina have abolished it for all crimes except those 
committed in wartime or in the violation of military law.”  Id. at 177 n.15. 
 422. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 423. Id. at 408.  The holding of Ford applies to all insane persons, but since the Court has already 
held that a person must be competent to stand trial, the holding in Ford basically applies to those who 
were sane when tried, but became insane awaiting execution.  See id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 424. Id. at 406 (majority). 
 425. Id. at 408. 
 426. Id. at 407–08. 
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lent ‘moral quality’—is not served by execution of an insane person.”427  
Finally, the Court mentioned that no U.S. state currently allowed the exe-
cution of the insane, and twenty-six states expressly prohibited it.428 
However, what is the meaning of insanity and at what level of insanity 
is capital punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?  Justice Pow-
ell addressed this question in his concurrence which the Court failed to 
answer.  In answering this question, Powell looked to English common law 
and the purposes of the death penalty as a punishment.429  He noted that the 
retributive aim of capital punishment would be satisfied if the defendant 
recognized the connection between his punishment and crime.  Therefore, 
Powell held that the “Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of 
those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why 
they are to suffer it.”430  This opinion was not the ruling of the Court, how-
ever, and only provides a guideline that lower courts may use to determine 
whether an inmate has become insane. 
2. Capital Punishment for the Mentally Retarded 
The definition of mental retardation varies depending on the source be-
ing referenced, but it is usually described as a deficiency in both intelli-
gence and social behavior.  Generally, a person who has an IQ lower than 
seventy, which correlates to a mental age of under ten years, is considered 
to be mentally retarded.431  Four categories of mentally retarded individuals 
exist—mild, moderate, severe, and profound432—out of which eighty-nine 
percent of mentally retarded individuals fall within the “mild” category.433  
Under early English and American common law, it was a principle that 
“‘idiots,’ together with ‘lunatics,’ were not subject to punishment for 
criminal acts committed under those incapacities. . . . Idiocy was under-
stood as ‘a defect of understanding from the moment of birth,’ in contrast 
to lunacy, which was ‘a partial derangement of the intellectual faculties, 
the senses returning at uncertain intervals.’”434  However, if a person could 
be found to understand the difference between right and wrong, they could 
be tried and executed under the common law. 
  
 427. Id. at 408. 
 428. Id. at 408 n.2. 
 429. Id. at 419–21 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 430. Id. at 422. 
 431. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 
(1989); HOOD, supra note 86, at 128. 
 432. An individual is considered mildly retarded with an IQ between 50–55 to 70; moderately re-
tarded with an IQ between 35–40 and 50–55; severely retarded with an IQ between 20–25 and 35–40; 
and profoundly retarded with an IQ below 20–25.  Penry, 492 U.S. at 308 n.1. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 331. 
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The execution of the mentally retarded, while rare in the United States 
throughout its history, still occurred from time-to-time.  Between 1976 and 
1989, eight mentally retarded individuals were executed in the United 
States.435  Despite its rarity (or maybe because of its rarity), many state 
legislatures did not address the issue of executing the mentally retarded for 
some time.  In Georgia, for example, the high profile execution of Jerome 
Bowden, who had an IQ of only sixty-five, caused public outrage that a 
person with mental retardation could be executed in that State.436  In re-
sponse to public opinion polls condemning the execution, Georgia became 
the first State to enact a law prohibiting the death penalty for the mentally 
retarded in 1988.437  Maryland and the federal government would pass 
similar legislation within the next year.438  In 1989, the Supreme Court 
took up the question whether the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of 
any mentally retarded individual. 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not 
bar the execution of the mentally retarded.439  The opinion written by Jus-
tice O’Connor traced the history of capital punishment for the mentally 
retarded through the common law and noted that the common law only 
prohibited the execution of those individuals who were severely or pro-
foundly retarded—those that could not understand right from wrong.440  
She then applied the “evolving standards of decency” test and concluded 
that since only two states have rejected the death penalty for the mentally 
retarded, no national consensus among the legislatures existed to prohibit 
the punishment as excessive under the Eighth Amendment.441   
O’Connor then conducted a proportionality review, looking into the 
social purposes of retribution and deterrence and determined that the goals 
of the death penalty would at least be furthered as to some mentally re-
tarded offenders.442  Therefore, she concluded that the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded was not cruel and unusual punishment.443 
By 2000, many state legislatures were enacting laws banning the death 
penalty for the mentally retarded.  By December 2001, eighteen states and 
  
 435. Death Penalty Information Center, List of Defendants with Mental Retardation Executed in the 
United States, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1858 (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 436. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 n.8; see also HOOD, supra note 86, at 127–28. 
 437. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 nn.8–9; see also HOOD, supra note 86, at 127–28. 
 438. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314; Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. 
 439. 492 U.S. at 340. 
 440. Id. at 332–33. 
 441. Id. at 334. 
 442. Id. at 338. 
 443. Id. at 340.  As for defendant Penry, his case was remanded because the Court found that Texas’s 
sentencing procedure of not specifying any mitigating circumstances was now unconstitutional.  Id. at 
328. 
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the federal government had enacted such statutes.444  In 2002, the Supreme 
Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which held unconstitutional the death 
penalty for the mentally retarded.445  The Court started by noting the recent 
trend of legislation abolishing the death penalty for the mentally retarded—
since Penry, sixteen more states abolished the death penalty for the men-
tally retarded, bringing the total to eighteen states plus the federal govern-
ment.446  The majority concluded that this showed a national consensus of 
legislatures against the practice.447 
The Court then observed that international opinion, though not disposi-
tive on the subject, may lend support to the Court’s conclusions.  In a foot-
note they noted that “within the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved.”448  As a single sentence inside a long foot-
note, this fact would have probably gone unnoticed if it was not for the 
dissents of Rehnquist and Scalia specifically repudiating the use of interna-
tional authority on this issue.449  Finding that the death penalty did not sat-
isfy the purposes of retribution or deterrence, the Court held that the death 
penalty was excessive for the mentally retarded and therefore violated the 
Eighth Amendment.450 
Since Atkins, the states have struggled with a proper definition for 
“mentally retarded” under the law.  Some states specify an IQ level, others 
do not.  Some states require an age limit after which one may no longer 
claim to be mentally retarded while others specify that mental retardation 
is a rebuttable presumption.451  The matter remains unresolved, unfortu-
nately, and “shortly after the Atkins decision was handed down, a Texas 
jury found John Paul Penry, at his third trial, not to be mentally retarded 
and sentenced him once again to death, despite the fact that he had never 
tested above an IQ level of 70.”452 
  
 444. HOOD, supra note 86, at 128–29. 
 445. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 446. Id. at 314–315.  These sixteen states were: Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Missouri, and North Carolina.  Id. 
 447. Id. at 316. 
 448. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 449. Id. at 324–25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 450. Id. at 321 (majority). 
 451. HOOD, supra note 86, at 130. 
 452. Id.  In October 2005, Penry once again got his death sentenced reversed (for the third time) by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  He is now undergoing his fourth sentencing trial.  See Death 
Sentence Overturned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A29. 
File: Millett - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on:  3/5/2008 10:31:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 10:33:00 PM 
606 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 3 
 
3. Capital Punishment for Juveniles 
The first known execution of a juvenile in the United States occurred 
in 1642.  Since that time, at least 366 juvenile offenders have been exe-
cuted in the United States—twenty-two of those after 1976.453  Further, the 
last juvenile executed in the United States who was under the age of six-
teen when committing the crime occurred in 1948.454  Hence, when the 
issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles under six-
teen reached the Supreme Court, it should have been a routine decision like 
that of Ford.  The decision, however, was anything but simple. 
The decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma consisted of three separate 
opinions.  A plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens (in which three 
other Justices joined), expressed the view that the death penalty was un-
constitutional for juveniles who committed their crimes when under the 
age of sixteen.455  Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion (which two other 
Justices joined), expressed the view that the death penalty was constitu-
tional for that category of offenders.456  The deciding vote was Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment,457 ruling that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional as imposed on defendant Thompson because no age 
requirement was specified in Oklahoma’s death penalty statute.458 
The plurality looked to international opinion on the issue of juvenile 
executions.  In the first use of international opinion outside a footnote since 
Trop, the plurality mentioned that the leading European countries prohib-
ited juvenile executions: 
Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the 
United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Austra-
lia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available 
for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile 
be executed.  The death penalty has been abolished in West Ger-
many, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandina-
vian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as 
  
 453. VICTOR L. STREIB, 77 THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND 
EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973–FEBRUARY 28, 2005, at 3 (2005), http://www. 
law.onu.edu/faculty_staff/faculty_profiles/coursematerials/streib/juvdeath.pdf. 
 454. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 n.37 (1988). 
 455. Id. at 838. 
 456. Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 457. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision.  Id. at 838 (plurality). 
 458. Id. at 857–58 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.  Juvenile execu-
tions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union.459 
The issue of juvenile executions was again argued in Stanford v. Ken-
tucky.460  Again the decision consisted of three opinions, but this time the 
plurality opinion was written by Justice Scalia.  As expected by his dissent 
in Thompson, he concluded that the death penalty for a juvenile aged six-
teen or seventeen when committing a crime was not cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.461  To reach his conclusion, he started with the common law tradi-
tion of the death penalty, which stated that anyone over the age of fourteen 
was culpable for their felonious actions and that when the Eighth Amend-
ment was adopted, theoretically anyone over the age of seven could be 
executed.462  Then, looking to “evolving standards of decency,” he first 
specifically repudiated the use of international opinion on the issue, stating 
that it is only “American conceptions of decency” that matter for the analy-
sis.463 
Next, he looked to recent legislative judgments and noted that of “the 
37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it 
upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old 
  
 459. Id. at 830–31.  As one source for their information, the Court cited the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933 of England.  Id. at 831 n.34.  Scalia disagreed with the plurality’s use of international 
opinion.  In a footnote to his dissent, Scalia wrote that international opinion may be relevant, 
[b]ut where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other 
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be im-
posed upon Americans through the Constitution.  In the present case, therefore, the fact that 
a majority of foreign nations would not impose capital punishment upon persons under 16 at 
the time of the crime is of no more relevance than the fact that a majority of them would not 
impose capital punishment at all, or have standards of due process quite different from our 
own. 
Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 460. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 461. Id. at 381. 
 462. Id. at 368; see also supra Part II(B)(2). 
 463. Id. at 369 n.1 (citations omitted).  The dissent by Justice Brennan disagreed with Scalia, noting 
that international opinion was very relevant to the issue: 
Our cases recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the 
form of legislation in other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.  
Many countries, of course—over 50, including nearly all in Western Europe—have formally 
abolished the death penalty, or have limited its use to exceptional crimes such as treason.  
Twenty-seven others do not in practice impose the penalty.  Of the nations that retain capital 
punishment, a majority—65—prohibit the execution of juveniles.  Sixty-one countries retain 
capital punishment and have no statutory provision exempting juveniles, though some of 
these nations are ratifiers of international treaties that do prohibit the execution of juveniles.  
Since 1979, Amnesty International has recorded only eight executions of offenders under 18 
throughout the world, three of these in the United States. . . . Within the world community, 
the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disap-
proved. 
Id. at 389–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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offenders.”464  This established a majority of jurisdictions that allow the 
execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders.  He then analogized 
the situation to Tison and concluded that the legislative judgments show 
that the juvenile death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment.465 
In Roper v. Simmons,466 the Supreme Court overruled Stanford and 
held that the death penalty for anyone under the age of eighteen when 
committing their offense was cruel and unusual punishment.467  The Court 
first looked to legislative enactments and determined that a “national con-
sensus” existed within the United States for abolishing the juvenile death 
penalty.  After Stanford, five states plus the federal government abandoned 
the juvenile death penalty, bringing the total to thirty states that reject the 
death penalty for juveniles—a definite majority.468  The Court then specifi-
cally rejected the counting methods for a consensus that the opinions in 
Tison and Stanford employed.469  As well as a majority of legislatures abol-
ishing the death penalty, the Court also noted that in the twenty states that 
still use the juvenile death penalty, its use has been very infrequent—in the 
past ten years, only three states had actually executed a juvenile of-
fender.470  For instance, defendant Stanford was granted clemency from the 
governor of Kentucky in 2003 and had his death sentence changed to one 
of life imprisonment.471 
The majority then conducted its proportionality review, first noting 
three general differences between juveniles and adults: (1) juveniles are 
less mature, (2) juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences, and 
(3) the character of juveniles is less fixed.472  The Court concluded that the 
societal purposes of retribution and deterrence are not met by the juvenile 
death penalty.473 
Perhaps the most extraordinary part of the opinion, though, was the 
majority’s decision to devote a whole section to international authority on 
the juvenile death penalty.  This has spurred much commentary from 
  
 464. Id. at 370 (plurality). 
 465. Id. at 371.  In his dissent, Brennan took issue with this conclusion by Scalia as well.  Brennan 
could not understand why Scalia chose to disregard the opinions of the states that have completely 
abolished the death penalty when looking at legislative judgments.  Surely the fifteen jurisdictions that 
do not have the death penalty would also not allow the execution of a juvenile.  When taking these 
states into account, a total of twenty-seven state legislatures have concluded that the death penalty for 
juvenile offenders is wrong.  Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 466. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 467. Id. at 578. 
 468. Id. at 564. 
 469. Id. at 574. 
 470. Id. at 564–65. 
 471. STREIB, supra note 453, at 6.  A total of eight juvenile offenders would be executed in the 
United States. between the years 1990 and 2005.  Id. at 19–23. 
 472. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 473. Id. at 571–72. 
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scholars and law students all over the nation asking whether international 
authority should be used to interpret the Constitution.474  The majority first 
noted that the United States is the only country in the world that still allows 
the death penalty for juveniles, and only one of eight countries that have 
executed juvenile offenders since 1990.475  The Court then went into a 
short analysis of the experience of the United Kingdom with the death pen-
alty—noting that they abolished the juvenile death penalty in 1933 and 
have now completely abolished the death penalty.476  The majority then 
concluded that the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional based on the 
national consensus and proportionality review done previously and stated 
that international opinion was used as confirmation of this conclusion. 
E. Miscarriages of Justice in the United States 
1. The Difficulty of Proving Actual Innocence 
The awareness of the possibility of putting an innocent man to death in 
the United States is growing.  As of February 8, 2008, 127 people sen-
tenced to death were later found innocent.477  The media has started cover-
ing these miscarriages of justice more and more—bringing it to the atten-
tion of the American public.478  The way these wrongly convicted inmates 
  
 474. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipose, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2005); Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Su-
preme Court Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 909 
(2005); Glensy, supra note 6; Greta Proctor, Comment, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy 
of a Foolproof System, the Focus on Reform, and the International Factor, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 211 
(2006–2007); Michael J. Shultz, Comment, Finding Consensus While Footnoting the “Opinions of 
Mankind”: Roper v. Simmons and the Proper Role of International Consensus in United States Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 233 (2005). 
 475. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 575, 577.  “In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone 
in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”  Id. at 577. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenalty-
info.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).  The last person found innocent on 
death row was Kennedy Brewer in Mississippi on February 8, 2008.  Id. 
 478. See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 
271 (2006) (a nonfiction work documenting the life of Ron Williamson, an ex-minor league baseball 
player, wrongly convicted of murder in Oklahoma—he once came within a week of execution before 
he was finally freed based on DNA evidence).  See also Henry Weinstein, Executions in U.S. Drop to a 
10-Year Low, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at 21 (a recent Gallup poll found that 63% of the American 
public believed that an innocent man had been executed in the United States within the last five years).  
But see David R. Dow, The End of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A31 (“For too many years 
now, though, death penalty opponents have seized on the nightmare of executing an innocent man as a 
tactic to erode support for capital punishment in America.  Innocence is a distraction.  Most people on 
death row . . . did what the state said they did.  But that does not mean they should be executed.”); 
Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23 (“But nothing is 
gained by deluding the public into believing that the police and prosecutors are trying to send innocent 
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are freed is varied—some are freed because of recent developments in 
DNA science, others by long legal battles.479 
In Illinois, the exoneration of innocent men on death row caused Gov-
ernor Ryan to halt all executions in the state in 2000.  In a speech given at 
Northwestern University, Ryan said that finding seventeen innocent men 
on death row was a “catastrophic failure” of the system and an “absolute 
embarrassment” for Illinois.480 
A study written by Professors Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet pub-
lished in 1987, reported that it was possible that twenty-three innocent 
people had been executed in the United States throughout the history of the 
death penalty—even one in 1984.481  This article was highly criticized by 
supporters of the death penalty482 and is still being debated today as is evi-
denced by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kansas v. Marsh,483 
which upheld Kansas’s death penalty statute as constitutional, but sparked 
a debate between the Justices about recent DNA testing and exonerations 
of innocent men on death row.  Whatever the case, miscarriages of justice 
in the United States are occurring, and it is causing many people to ques-
tion the death penalty, even though the Supreme Court has not used this 
factor in their Eighth Amendment analysis.484 
  
people to prison. . . . Americans should be far more worried about the wrongfully freed than the wrong-
fully convicted.”). 
 479. Henry Weinstein, Victims of the Justice System: A Conference at UCLA Brings Together the 
State’s Wrongly Convicted, to Share Their Experiences and Push for Legal Changes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
9, 2006, at 1. 
 480. George Ryan, “I Must Act,” in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 222 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004).  Since his speech, there 
have now been eighteen people found innocent in Illinois.  Death Penalty Information Center, Inno-
cence and the Death Penalty, supra note 477.  Illinois does not even have the highest number of inno-
cent people found on death row—twenty-two people have been freed from death row in Florida be-
cause of innocence since 1976.  Id. 
 481. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 36 (1987).  James Adams was executed in Florida in 1984, with what Bedau and 
Radelet believed to be a high level of doubt of his guilt.  See id. at 91. 
 482. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Comment, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to 
the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 124, 128–33 (1988) (“Moreover, the authors cite but a 
single allegedly erroneous execution during the past twenty-five years—that of James Adams.  A 
review of that case demonstrates, however, that Adams was unquestionably guilty.”).  But see Hugo 
Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Comment, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and 
Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988).  If anything can be said of this debate, it is how difficult it is to 
prove innocence once convicted in the United States, especially after one has been executed.  See 
MICHAEL L. RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: 
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES, at xii (1992). 
 483. 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2534 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Even if the innocence claims made in this 
study were true, all except (perhaps) the 1984 example would cast no light upon the functioning of our 
current system of capital adjudication.  The legal community’s general attitude toward criminal defen-
dants, the legal protections States afford, the constitutional guarantees this Court enforces, and the 
scope of federal habeas review, are all vastly different from what they were in 1961.”). 
 484. The possibility of executing the innocent was only once mentioned in a major Supreme Court 
death penalty case, brought up in Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Furman.  See Furman v. Georgia, 
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One recent execution where a possible miscarriage of justice was 
thought to have occurred was the execution of Roger Coleman in 1992 in 
Virginia.  Coleman was convicted of rape and murder in 1981, but pro-
fessed his innocence.485  Investigators took up Coleman’s case, researched 
the murder for four years, questioned the evidence used to convict him, and 
even found evidence that another person could be guilty.486 
Around the time of his execution, Coleman was interviewed on TV, his 
face was on the cover of Time magazine, and even Pope John Paul II urged 
his execution to be stayed.487  The governor of Virginia then said that he 
would grant a stay to Coleman if he passed a lie detector test—Coleman 
failed and was executed.488  On January 12, 2006, DNA testing which was 
unavailable at the time of Coleman’s conviction and execution proved that 
Coleman almost certainly was guilty of the murder.489 
2. The Supreme Court Shuts the Door to Innocence Claims 
In Herrera v. Collins,490 the Supreme Court basically stated that they 
were not open to innocence claims once a defendant has been convicted.  
In Herrera, the defendant claimed, in a second federal habeas petition, that 
new evidence now existed showing that he was “actually innocent”—ten 
years after his capital conviction at trial.  New affidavits pointed to the fact 
that the defendant’s brother, now dead, was the one who murdered the po-
lice officer, not the defendant.491  The Court ruled that in a federal habeas 
petition, a defendant cannot solely present evidence of innocence, but must 
show that the evidence of innocence is rooted in a constitutional viola-
tion—a rule “grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to 
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitu-
tion—not to correct errors of fact.”492  Further, the Court reiterated the fact 
  
408 U.S. 238, 366 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).  Since that time, the Court has concentrated on 
objective factors and the social purposes of deterrence and retribution to guide their analysis. 
 485. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2533 (Scalia, J., concurring); James Dao, DNA Ties Man Executed in ’92 to 
the Murder He Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A14. 
 486. Dao, supra note 485. 
 487. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2533 (Scalia, J., concurring); Dao, supra note 485. 
 488. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2533 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 489. Dao, supra note 485.  DNA tests done in a Canadian laboratory stated that there was a one in 
nineteen million chance that Coleman was not the killer.  Marquis, supra note 478. 
 490. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 491. Id. at 393. 
 492. Id. at 400.  However, the Court said that a defendant  
may have his federal constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper 
showing of actual innocence.  This rule, or fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, is 
grounded in the “equitable discretion” of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional er-
rors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. 
Id. at 404. 
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that once a defendant has been convicted after a fair trial, “the presumption 
of innocence disappears,” and upheld Texas’s law barring a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence found thirty days after sentencing.493 
The defendant claimed that the evidence of actual innocence in itself is 
a constitutional claim since the execution of an innocent person would 
constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.”  In answer to this, the Court 
traced the history of the common law and recognized that clemency has 
been a “historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judi-
cial process has been exhausted.”494  Therefore, if new evidence comes up 
ten years after trial showing innocence, the defendant can petition for a 
reprieve from the governor. 
However, the Court did concede one possible exception for a capital 
case: a situation where a “truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual inno-
cence’” was made.495  The Court then stated that there was an “extraordi-
narily high” threshold for proving this.496  The defendant did not meet this 
heavy burden with his evidence in this case and his new trial motion was 
denied.  If anything can be taken from this case, it is that, although possible 
to get a court to review new evidence of innocence in a new trial, the bur-
den is very high to actually meet.  After Herrera, it is now more difficult 
for a defendant, even with new evidence, to prove he is innocent. 
  
 493. Id. at 399–400.  The Court reasoned this principle from the fact of “finality” of judgments and 
that “passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications” which could prejudice 
the state after a long enough time has elapsed to again present a preponderance of evidence of guilt.  Id. 
at 403. 
 494. Id. at 411–12.  Further, the Court compared the practice of clemency in America to that of 
England, noting that in England, “[c]lemency provided the principal avenue of relief for individuals 
convicted of criminal offenses—most of which were capital—because there was no right to appeal until 
1907.  It was the only means by which one could challenge his conviction on the ground of innocence.”  
Id. at 412 (internal citation omitted).  This is another similarity between the British death penalty and 
the American death penalty—the reliance on executive clemency to free the innocent.  As seen from 
the cases of Timothy Evans and Derek Bentley, however, executive clemency did not work too well in 
England. 
 495. Id. at 417. 
 496. Id.  So the question is: if Timothy Evans’s case occurred after the decision of Herrera in Amer-
ica, would the Court hear his claim of actual innocence?  Would he meet the extraordinarily high 
burden of showing actual innocence?  Keep in mind that Evans confessed to both murders and had a 
motive to kill at least his wife, similar to this case where Herrera confessed to the murder of the police 
officer that the Court seemed to weigh heavily in favor of Herrera not meeting the burden.  Clemency 
did not help Evans, nor did it help Herrera as he was denied a pardon and executed shortly after this 
decision.  See Death Penalty Information Center, Part II: History of the Death Penalty, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did=411 (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS: EXPANDING ON ROPER V. SIMMONS 
The United Kingdom’s experience bears particular relevance here 
in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of the 
Eighth Amendment’s own origins.497 
The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for 
our own conclusions.498 
A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death pen-
alty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is re-
quired by the Eighth Amendment.499 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court first laid out the analysis to 
use for every Eighth Amendment analysis under the “evolving standards of 
decency” test.  To determine whether a punishment is “excessive,” a pun-
ishment must (1) make no measurable contribution to the goals of punish-
ment and (2) not be grossly disproportionate to the serious nature of the 
crime.500  In subsequent cases, the Court has determined that the propor-
tionality analysis is an objective test, where the Court looks to legislative 
judgments for a “national consensus” on the punishment, jury determina-
tions on the rarity of the imposition of the punishment, and international 
opinion on the matter to confirm the Court’s own conclusions.501  In each 
subsequent death penalty case, the Court ends its analysis with its own 
judgment as to whether the punishment furthers the social purposes of de-
terrence and retribution. 
In Simmons, the Court expanded the international opinion part of the 
test, concluding that the Court may look to (1) the international trend of 
abolition on the punishment at issue and (2) the opinions of the United 
Kingdom on the punishment at issue.502  This next section first compares 
and contrasts English law to American law on the history of the death pen-
alty, then briefly discusses the international trend of abolition of the death 
penalty.  Finally, this section will look to the debate in the states, to see 
whether a “national consensus” is forming about the death penalty or 
whether one may be possible in the not so distant future. 
  
 497. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005). 
 498. Id. at 578. 
 499. Id. at 568. 
 500. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
 501. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 502. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564, 578. 
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A. English Law v. American Law 
In Simmons, a major part of the Court’s analysis of international opin-
ion was devoted to the death penalty in England.  First, it is important to 
point out a few inconsistencies and misstatements of fact from the majority 
opinion.  The Court mentioned the report of the select committee in 1930, 
which recommended the minimum age be raised to twenty-one in England.  
As can be seen from Part II of this article, though, that was only a minor, 
conditional recommendation of the report; conditional on if Parliament 
insisted on maintaining the death penalty.  What is most important for this 
analysis is the major finding of the report—the complete abolition of the 
death penalty in England.503 
Next, the majority mentions the Children and Young Persons Act 
1933, which abolished the juvenile death penalty for all those under eight-
een.  What the majority failed to mention, however, is that the last actual 
execution of a juvenile offender in England occurred in 1833—one hun-
dred years before the passing of this Act.  In effect, this Act only codified 
in law what the common practice was in England.504  Hence, the juvenile 
death penalty had been abolished for much longer than fifty-six years in 
practice.505 
It is also important to note Scalia’s opinion about using international 
authority, especially English law, on the death penalty: 
The Court’s special reliance on the laws of the United King-
dom is perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion.  It is of 
course true that we share a common history with the United King-
dom, and that we often consult English sources when asked to dis-
cern the meaning of a constitutional text written against the back-
drop of 18th-century English law and legal thought. . . . [But] [i]t 
is beyond comprehension why we should look, for that purpose, to 
a country that has developed, in the centuries since the Revolu-
tionary War—and with increasing speed since the United King-
dom’s recent submission to the jurisprudence of European courts 
dominated by continental jurists—a legal, political, and social cul-
ture quite different from our own.506 
  
 503. See supra Part II(C)(2). 
 504. See supra Part II(B)(2). 
 505. Despite these few misstatements, Justice Kennedy’s words ring true: “As of now, the United 
Kingdom has abolished the death penalty in its entirety; but, decades before it took this step, it recog-
nized the disproportionate nature of the juvenile death penalty; and it abolished that penalty as a sepa-
rate matter.”  Simmons, 543 U.S. at 577. 
 506. Id. at 626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In contrast to Scalia, Rex Glensy states the following 
about using English law in comparative analysis: 
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While his beliefs shed some light on the discussion, it is important to note 
that England abolished the death penalty in 1965, long before they joined 
the European courts and made many of the social changes Scalia refers to.  
The two countries may be going in different directions now, but that was 
not the case when England was considering abolishing the death penalty. 
1. Generally 
First, it is worth mentioning the obvious similarities and differences 
between British and American law on the death penalty.  For example, 
both countries entered a moratorium on capital punishment in the 1960s, 
both in disregard of public opinion.  In 1965, public opinion in England 
favored keeping the death penalty; nevertheless, British Parliament decided 
to enact the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, temporarily 
abolishing capital punishment in England for five years.  In 1966, opinion 
polls in America showed that the public also supported the death penalty, 
but in 1967 the death penalty was effectively halted in every state based on 
two Supreme Court decisions.  The moratorium in the United States would 
last for ten years, but the death penalty would be reinstated in 1976 with 
Gregg and its progeny.  In 1969, the death penalty in England was offi-
cially abolished for murder. 
One possible reason for this disparity may be the size difference be-
tween the countries.  The United States is a very large nation, consisting of 
over fifty separate jurisdictions, while England is much like a single state 
here.  Hence, it would take a great deal more change in the United States to 
equal the nation-wide impact that the developments had in England around 
the 1960s.  England abolishing the death penalty, as a country, is much like 
a single state abolishing the death penalty in the United States. 
The obvious, but important difference between the two countries is that 
England reformed its death penalty procedures by legislative action while 
America is currently reforming its system judicially.  In his dissenting 
  
Indeed, one need only observe the institutional make-up of the nation which is one of our 
favorite targets for comparison, the United Kingdom, to realize that the governmental super-
structure of a nation is but window dressing to the true definition of the society that the su-
perstructure governs.  The United Kingdom is a non-federal constitutional monarchy with 
an unwritten constitution.  It has a parliament giving rise to a government that fuses the ex-
ecutive and legislative; a largely self-appointed judicial branch without a defined power of 
judicial review; and laws that must comply with the laws of the European Union.  In other 
words, from an institutional point of view, the United States and the United Kingdom have 
little in common.  However, the structural differences between these two nations (and the 
societies comprising them) are “more fanciful than real,” in that an examination from within 
reveals a commonality of history, direction, and outlook, which shows that the society of the 
United Kingdom closely resembles that of the United States. 
Glensy, supra note 6, at 428–29. 
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opinion to Furman, Chief Justice Burger said the following, which is 
highly relevant to this discussion: 
The world-wide trend toward limiting the use of capital pun-
ishment, a phenomenon to which we have been urged to give great 
weight, hardly points the way to a judicial solution in this country 
under a written Constitution.  Rather, the change has generally 
come about through legislative action, often on a trial basis and 
with the retention of the penalty for certain limited classes of 
crimes.  Virtually nowhere has change been wrought by so crude a 
tool as the Eighth Amendment.  The complete and unconditional 
abolition of capital punishment in this country by judicial fiat 
would have undermined the careful progress of the legislative 
trend and foreclosed further inquiry on many as yet unanswered 
questions in this area.507 
The reasoning behind this point is twofold: a separation of powers issue, 
and the judiciary is unable to adequately debate the issue of capital pun-
ishment—a largely fact-driven, not legal-driven, issue—and it should 
therefore be left to the legislature to decide.508 
However, there are many counter-arguments to this theory.  For in-
stance, in the United States, the judiciary may present the only means 
through which to completely abolish the death penalty.  As a nation con-
sisting of fifty separate states and the federal government, the only way to 
completely abolish the death penalty in all states, other than through the 
Supreme Court, would be to add an amendment to the Constitution abol-
ishing the death penalty.  This is an improbable action.  Other than this, the 
legislatures of every jurisdiction would have to debate and analyze the 
need for the death penalty, which could be a very time-consuming, exhaus-
tive solution, not to mention the fact that certain states, unless forced, are 
unlikely to ever abolish the death penalty.509 
  
 507. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 404 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  However, since this 
was written, South Africa abolished the death penalty judicially, declaring it unconstitutional in the 
landmark decision State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu.  HOOD, supra note 86, at 39–40.  In 1995, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that the death penalty was inconsistent with South Africa’s prohibition 
against “cruel, inhuman or degrading” punishment, a provision in their constitution very similar to the 
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 40; see also Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty 
and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 369, 384–85 (2008). 
 508. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 404–05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 509. Hugo Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America Today, in 
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 480, at 31 (“[T]he death penalty is deeply entrenched in 
Texas, Florida, and other states of the Old Confederacy, where lynching was once the preferred way to 
deal with black men accused of the murder or rape of a white female.  No one has any idea how the 
death penalty in these states—where the vast proportion of all death sentences and executions in the 
United States takes place—is to be ended or even seriously reduced in the near future.”). 
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Further, in the years after Furman, the Supreme Court has been acting 
similarly to the foreign legislatures in its dwindling of the death penalty.510  
The process has been much like that of England.  The English legislature 
first abolished the death penalty for those under sixteen, then for those 
under eighteen.  Finally, the legislature limited the availability of the death 
penalty to only certain types of murder before abolishing it completely.  
Similarly in the United States, the Supreme Court limited the death penalty 
to only the most egregious types of murder in Gregg, Coker, Enmund, and 
Tison.511  Further, the Court abolished the death penalty for those under 
sixteen in Thompson, and then finally abolished the death penalty for those 
under eighteen in Simmons.  This could be considered a similarity between 
the two systems. 
Another disadvantage to the judicial adjudication of the death penalty 
issue is the permanence of the Court’s judgment: if the Supreme Court 
proclaims the death penalty unconstitutional, the only way to reverse that 
decision would be to enact a constitutional amendment allowing the use of 
the punishment.512  This, however, is similar to the current situation in 
England.  After 1998, England adopted two European protocols effectively 
requiring them to abolish the death penalty for all offenses and never re-
  
 510. Justice Scalia, in his dissent to Atkins, even admits that this is what has been happening: 
Today’s opinion adds one more to the long list of substantive and procedural require-
ments impeding imposition of the death penalty imposed under this Court’s assumed power 
to invent a death-is-different jurisprudence. . . . There is something to be said for popular 
abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its incremental abolition by this 
Court. 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 352–53 (2002). 
 511. However, this fact is often disputed.  In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme 
Court was confronted, yet again, with the issue of whether the death penalty was applied in an arbitrary 
and racist manner.  This time the Court was presented with statistical evidence (the Baldus study) that 
showed that a defendant who killed a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death pen-
alty than a defendant who killed a black victim, and that a black defendant was more likely to receive a 
death sentence than other defendants, thus leading to the conclusion that black defendants who kill 
white victims were most likely to receive the death penalty in Georgia for similar murders.  Id. at 288.  
Despite this evidence, the Court held that the Baldus study did not “demonstrate a constitutionally 
significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process” and denied relief to 
McCleskey on both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.  Id. at 313. 
In 2007, twenty years after the decision in McCleskey, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution pub-
lished a four-part special report on the death penalty.  See A Matter of Life or Death, http://www.ajc. 
com/metro/content/metro/stories/deathpenalty/dayone/dpdayone1.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (pub-
lished from September 23–26).  The report looked at Georgia’s death penalty within the last ten years, 
and found that the same problems that existed in 1972 exist today, reiterating Justice Stewart’s words 
from Furman: “Getting the death penalty in Georgia is as predictable as a lightning strike.”  Bill Ran-
kin et al., Death Still Arbitrary, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 23, 2007, at A1.  But see Ken Wynne, 
Death Penalty Is Fair; Georgians Support It, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 3, 2007, at A17 (president of 
the District Attorneys Association of Georgia).  Instead of reserving the death penalty for the most 
egregious kinds of murders, the statutory provisions in practice have made little improvement to the 
way the death penalty is carried out. 
 512. Furman, 408 U.S. at 462 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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enact the punishment.  If England were to reinstate the death penalty now, 
they would have to denounce the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the treaties of the European Union—an unlikely proposition.  Hence, 
the decision in England, while decided by the legislature, was also a per-
manent decision. 
Another argument is that the issue of abolishing the death penalty in 
England was better debated by elected officials who were forced to stay in 
touch with public opinion.  However, while the House of Commons is an 
elected body of Parliament, the House of Lords in England consists of ap-
pointed members not elected by the general public.  Further, when the 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act was passed in 1965, many of the 
House of Lords members were hereditary peers, whose right to be in Par-
liament was passed down from generation to generation.513  The House of 
Lords played an integral role in passing death penalty legislation, as can be 
seen by the many years it took in England before the Lords arrived at the 
same opinion as those in the Commons that capital punishment should be 
abolished. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court Justices are appointed in America, and 
thus one might argue that their power to see the public opinion on an issue 
restricts them from ultimately abolishing the death penalty.  However, the 
Supreme Court can be seen as a similar body to the House of Lords, look-
ing over what the appointed members in the Commons are doing and then 
rendering its own judgment.  The Supreme Court bases all of its death pen-
alty decisions greatly on what the individual legislatures in each state have 
done, thus acting like the House of Lords in England. 
As can be seen from the analysis above, the difference between the 
legislative action in England and the judicial action in America concerning 
the death penalty is an important one.  However, looking at the distinction 
in depth, many similarities exist between the processes in both countries 
despite this fundamental difference. 
  
 513. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
The Lords currently has around 730 Members, and there are four different types: life Peers, 
Law Lords, bishops and elected hereditary peers.  Unlike MPs, the public do not elect the 
Lords.  The majority are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Prime Min-
ister or of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. . . . The right of hereditary peers 
to sit and vote in the House of Lords was ended in 1999 by the House of Lords Act but 92 
Members were elected internally to remain until the next stage of the Lords reform process. 
UK Parliament, Different Types of Lords, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/members/lords_ 
types.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). 
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2. After World War II: A More Humane Society 
Prior to the First World War, abolitionist movements in both the Unit-
ed States and England were gaining strength.  Bills were being debated in 
the House of Commons to abolish the death penalty, and even one bill 
passed through Parliament and received the royal assent—the Children Act 
1908, which abolished the death penalty in England for all children under 
the age of sixteen.  In the United States, significant efforts were being 
made in legislatures throughout the states to enact anti-death penalty legis-
lation.  During the late 1800s, a few states abolished the death penalty and 
similar legislation in other states was going through the system—for all 
intents and purposes it looked like the death penalty would be abolished in 
America in the twentieth century. 
The First World War then brought an abrupt halt to the abolition 
movement in both countries.  Shortly after the war, the movement again 
picked up momentum—the 1930 report of the select committee was issued 
in England, calling for an end to the death penalty as one of its major rec-
ommendations.  Further, as a response to that report, England enacted the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933, officially abolishing the death pen-
alty for all juveniles under eighteen.  In the United States, a total of eight 
more states would abolish the death penalty for murder.514 
However, in both countries the movements again came to a halt.  The 
recommendations of the select committee in England would not be acted 
upon for many years, and by 1921, five states in America reinstated the 
death penalty in their legislatures.  By the time World War II began, the 
abolitionist movements in both countries were at all-time lows. 
The end of the Second World War is where the two countries split.  In 
England, the abolitionist movement picked up from where it left off, and 
by 1948, England had a bill to abolish the death penalty passed through 
one house of Parliament.  By 1957 they had the Homicide Act that severely 
restricted the use of the death penalty; by 1965, they achieved complete 
abolition of the death penalty for murder.  In the United States, though, the 
abolitionist movement did not pick up and nothing would really happen 
with the death penalty in the United States again until the 1960s. 
What happened to cause this difference?  By the end of World War II, 
England and the rest of Europe were in need of change—social reform for 
a more humane society.  The horrors of the Second World War were still 
fresh in everyone’s mind as the death penalty had been used by the Ger-
  
 514. Arizona, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington.  
See Bedau, supra note 280, at 10. 
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mans and Italians as a political cleansing tool, for eugenics purposes.515  
The horrors of the potential of capital punishment were now visible, and 
the response in Europe was to get rid of it before it could do any more 
damage.  Italy abolished the death penalty in 1944 and Germany did the 
same in 1949.  In 1948, the United Nations adopted its Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which guaranteed to everyone the “right to life.”516  
That same year, England’s first major attempt to abolish the death penalty 
passed through the Commons and was nearly put into law.  The efforts 
made by the abolitionists in these early years following the war paved the 
way for the United Nations’ recommendation to severely restrict the death 
penalty’s use in 1966 and its recommendation to abolish the death penalty 
in 1983 for all offenses during peace time.517  By this time, however, Eng-
land had already abolished the death penalty for murder nearly twenty 
years earlier. 
In the United States, the abolitionist movement did not pick up pace as 
fast as in Europe.  Maybe it was because we were not exposed to the hor-
rors of the death penalty as in Europe—the distance of an ocean kept us 
from experiencing the damage capital punishment could bring if used for 
the wrong reasons.518  Justice Marshall, in his concurrence to Furman, of-
fered his reasoning: 
It is not easy to ascertain why the movement lost its vigor.  
Certainly, much attention was diverted from penal reform during 
the economic crisis of the depression and the exhausting years of 
struggle during World War II.  Also, executions, which had once 
been frequent public spectacles, became infrequent private affairs.  
The manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the 
  
 515. See HOOD, supra note 86, at 10 (“[The death penalty] was reintroduced in Italy by Mussolini’s 
Fascist regime in 1927 and in Germany was expanded beyond all recognition by the Nazis, where it 
was ‘to be transformed from an instrument of penal policy into a tool of racial and political engineering 
. . . not merely a matter of retribution but also of eugenics policy.’  Under the Third Reich ‘some 
16,500 death sentences had been passed.’”). 
 516. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
 517. See HOOD, supra note 86, at 14–15. 
 518. Joshua Marquis, a district attorney in Oregon, offers his own reasoning for why Europe was 
affected by the death penalty differently than America: 
Again, context is essential.  The nations that first foreswore capital punishment were 
Germany and Italy, whose very recent history was rife with state-sanctioned murder and 
even genocide.  Add to that legal systems where defendants were and sometimes are pre-
sumed guilty, the absence of a comprehensive jury system, and a recent legal history of ju-
dicial corruption and you would likely find the staunchest of American death penalty sup-
porters understanding why the European Union requires any nation seeking admission to re-
nounce capital punishment. 
Joshua K. Marquis, Truth and Consequences: The Penalty of Death, in DEBATING THE DEATH 
PENALTY, supra note 480, at 117, 125.  
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punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of 
the general public.519 
As explained in the next section, the United States would modify its 
death penalty system, creating restrictions on the way a state would choose 
who would receive the death penalty and new humane methods of execut-
ing the condemned prisoner.  Nearly every one of these changes, however, 
would be discarded by England as unworkable modifications to the system 
with little known enhancement. 
3. Sentencing/Execution Procedures 
Many of the early modifications to the death penalty in the United 
States were explicitly rejected by the British as unworkable and unfair.  
For instance, until the death penalty’s abolition in England, a capital case 
carried a mandatory death sentence for a defendant if convicted.  Even 
after the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report of 1953 rec-
ommended that jury discretion be used, Parliament still believed that man-
datory sentencing was the fairest solution because it based the sentence on 
the heinousness of the crime, not on the personal characteristics of the de-
fendant or possible leniency of a jury.  Jury discretion, the British believed, 
would not result in equal justice for all. 
The United States, however, since the early history of the death penalty 
and confirmed by the Supreme Court in Woodson, believed that jury dis-
cretion was the best way to decide whether a particular defendant received 
the death penalty or not—that the imposition of the death penalty should 
take into effect aggravating and mitigating factors of the individual of-
fender.  While this was an improvement over the random, discriminatorily 
imposed jury discretion system pre-Furman, one must wonder if it is still 
better than the method England imposed.  As it might be, both systems of 
imposing the death penalty were flawed for completely separate reasons.520 
Other modifications the British explicitly rejected were the modern 
methods of execution.  Until its abolition, the British method of execution 
was hanging—this they believed, if done correctly, was the most humane 
method of putting someone to death.  In the Royal Commission on Capital 
  
 519. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 340 (1972). 
 520. The system in the United States might be flawed, not because it allows discretion, but because 
discretion is used as a vehicle for racist administration of the death penalty.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Considering the race of a defendant or victim in 
deciding if the death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with this concern that an individ-
ual be evaluated as a unique human being.”).  But see id. at 311 (majority) (“a capital punishment 
system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency ‘would be totally alien to our notions of 
criminal justice’”). 
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Punishment Report of 1953, the commission recommended that lethal in-
jection be looked into as a possible alternative to hanging, but explicitly 
rejected the use of electrocution and lethal gas as inhumane methods of 
execution.  However, Parliament decided not to pursue the method of le-
thal injection in the 1950s (the United States would not even use it as a 
method of punishment until the 1980s, many years after England abolished 
the death penalty for ordinary crimes).  With America’s problems in the 
past with botched executions in the electric chair and the gas chamber, and 
with recent constitutionality issues with lethal injection, England may have 
been correct in its recommendation.521 
England also did not initially agree with separating murder into de-
grees, with one type of murder capital and the other non-capital, for much 
the same reason as jury discretion—it would be unworkable and unfair.  
Further, when England finally decided to do this with the Homicide Act 
1957, confusion and unfairness in the law led the British to quickly abolish 
the death penalty less than ten years later.  In the United States, first- and 
second-degree murder have been staples of our criminal law system for 
centuries.  Looking at the statutes of many states, the criminal law for capi-
tal murder is very similar to the Homicide Act 1957 in the murders it 
deems capital and those it does not.  Most states that have the death penalty 
impose it on a murder of a police officer, a prison officer by an inmate, or 
if the offender commits multiple murders, much like the Homicide Act 
required.  The United States, however, has somehow managed to quiet the 
critics about the unfairness and questionability of the “murder by degrees” 
doctrine. 
One area where the United States and England have agreed regarding 
execution procedure was the fact that executions should be private affairs, 
  
 521. The U.S. Supreme Court has just recently granted certiorari to hear the issue of whether the 
three-drug cocktail used in lethal injection procedures constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices to Enter the Debate over Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24; 
see also Tim Reid, Lethal Injection Under Review, TIMES (London), Sept. 26, 2007, at 38 (“Nearly all 
executions are carried out by lethal injection but its use has become increasingly controversial after 
research in 2005 in The Lancet, the British medical journal, suggested that some prisoners executed by 
lethal injection suffered agonising deaths.”).  Although England rejected the use of lethal injection in 
the 1950s, nearly thirty years before the United States even started using it as an execution method, the 
United States has never until recently called into question its use. 
Further, the Supreme Court has never held that a specific execution method is cruel and unusual.  
In one nineteenth century case, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Supreme Court upheld the 
firing squad as not a cruel and unusual method of punishment (in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), 
the Court ruled that New York’s state court ruling, that electrocution was not cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause).  See supra Part 
III(B)(1).  However, this will be the first challenge under the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards 
of decency” doctrine for an execution method.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Baze v. Rees, 
No. 07-5439 (July 11, 2007).  Although this case does not present a facial challenge to the constitution-
ality of lethal injection, it is an important case for outlining the standard for an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to an execution method.  Id.; see also infra note 541 and accompanying text. 
File: Millett - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on: 3/5/2008 10:31:00 PM Last Printed: 3/5/2008 10:33:00 PM 
2008 WILL THE UNITED STATES FOLLOW ENGLAND . . . ? 623 
 
not public spectacles.522  When public executions actually ended in each 
country, however, was a different matter.  In 1868, England abolished pub-
lic hangings.  On the other hand, it was not until after 1936, the last re-
corded public execution in Kentucky, that public executions were abol-
ished in the United States.  This discrepancy of nearly seventy years is 
another indication of how the system in England seems to lead and predict 
the changes in the United States.  Not only did England abolish the death 
penalty for juveniles under sixteen, then for juveniles under eighteen, and 
then restrict its use to murder before the United States, but it also led the 
way in abolishing public hangings. 
4. Deterrence & Retribution 
Deterrence and retribution have justified use of the death penalty in 
both countries for thousands of years.  Since the medieval times in Eng-
land, the death penalty has been believed to deter crime, and the close con-
nection between religion and the death penalty made retribution a justifi-
able purpose as well. 
Until the twentieth century, the death penalty in England was a highly 
religious affair—many believed that waiting to be killed by the gallows 
inspired criminals to find God and repent of their sins.  For many years, 
only clergy were allowed to visit a condemned person in prison before 
death—they would talk with the offender in hopes to allow him to confess 
of his sins before execution.  It is this religious background where the 
seeds of punishment for retribution began to grow, as Potter wrote: 
Throughout its history capital punishment served a religious 
function.  Whether imposed in the name of the king, the represen-
tative of God on earth, or by priests, or in the name of a society 
considered as a sacred body, the infliction of the death penalty was 
seen not just as a punishment for a crime, but as a repudiation by 
society of the evil in its midst, ridding the land of its blood-guilt.523 
  
 522. However, as Stuart Banner writes, public executions varied between the two countries.  In the 
United States, “[h]angings were not macabre spectacles staged for a bloodthirsty crowd.  A hanging 
was normally a somber event, like a church service.”  BANNER, supra note 282, at 24.  He goes on: 
[E]ighteenth century American execution crowds were usually not noisy or drunk or disre-
spectful.  Indeed, when the earliest American opponents of capital punishment wished to ar-
gue that frequent public hangings instilled in spectators a lighthearted attitude toward vio-
lence, they had to cite examples of English execution crowds, for want of appropriate ex-
amples at home. 
Id. at 27–28; see also supra Part II(B)(3). 
 523. POTTER, supra note 23, at 160. 
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Even in the Supreme Court, retribution is continuously mentioned as 
one of the reasons to maintain the death penalty.  Retribution is a philoso-
phy, viewed today as either “an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim.”524  
Much has stayed the same since the early days in England.  Although retri-
bution has lost some value—some scholars look to reformation of the 
criminal as a better societal purpose than punishment for retribution—it is 
still used in the Eighth Amendment analysis for an excessive punishment.  
Reasons vary between seeing that the criminal gets his “just deserts” and 
preventing society from taking matters into their own hands.525  But many 
justices see the inadequateness of this purpose and note that retribution is 
not justified for many different kinds of offenders (the insane, the mentally 
retarded, juveniles).  When retribution is justified, it cannot be used alone 
to justify the death penalty.  Despite this, both England and the United 
States have used retribution as a justification for capital punishment. 
Throughout history in both England and the United States, deterrence 
has been stated as the one major reason to support capital punishment.  
“The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the no-
tion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal ac-
tors from carrying out murderous conduct.”526  However, no study has ever 
proved that capital punishment is any more effective as a deterrent than life 
imprisonment without parole. 
The British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report of 1953, 
one of the most comprehensive reports on the death penalty ever assem-
bled (it was 500 pages in length and has been repeatedly cited by the U.S. 
Supreme Court), could find no statistical evidence that the death penalty 
deterred crime, but it assumed that the death penalty would deter certain 
people from committing murder, no matter the statistical evidence.  In 
Gregg, the Supreme Court held similarly that there are “carefully contem-
plated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of 
death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to 
act,” despite there being no proof to support this contention.527  Studies 
since then have varied—some studies show that the death penalty is a de-
terrent; some show it has no effect; and still others show that the death 
penalty actually has a brutalization effect, increasing the murder rate where 
imposed.528  Although England abandoned the death penalty, claiming as 
  
 524. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 525. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). 
 526. Id. at 320. 
 527. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).  
 528. See Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capi-
tal Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 260–61 (2006) (finding that new studies showing the death 
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one of its reasons that capital punishment did not deter crime, the United 
States still uses deterrence as one of the main social purposes of imposing 
the punishment. 
5. The Role of Public Opinion 
The German philosopher Hegel once said, “[t]o be independent of pub-
lic opinion is the first formal condition of achieving anything great.”529  
This quotation summarizes the abolitionists’ stance on capital punishment, 
as there has rarely ever been public support for its abolition.  In both Eng-
land and the United States, public opinion polls throughout the history of 
the death penalty have shown support for its retention.  A recent opinion 
poll in England has even suggested that the public wants the government to 
reinstate the death penalty as a punishment after over thirty years of its 
abolition for ordinary crimes.530  Nevertheless, opinion polls have usually 
made no difference to the subject of the death penalty in either country—as 
Justice Marshall stated in Furman, “American citizens know almost noth-
ing about capital punishment.”531 
In England, public opinion during their retentionist years consistently 
showed the public wanted to retain the death penalty as a punishment.  
Even as Parliament was decreasing the offenses eligible for the death pen-
alty and introducing abolition bills, public opinion was against the aboli-
tion of the death penalty.  When the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) 
Act 1965 received the royal assent and became law, England was still a 
country with public support for the death penalty.  Even after the abolition 
of the death penalty for ordinary offenses in 1965, many public opinion 
polls showed the public wanted to reintroduce the death penalty for mur-
der, despite all the problems the country had with its Homicide Act 1957.  
When England adopted the two European protocols in 1998 and com-
pletely abolished the death penalty, Parliament was still acting without 
public support. 
Similarly in the United States, public support has never favored the 
abolition of the death penalty.  Other than Marshall’s opinion in Furman, 
  
penalty is a deterrent “are fraught with numerous technical and conceptual errors”); Shepherd, supra 
note 81, at 203–04. 
 529. See Arnie Arnesen, Shaheen Should Risk Doing What’s Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2000, 
at 2. 
 530. John Cooper, Stop! There Can Be Too Much of a Good Thing, TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 2006, at 
7 (“BEWARE popular demand—being popular does not make something right and it certainly may not 
make it good. . . . [For example,] if opinion polls are to be believed the general public would welcome 
back capital punishment with open arms, citing a mythical, safer society during the days of judicial 
execution.”). 
 531. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361–62 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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the Supreme Court has only once recognized public opinion in any of its 
decisions—when the majority in Atkins mentioned in a footnote that the 
public supported the abolition of the death penalty for the mentally re-
tarded.532  Most of the state legislatures that have abolished the death pen-
alty have done so despite public opinion to the contrary.  When it comes to 
the issue of the death penalty, public opinion polls really do not matter that 
much to either the Supreme Court or the state legislatures.  When enough 
people believe that the death penalty is inhumane and needs to be abol-
ished, the government will take action despite what the public thinks. 
6. A Lack of Uniformity 
In England, a major factor in its decision to abolish the death penalty 
was the fact that it could not be fairly and uniformly administered.  This is 
part of the reason why they decided not to use jury discretion and why their 
eight year experience in degrees of murder did not work.  They believed 
that if the death penalty was to be imposed, it should be imposed equally 
upon all who commit an equivalent crime, no matter what the mitigating 
factors or where the defendant was located.  To impose the punishment in 
any other way was to be unfair to the people of England.  They also be-
lieved that in order for the death penalty to be a possible deterrent, it must 
be imposed on all people based on the crime they commit, not based on 
where a defendant is from or the defendant’s personal circumstances.  For 
the most part, this worked for them during their experiment with capital 
punishment, although if jury discretion was used instead of mandatory 
death sentences for murder, the lives of Derek Bentley and Ruth Ellis 
would probably have been spared. 
When the Homicide Act 1957 was put into law, many scholars and 
politicians in England noted how unfair and confusing the change of law 
was, as it imposed the death penalty for certain offenses rather than others 
with no real consistency.  There is no doubt that this Act helped lead to the 
abolition of the death penalty in 1965.  As England believed, if they could 
not enact a law to improve the imposition of the death penalty, they might 
as well abolish it altogether. 
The system in the United States is entirely different from that of Eng-
land fifty years ago in this respect, and for entirely the wrong reasons.  As 
Adam Liptak of the New York Times recently said: 
Any system that sentences about 2 percent of all murderers to 
death and then executes relatively few of them is bound to seem 
  
 532. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
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arbitrary.  Add to that the fact that the states have chosen very dif-
ferent approaches to capital punishment, and the output of the ma-
chinery of death can seem awfully random.533 
In the United States, there is a serious lack of uniformity with the use 
of the death penalty that many believe make it an unfair sentence.  In many 
Southern states, studies have shown that race has played a substantial role 
in jury decisions on whether to impose the death penalty.534  Further, since 
the death penalty is not controlled by the federal government (except for 
where the Supreme Court has ruled), each state has a different law for capi-
tal punishment.  Each state also has a different list of offenses that are pun-
ishable by death.  Further, thirteen U.S. states currently do not have the 
death penalty.  To better understand this situation, take the example of two 
bordering states: Michigan and Ohio.  Michigan was the first jurisdiction in 
modern times to abolish the death penalty, while Ohio executed the second 
most people in the United States in 2006.  If a defendant commits murder 
in Michigan, the worst sentence he could have received over the last 150 
years is life imprisonment without parole.  However, if the defendant lives 
just across the border in Ohio, that same defendant could be subject to the 
death penalty.  It does not seem fair that such a distinction could exist for 
two different areas of the same country.535 
Further, many European nations, as well as Canada and Mexico, are 
now refusing to extradite offenders back to the United States if the death 
penalty is sought.  In order for extradition to occur in these situations, the 
United States must give written confirmation to these countries that the 
death penalty will not be sought.536  Take another example of a defendant 
who commits capital murder in Texas—the state that executes the most 
people in the United States.  Assume that the defendant escapes into Mex-
ico after committing the crime but before being caught by the authorities.  
Under this scenario, Texas would have to agree not to pursue the death 
penalty against the defendant in order for extradition to be possible.  Why 
should the law give advantages to a defendant who runs away to another 
country after committing a crime?  This seems to suggest that the best 
available option for a criminal who commits capital murder in a death pen-
alty state is to leave the country.  If the criminal can successfully get out of 
the country, the criminal is then free from the possibility of receiving the 
  
 533. Adam Liptak, Geography and the Machinery of Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at A12. 
 534. See supra note 511 and accompanying text. 
 535. Some may argue that this is the case in many areas of the law; however, as even Justice Scalia 
has admitted, “death is different.”  See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991). 
 536. HOOD, supra note 86, at 21. 
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death penalty.  Not only does this seem unfair, but it also seems to cut 
down the already shaky deterrence effect of capital punishment. 
If this is not enough, geography within a criminal’s home state will 
also, in many cases, determine whether the death penalty will be sought.  
Consider the example of a defendant who commits capital murder in a state 
that has the death penalty on the west side of a road instead of a few feet 
away on the east side.  Such a small difference should not matter when 
seeking the death penalty for a heinous offense like murder, should it?  
Well, if the west side of the road was given to the Native Americans by the 
United States and the offender who committed the crime is Native Ameri-
can, federal law prohibits the death penalty as a punishment unless the 
tribe consents to it.  Such a far-fetched situation happened to Patrick Mur-
phy, who is now on death row in Oklahoma appealing his sentence because 
the trial court determined that he committed murder on the wrong side of 
the road.537 
Finally, geography can also play a deciding role depending on whether 
the prosecutor in your district is a staunch supporter of capital cases.  As 
Stephen Bright, President of the Southern Center for Human Rights, said: 
The two most important decisions in every death penalty case are 
made not by juries or judges, but by prosecutors.  No state or fed-
eral law ever requires prosecutors to seek the death penalty or take 
a capital case to trial.  A prosecutor has complete discretion in de-
ciding whether to seek the death penalty and, even if death is 
sought, whether to offer a sentence less than death in exchange for 
the defendant’s guilty plea. . . .  
As a result of this discretion, there are great geographical dis-
parities in where death is imposed within states.  Prosecutors in 
Houston and Philadelphia have sought the death penalty in virtu-
ally every case in which it can be imposed.  As a result of aggres-
sive prosecutors and inept court-appointed lawyers, Houston and 
  
 537. Liptak, supra note 533.  The issue could even turn on who has the property rights to the land and 
whether they are surface or underground rights: 
But in December 2005, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, while acknowledg-
ing that Mr. Murphy’s case presented a “challenging issue,” ruled that underground rights 
do not count.  “Common sense tells us,” Vice Presiding Judge Gary L. Lumpkin wrote, 
“that this issue has more to do with surface rights than underground minerals.” 
The United States Supreme Court is now considering whether to hear the case and 
asked the federal government in June to offer its views. 
Id.; see also Murphy v. State, 124 P.3d 1198, 1207 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). 
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Philadelphia have each condemned over 100 people to death—
more than most states.538 
Governor George Ryan of Illinois agreed with Bright.  One of the rea-
sons why he commuted all the sentences for inmates on death row in Illi-
nois to life imprisonment in 2003 was the fact that uniformity was a prob-
lem within Illinois—where prosecutors around the state did not equally 
seek the death penalty.539  The non-uniformity of the United States’ use of 
the death penalty has made it an unfair and random process.  Uniformity 
was one of the main reasons for England abolishing the death penalty, and 
they did not have nearly as many of the problems that America is currently 
facing. 
7. The Importance of Miscarriages of Justice 
The United States has yet to have a cause celebre case of a miscarriage 
of justice similar to that of Evans, Bentley, and Ellis in England.  Many of 
the innocent inmates in America discussed by the media have been found 
wrongly convicted through recent DNA technology, through independent 
groups that investigate death penalty cases, or even through the lengthy 
legal process.  People like Ron Williamson, the ex-minor league baseball 
player wrongly convicted for murder in Oklahoma; Gary Gauger, wrongly 
convicted for murdering his parents in Illinois; and Ray Krone, freed be-
cause DNA evidence pointed to another man in Arizona, have all had their 
stories heralded around the news and public.540  Luckily these men eventu-
ally were found innocent before their executions, due in a large part to the 
abolitionist movement in the United States and the members of the public 
who are always questioning the system.541 
  
 538. Stephen B. Bright, Why the United States Will Join the Rest of the World in Abandoning Capital 
Punishment, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 480, at 163; see also Bright, supra note 
507, at 374–79. 
 539. Ryan, supra note 480, at 220–21.  In a speech at Northwestern University in 2003, Ryan, once a 
staunch supporter of the death penalty, said the following: 
In Illinois last year we had about 1,000 murders, only 2 percent of that 1,000 were sentenced 
to death.  Where is the fairness and equality in that?  The death penalty in Illinois is not im-
posed fairly or uniformly because of the absence of standards for the 102 Illinois state attor-
neys, who must decide whether to request the death sentence.  Should geography be a factor 
in determining who gets the death sentence?  I don’t think so but in Illinois it makes a dif-
ference.  You are five times more likely to get a death sentence for first-degree murder in 
the rural area of Illinois than you are in Cook County.  Where is the justice and fairness in 
that?  Where is the proportionality? 
Id. 
 540. Death Penalty Information Center, Cases of Innocence 1973–Present, http://www.deathpenalty-
info.org/article.php?scid=6&did=109 (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
 541. Is it a good idea for the public to question the system?  Obviously, Carol and Jordan Steiker do 
not believe so: 
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What is most frightening about the current situation in the United 
States, however, is that looking at the British trilogy of cases, in some in-
stances history seems to be repeating itself.  Because of the early modifica-
tions of jury discretion and degrees of murder, a person like Ruth Ellis 
probably would not be sent to death row in the United States.  However, a 
case similar to Derek Bentley’s almost occurred.  LaSamuel Gamble was 
on death row in Alabama for a robbery murder he committed when nine-
teen years old.  The actual triggerman, Marcus Pressley, is serving a life 
sentence because he was only sixteen at the time of the offense.  Granted, 
Gamble was not in police custody when the shot was fired, but video evi-
dence conclusively proved that Gamble was not the one who pulled the 
trigger during the robbery.  Yet because of the confusing language in Ti-
son, and because of Gamble being nineteen years old at the time of of-
fense, he was on death row while his co-defendant—the one who actually 
committed murder—was not.  However, thanks to the great work of the 
Southern Center for Human Rights, Gamble’s death sentence was reversed 
on September 7, 2007.  This decision has caused much controversy in Ala-
bama and Troy King, the Alabama Attorney General, has promised an ap-
peal in the case.  The United States may avoid a miscarriage of justice like 
the one in England. 
However, the case of Timothy Evans could never be avoided no matter 
how many “improvements” are made to the system.  The case against Ev-
ans was overwhelming—he confessed to the killings, the bodies were 
found outside his house hidden in a wash-house, and he had a potential 
motive to kill his wife and daughter.  If not for the revelation that a serial 
killer, John Christie, was also living at 10 Rillington Place who killed 
many more women in the same way that Evans’s wife and daughter were 
killed, Timothy Evans would probably be just another guilty man who died 
by the gallows in England.  An extraordinary, coincidental tale this was 
indeed, but most murders are extraordinary tales.  What are the odds that 
this could happen again?  What are the odds that this has already happened 
in the United States? 
  
Moreover, when such errors are discovered, as some but by no means all of them eventually 
will be, they deeply undermine the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.  This lat-
ter cost, though unquantifiable, is tremendously important.  Public fear of unjust violence at 
the hands of the state, which has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, is the hallmark 
of totalitarian regimes, one of the indices that most distinguish them from free and democ-
ratic societies.  There is thus ample reason to weigh erroneous executions quite differently 
from unavoidable deaths in the regulatory context. 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of 
the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
587, 588 (2005); see also Craig Haney, Comment, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Ex-
panding the Zone of Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131 
(2006). 
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The similarities between Evans’s case and the facts in Herrera are 
striking.  Herrera claimed to have new evidence showing his innocence ten 
years after he was convicted—Evans’s innocence did not surface until 
many years after his execution.  Further, Herrera allegedly confessed to the 
murder of the Texas police officer, a fact which the Supreme Court 
weighed heavily in favor of him not meeting the extraordinarily high bur-
den—Evans also confessed to the murder of his wife and baby, and even 
had a potential motive to kill his wife.  These similar facts show that, even 
if Herrera was guilty, the Herrera test could bar a future innocent inmate 
on death row from bringing that evidence to court. 
True, recent scientific developments such as DNA testing have helped 
to predict who is guilty and who is not, but these tests are not 100% con-
clusive and cannot be applied in every case.  Many cases just do not have 
physical evidence that exists that would be testable for DNA.  Looking at 
the way John Christie murdered his victims, by gassing them and then 
strangling them, it is possible that if that same murder happened today, 
evidence might not be found to test for DNA to prove Timothy Evans’s 
innocence. 
The abolitionist movement thought they had a case of an innocent man 
executed in Roger Coleman.  However, DNA testing after his execution 
proved that Coleman was actually guilty, prompting a sigh of relief from 
the whole world that an innocent man was not executed.  The issue of in-
nocence and death row exonerees is often one that gets much public atten-
tion in the United States, but it may not be the best approach to abolishing 
the death penalty. 
In England, the “trilogy” of cases caused such a public outcry against 
the death penalty that action was nearly guaranteed in Parliament for aboli-
tion of capital punishment.  However, in the U.S. Supreme Court, inno-
cence rarely plays a role in the Justice’s Eighth Amendment analysis.  It 
was mentioned in passing by Justice Marshall in Furman, but has never 
played a part in any Court opinion restricting the death penalty.  There are 
some signs of change occurring, however.  In one of the most recent Su-
preme Court cases on the death penalty, Kansas v. Marsh, upholding Kan-
sas’s death penalty procedures, Justice Souter dissented citing recent DNA 
evidence and studies that showed the possibility of executing the innocent.  
Scalia, in a concurrence, then attacked Souter for his conclusions and for 
even bringing up such a subjective subject as innocence in a Court deci-
sion.542 
There is also hope in the state legislatures, where innocence on death 
row is a more debated matter.  In Illinois, for instance, the exoneration of 
  
 542. See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2534 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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eighteen inmates believed to be wrongly convicted caused Governor 
George Ryan to implement a moratorium on the death penalty, create a 
commission to study the death penalty in Illinois, and later commute the 
death sentences for all inmates on death row in Illinois to life imprison-
ment without parole.  If more states begin to look at the question of inno-
cence, perhaps this question will become as important to abolition as it was 
in England. 
8. Political Involvement 
There is no question that politics plays a role in capital punishment.  
This is relevant both in England and the United States.  Written after the 
decision in Thompson, one author mentions even the political nature of the 
Supreme Court decisions: 
Although politics naturally plays a role in Supreme Court ap-
pointments, the Justices have expressed concern over the public’s 
“perception that constitutionality is nothing more than the cumula-
tive product of the political parties’ power and luck at controlling 
new appointments.”  However, as one of the most important, yet 
divisive, constitutional issues of our day, capital punishment un-
doubtedly will continue to be controlled, to some extent, by politi-
cal forces.  Given the frequent political changes within the execu-
tive branch and the inevitable retirement or death of Court mem-
bers, the Court’s final word on both adult and juvenile executions 
may not be heard for a long time—if ever.543 
Thus, the death penalty, even when being controlled by judicial over-
sight in America, can still be controlled by political appointments of Su-
preme Court Justices.  Further, there is no question that the death penalty is 
a highly political issue in the state legislatures. 
In England, abolition of the death penalty was achieved in most part 
due to the rise of power and backing of the Labour Party.  The Labour Par-
ty, even when in office, stood by its stance against the death penalty in 
England, and when the time came for the government to abolish the death 
penalty in 1965, the Labour Party did everything within its power to make 
that not only a possibility but a political achievement.544 
  
 543. Susan M. Simmons, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the Constitutionality of Juvenile 
Executions, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 760–61 (1989). 
 544. See generally Christoph, supra note 111, at 22, 31–35 (“The second development that gave 
cause for hope was the coming to power of the Labour Party.  Over the years, Labour had shown con-
siderably more interest in the cause of abolition than the Conservatives.  For example, it was the Mac-
Donald Government of 1929 that had appointed the Select Committee on Capital Punishment which 
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The backing of a political party is one thing the United States does not 
have.  The Democratic Party comes close to having an anti-death penalty 
stance; however, whenever the Democrats are in power, little is done about 
the issue of capital punishment.  In fact, one of the greatest expansions of 
the death penalty in the United States was signed into law by the Clinton 
administration—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.545 
This may be the greatest difference regarding abolition of the death 
penalty between these countries.  England had the leadership and the party 
affiliation to make abolition a reality.  The Labour Party, Sydney Silver-
man, Lord Gardiner, and many others were able to make a change because 
they believed that the death penalty needed to go.  In the United States, few 
people here have risen up and taken the leadership role in abandoning the 
death penalty.  Just like England, the United States needs leaders to de-
nounce the death penalty and fight for change, instead of raising the death 
penalty up as being tough on crime. 
Two recent signs of improvement are Governor Ryan denouncing the 
death penalty in Illinois and Democrat Governor O’Malley’s recommenda-
tion that Maryland completely abolish the death penalty shortly after his 
entering office.546  Hopefully death penalty abolitionists can start to rely on 
the Democratic Party to renounce the death penalty—especially with a new 
presidential election soon approaching.  Hopefully more Democrats like 
O’Malley will push for the abolition of the death penalty in state and fed-
eral legislatures.  We need much more than just a few leaders rejecting 
capital punishment, however, for abolition to become a reality. 
B. International Trend of Abolishing the Death Penalty 
For the first time in history, a majority of the world has now abolished 
the death penalty.  According to Table 1 below, 102 countries have either 
completely abolished the death penalty (91) or have abolished the death 
penalty for all but exceptional crimes, such as military offenses (11).  
Ninety-five countries still retain the death penalty, although technically 
thirty-three of those countries are abolitionist in practice, meaning they 
“have not executed anyone during the past 10 years and are believed to 
  
recommended the experimental abolition of the death penalty for five years.  Furthermore, the party’s 
annual conference in 1934 had passed an abolitionist resolution, and a number of Labour MP’s who 
now were ministers (including Home Secretary J. Chuter Ede) had supported the abortive 1938 
amendment.”). 
 545. See The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214. 
 546. Jennifer Skalka, O’Malley Lobbies for Repeal: Governor Urges an End to Death Penalty in MD, 
BALT. SUN, Feb. 22, 2007, at 1A. 
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have a policy or established practice of not carrying out executions.”547  In 
practice, then, there are currently 135 abolitionist countries, compared to 
only 62 retentionist countries. 
As seen in Table 1 below, since 1988, fifty countries have abolished 
the death penalty.  Recently, in 2005 Mexico abolished the death penalty 
completely (their last execution for ordinary offenses was in 1937), leaving 
the United States as the only country in North America with capital pun-
ishment on its books.548  The most recent country to abolish the death pen-
alty was Uzbekistan, which abolished the death penalty for all offenses on 
January 11, 2008.549  Further, all Western European nations have now abol-
ished the death penalty, the last country being Turkey in 2004.550  It ap-
pears that the evolving international standard of decency shows that the 
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment, as most countries around 
the world have now abolished capital punishment.  The “world commu-
nity” (especially America’s “democratic allies”) has turned away from the 
imposition of the death penalty, mostly due to the international human 
rights movement in Europe.551 
 
TABLE 1 
RECENT INTERNATIONAL TREND OF ABOLITION 




Yearc No. Percent No. Percent 
Tot. No. 
Countries 
1988 52 29% 128 71% 180 
1995 73 38% 119 62% 192 
2001 89 46% 105 54% 194 
  
 547. See Amnesty International—Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, http://www.amnesty.org/en 
/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 548. See Amnesty International—Death Penalty Developments in 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/ 
pages/deathpenalty-developments2005-eng (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).  Canada completely abolished 
the death penalty in 1998—they had not executed anyone since 1962.  HOOD, supra note 86, at 62. 
 549. Amnesty International—Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 547. 
 550. Turkey abolished the death penalty for all ordinary offenses in 2002.  HOOD, supra note 86, at 8.  
In 2004, Turkey completely abolished the death penalty for all offenses.  Amnesty International—
Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 547. 
 551. HOOD, supra note 86, at 14–15.  The human rights campaign in Europe began shortly after the 
Second World War, in 1948, when the United Nations declared that every human being had the “right 
to life.”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 516.  In 1994, the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe recommended the complete abolition of the death penalty by establishing 
the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.  HOOD, supra note 86, at 14–15.  By 2001, 
this protocol was ratified by thirty-nine countries.  Another protocol of the ICCPR recommending 
abolition of capital punishment was ratified by forty-six countries.  The effect of these treaties meant 
that all sixty-nine countries that had ratified them were now barred from reintroducing the death pen-
alty.  Id. at 15–16.  Finally, the European Union has made the abolition of the death penalty a precondi-
tion of membership, causing many more countries to abolish the death penalty in order to join the EU.  
Id. at 17. 
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2007 102 52% 95 48% 197 
a. Includes complete abolitionist countries and abolitionist countries for ordinary offenses. 
b. Includes retentionist countries and abolitionist in practice countries (abolitionist de facto—
no executions within the last ten years). 
c. All data from years 1988, 1995, and 2001 collected from HOOD, supra note 86, at 14.  All 
data from 2007 collected from Amnesty International—Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, 
supra note 547. 
 
Despite this fact, many countries still support the use of capital pun-
ishment—ninety-one percent of all known executions in 2006 occurred in 
China, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, and the United States.552  Methods of 
execution used by countries since 2000 include: beheading, electrocution, 
hanging, lethal injection, shooting, and stoning.  The most common meth-
ods are hanging and shooting—electrocution is only used in the United 
States and lethal injection is only used in four countries.553  In these coun-
tries, abolition is not likely to happen for some time.  As Roger Hood 
points out: 
There is good evidence to support the view that abolition of capital 
punishment is linked to the development of political rights which 
emphasize “human rights,” and it is probable therefore that many 
countries that face this challenge shelter behind the fact that the 
government of the United States, a government which regards it-
self as a champion of human rights, continues to support and prac-
tise capital punishment.  What happens to the abolitionist cause in 
America may therefore be of crucial significance to the further ad-
vancement of the abolitionist movement worldwide.554 
In addition, many countries are refusing to extradite criminals to the 
United States if the death penalty is a possibility.555  In Soering v. United 
Kingdom,556 the European Court of Human Rights held that a West Ger-
man national living in England could not be extradited to the United States 
because of what was called the “death row phenomenon,” the degrading 
and inhuman treatment suffered by a death row inmate awaiting execution, 
contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights.557  This policy has 
  
 552. Amnesty International—Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ 
deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited Nov. 19, 2007) (177 in Iran, 82 in Pakistan, 65 in Iraq, 65 in Sudan, 
and 53 in the United States). 
 553. Id.  Lethal injection, now under controversy in the United States, is only used by three other 
countries in the world: China, Guatemala, and Thailand.  Beheading is only used in Saudi Arabia and 
stoning is only used in Afghanistan and Iran.  Id. 
 554. HOOD, supra note 86, at 22. 
 555. Id. at 21. 
 556. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 439 (1989). 
 557. Id.; see also HOOD, supra note 86, at 20–21. 
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been taken up by all of Europe; even Canada and Mexico now refuse to 
extradite a criminal to the United States without express written confirma-
tion that the death penalty will not be sought.558  The use of the death pen-
alty by the United States is not only divergent to the international trend of 
abolition, but is also causing bad diplomatic relations with other nations. 
C. The Death Penalty Debate in the States 
1. Generally 
In America, a majority of states still have the death penalty, making it 
very difficult, if not impossible, to find a “national consensus” for an 
Eighth Amendment analysis.  Thirteen states, plus the District of Colum-
bia, have completely abolished the death penalty in the United States.559  In 
fact, just recently New Jersey became the thirteenth state to abolish the 
death penalty in the United States, signing the abolition bill into law on 
December 17, 2007.560  On December 10, the New Jersey Senate voted to 
abolish by a vote of 21–16.561  This was shortly followed by the New Jer-
sey General Assembly, voting 44–36 on December 13 to abolish the death 
penalty.562  The Bill was signed into law on December 17 by Governor Jon 
Corzine.563  This legislative action was spurred by a commission report 
published in January 2007 recommending complete abolition of the death 
penalty in New Jersey.564 
There is evidence that momentum is beginning to gain in other states 
as well.  In 2004, New York’s highest court declared its current death pen-
  
 558. HOOD, supra note 86, at 21; Burleson, supra note 474, at 913–14. 
 559. Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  HOOD, supra note 86, at 63; Jeremy W. Peters, 
Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at 
B3. 
 560. Peters, supra note 559. 
 561. Joe Donohue & Josh Margolin, Poll: Jersey Voters Favor Keeping Death Penalty, TIMES (Tren-
ton, N.J.), Dec. 12, 2007, at A17. 
 562. Jeremy W. Peters, Trenton Moves to End Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at 
B7. 
 563. Peters, supra note 559.  The abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey was without public 
support.  A poll taken shortly after the Senate voted to abolish the death penalty showed that the public 
supports the death penalty in New Jersey by a margin of fifty-three percent to thirty-nine percent.  
Donohue & Margolin, supra note 561. 
 564. Peter G. Verniero, Appealed to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at 15; see also David W. 
Chen, Suspension of the Death Penalty Is All but Assured in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at 
B1; Laura Mansnerus, Panel Seeks End to Death Penalty for New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at 
A1; Rethinking the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at A16.  But see John F. Russo, Don’t 
Abolish Death Penalty, Fix It, BALT. SUN, Mar. 1, 2007, at 13A. 
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alty statute unconstitutional.565  Further action in the New York legislature 
has been unable to pass a new bill reinstating the death penalty.566  Also, on 
February 21, 2007, Governor O’Malley urged the Maryland legislature to 
consider a bill that would completely abolish the death penalty in Mary-
land, though this bill was defeated in a Senate committee.567  On February 
8, 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court declared death by electrocution 
“cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of their state constitution, thus 
voiding the state’s only method of execution.568  Further, the Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments on the issue of whether the three-drug cocktail 
used in lethal injections is cruel and unusual punishment in January 2008.  
This has blocked all executions using lethal injection while the issue has 
been pending.569  Prior to this, lethal injection procedures were being ques-
tioned by the courts of many states, causing twelve jurisdictions to halt all 
executions and create de facto moratoriums.570  The main reason for this 
trend was a recent botched execution in Florida, where it took an accused 
individual thirty minutes to die by lethal injection.571  Arkansas, California, 
Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, 
  
 565. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 368 (N.Y. 2004) (finding a problem with a mandatory jury 
instruction required by the death penalty statute); see also Al Baker, Legislature Is Given Task of 
Correcting Law’s Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at B5. 
 566. Patrick D. Healy, Death Penalty Is Blocked by Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at B1 
(“Democrats in the State Assembly closed the door Tuesday on reviving the death penalty in New York 
State this year, handing a significant victory to opponents of capital punishment who are trying to build 
a national momentum.”); see also Al Baker, Effort to Reinstate Death Penalty Law Is Stalled in Albany, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at A1. 
 567. Bradley Olson & Jennifer McMenamin, Death Penalty Revoked in N.J., Despite Hopes, Repeal 
in MD Faces Hurdles, BALT. SUN, Dec. 18, 2007, at 1A; Skalka, supra note 546 (“Gov. Martin 
O’Malley appeared before two General Assembly committees yesterday to make a forceful call for 
repealing the death penalty.  O’Malley, a Democrat, told lawmakers that the death penalty does not 
deter crime, carries excessive costs and damages human dignity.”).  But see Larry Carson, Most County 
Legislatures Back Death Penalty, BALT. SUN, Feb. 25, 2007, at 1G. 
 568. Liptak, supra note 298.  
 569. Greenhouse, supra note 521; see also supra note 521 and accompanying text. 
 570. Rulings May Change Lethal Injection Process, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at 19 (“A federal 
judge’s ruling Wednesday that Tennessee’s lethal injection procedure could cause excruciating pain is 
another blow to the three-drug cocktail used by every state that executes by lethal injection.”); Henry 
Weinstein, N.C. Is 11th State to Halt Lethal Injections: A Judge Blocks Two Executions Until Proce-
dures Are Changed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at 16 [hereinafter Weinstein, 11th State]; see also 
Andrew Cohen, Stay of Executions: After a Generation of Often Reckless Expansion, the Pendulum Is 
Swinging Back, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at 19 (North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas courts have stayed 
executions for various reasons); Henry Weinstein, Federal Judge Orders Missouri to Stop All Execu-
tions, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at 16; Henry Weinstein, Ruling Halts State Method of Execution: A 
Judge Says California’s Injection Procedure Is Cruel and Unusual, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at 1. 
 571. Terry Aguayo, Florida Death Row Inmate Dies Only After Second Chemical Dose, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2006, at A28; see also Adam Liptak & Terry Aguayo, After Problem Execution, Governor 
Bush Suspends the Death Penalty in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at A11. 
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Tennessee, and the federal government all halted executions before the 
U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the issue.572 
Illinois has had a moratorium on the death penalty since 2000, imposed 
by Governor Ryan after a number of innocent men were freed from Illi-
nois’s death row.573  Governor Ryan also set up a commission to study the 
death penalty in Illinois and in 2002, after two years of deliberation, the 
commission members agreed that the death penalty should be significantly 
changed and restricted.  A majority of the commission even recommended 
the abolition of the death penalty.574  One specific recommendation made 
by the commission was to limit the number of crimes eligible for the death 
penalty to five types of murder: (1) murder of a police officer or firefighter, 
(2) murder of a prison correctional officer or inmate, (3) murder to obstruct 
the justice system, (4) torture during the course of a murder, and (5) the 
murder of two or more persons.575  Governor Ryan immediately announced 
legislation to put into effect the recommendations, but the legislature never 
acted.576  In a speech in 2003, Ryan commuted all the sentences of the 
death row inmates to that of life imprisonment, after noting that the system 
in Illinois was flawed and unfair.577 
In 2006 there were fifty-three executions in the United States; in 2007 
there were forty-two, the lowest number since 1994.578  Only fourteen 
states actually used the death penalty in 2006, followed by only ten states 
in 2007.579  In 2007, Texas accounted for twenty-six executions—no other 
state had more than three executions.580  In addition, a number of states 
who still maintain the death penalty have not even executed anyone since 
1976: Kansas, New Hampshire, and New York.581  South Dakota recently 
executed its first person since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, 
  
 572. Weinstein, 11th State, supra note 570; Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty in Flux, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2289 (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
 573. Eighteen people have been found innocent on death row in Illinois.  Death Penalty Information 
Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 477. 
 574. HOOD, supra note 86, at 71–72. 
 575. Id. at 189.  Does this not sound very similar to the Homicide Act 1957 in England? 
 576. Id. at 72 n.210. 
 577. Ryan, supra note 480, at 233. 
 578. Weinstein, supra note 478; Death Penalty Information Center, Executions by Year, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146 (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
 579. Weinstein, supra note 478; Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State 
and Region Since 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186 (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2007). 
 580. Weinstein, supra note 478. 
 581. Death Penalty Information Center, State Execution Rates, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?scid=8&did=477 (last visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
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after previously postponing the execution because of concerns with the 
State’s lethal injection procedure.582 
See Figure 1 below for a summary of the death penalty currently in the 
United States.  Added together, seventeen states (eighteen including D.C.) 
currently have either rejected or refused to impose the death penalty in the 
United States.  Time will tell whether the jurisdictions who have currently 
halted all executions due to problems with lethal injection will decide to 
resume executions or abolish the death penalty, but it seems like momen-
tum may be gaining with the state legislatures showing a rejection of capi-
tal punishment.583 
  
 582. Monica Davey, Execution in South Dakota, Delayed a Year by Debate on Method, Is First in 6 
Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A12 [hereinafter Davey, Execution]; Monica Davey, South 
Dakota Plans Its First Execution Since 1947, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at A16 (“Although capital 
punishment has been allowed in South Dakota for decades, it is one of a handful of states, including 
New Jersey and New Hampshire, that have carried out no executions since they most recently enacted 
such laws.  In South Dakota, the most recent law allowing death sentences was enacted in 1979 after 
the United States Supreme Court restored capital punishment in 1976.”); South Dakota: Execution 
Postponed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, at A17. 
 583. Things are not all going well for abolitionists, however.  Six states have enacted legislation that 
would expand the death penalty in their states: Florida, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, South Caro-
lina, and Texas.  Liptak, supra note 402.  South Dakota just recently executed their first inmate since 
1947.  Davey, Execution, supra note 582.  Further, New Hampshire, a state once thought would soon 
abolish the death penalty, is pursuing the death penalty for a recent arrest connected with the killing of 
a police officer.  Jonathan Saltzman, N.H. Revives Death-Penalty Issue: Officer’s Killing Spurs a 
Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2006, at 5B; see also infra Part IV(C)(2). 
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2. History and Recent Developments in New Hampshire 
New Hampshire is generally seen as the least worrisome state that still 
maintains the death penalty in the United States.  New Hampshire is 
among the few states that have not executed anybody since the death pen-
alty was reinstated in 1976.  Further, New Hampshire is the only state that 
has not put anybody on death row since 1976.584  In fact, the last execution 
in New Hampshire was in 1939.585  Throughout the history of the death 
  
 584. See Norma Love, Death Penalty Untested, CONCORD MONITOR, Oct. 22, 2006, at B1. 
 585. Mike Pride, Unseemly Enthusiasm, CONCORD MONITOR, Oct. 22, 2006, at D1; see also DANIEL 
ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW ENGLAND: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE, 1623–1960, at 
373–74 (1999). 
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penalty in New Hampshire, the state has only executed twenty-four peo-
ple—the same number, coincidentally, that Texas executed in 2006.586 
The first execution in New Hampshire occurred in 1739—the public 
hangings of Sarah Simpson and Penelope Kenny for the murder of their 
infant children.587  The crimes were committed in Portsmouth, New Hamp-
shire in August 1739 when both women had births out of wedlock.  Both 
concealed their pregnancies and then killed their babies after birth.  When 
the authorities found the dead infants, both women became suspects and 
were questioned by the police.588  Simpson and Kenny both confessed to 
the murders and both were convicted by juries and hanged on December 
27, 1739.589  The last execution of a woman in New Hampshire was that of 
Ruth Blay—hanged on December 30, 1768, also for the murder of her 
newborn child.590 
New Hampshire last revised their death penalty statute in 1991.  Under 
New Hampshire law, six types of murder are eligible for the death penalty: 
(1) murder of a police or judicial officer acting in the line of duty, (2) mur-
der during or while attempting to commit kidnapping, (3) murder for hire 
(either the one who paid or the one who killed), (4) murder while under the 
sentence of life without parole, (5) murder during or while attempting to 
commit aggravated felonious sexual assault, and (6) murder during or 
while attempting to commit a felony under the Controlled Drug Act.591 
Under the procedures enforced by the Supreme Court in Gregg, New 
Hampshire requires a second sentencing trial after conviction of capital 
murder where aggravating and mitigating factors are presented to the 
jury.592  A jury must find at least two aggravating circumstances by unani-
  
 586. Weinstein, supra note 478; see also HEARN, supra note 585, at 131–32, 141–42, 151, 174, 184, 
192, 207–08, 222–23, 227–29, 245–46, 249, 252–53, 258–60, 262–63, 265–66, 274–75, 280–81, 285–
86, 334–35, 339–41, 373–74. 
 587. HEARN, supra note 585, at 131–32. 
Well into the nineteenth century, execution crowds still outnumbered crowds gathered for 
any other purpose. 
One reason crowds were so big was that in any given area an execution was a rare 
event.  When Sarah Simpson and Penelope Kenny were hanged for infanticide in Ports-
mouth, New Hampshire, in the winter of 1739, the ceremony “drew together a vast Con-
course of People, and probably the greater, because these were the first Executions that ever 
were seen in this Province.” 
BANNER, supra note 282, at 25. 
 588. HEARN, supra note 585, at 131. 
 589. Id. at 132. 
 590. Id. at 151 (“This celebrated case has long been rife with misinformation.  A subject of folklore, 
it has had its facts twisted and romanticized by generations of storytellers to create a popular myth 
about innocence, wrongful execution, and official misconduct.  The truth, however, is quite different: 
Ruth Blay was undeniably guilty and the sheriff who officiated at her execution acted in strict accor-
dance to his orders.”). 
 591. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (2005). 
 592. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1991). 
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mous vote to impose a death sentence.  However, the finding of an aggra-
vating circumstance with no mitigating circumstances does not mandate 
the death penalty—the jury may still impose a sentence of life without pa-
role.  New Hampshire’s statute provides nine statutory mitigating factors 
and ten statutory aggravating factors.593  There is also a specification that if 
a jury cannot decide on a sentence within a reasonable time, the judge shall 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole.  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court must review death sentences within sixty days.  New 
Hampshire specifies the use of lethal injection for executing the con-
demned, but also allows hanging if lethal injection cannot be adminis-
tered.594 
Attempts were made in 2000 to abolish the death penalty in New 
Hampshire.  In March 2000, an abolition bill passed in the House by a vote 
of 191–163.595  The bill then received world-wide attention, as New Hamp-
shire would possibly become the first state in over a decade to abolish the 
death penalty.596  In the preceding weeks leading up to a vote on the bill in 
the Senate, New Hampshire Senators received emails and calls from peo-
ple all over the United States and the world urging them to end the death 
penalty in the State.  It was said that the Colosseum in Rome would be lit 
up—as it is whenever a governing body abolishes the death penalty—and 
that the end of the death penalty in New Hampshire could start a national 
trend of abolition.597  In May, the Senate voted in favor of the bill to repeal 
the death penalty by a vote of 14–10, making New Hampshire the first 
legislature to abolish the death penalty for some time.598  However, shortly 
after the vote, Governor Shaheen vowed to veto the bill.  Since the House 
vote was too narrow to override her veto, many abolitionists “began an 
around-the-clock vigil in the State House parking lot . . . near Shaheen’s 
space.”599  Shaheen, a democrat, eventually vetoed the bill and the momen-
tum was lost—the death penalty survived.600 
  
 593. See id. 
 594. Id. 
 595. Arnesen, supra note 529. 
 596. Rachael M. Collins, Eyes Turn to State Debate on Penalty Bill Would End Capital Punishment, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2000, at 1 (“Worldwide, advocates of eliminating the death penalty were 
heartened when the New Hampshire House on March 9 became the first legislative body in the country 
to vote to abolish the death penalty since that power was reinstated to the states by the US Supreme 
Court in 1977.”). 
 597. Id. 
 598. Rachael M. Collins, N.H. Senate OK’s Death Penalty Ban Shaheen Vows Veto; Repeal Vote Is 
Nation’s First in Two Decades, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2000, at A1. 
 599. Id. (“‘I respect the deeply held beliefs of opponents of the death penalty, but it is my strong 
belief that there are some murders so heinous that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment,’ 
Shaheen said.”). 
 600. Hank Nichols, Shaheen Missed Chance at Distinction, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2000, at 2 
(“We let a remarkable opportunity slip through our fingers.  We could have led the way for the rest of 
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In October 2006, Officer Michael Briggs was fatally shot in the head in 
Manchester, New Hampshire.601  The suspect was arrested in Massachu-
setts fifteen hours after the murder and the next day, New Hampshire At-
torney General Kelly Ayotte announced plans to seek the death penalty for 
Briggs’s accused killer.602  Legislators immediately granted Ayotte an extra 
$420,000 to pursue the death penalty against the suspect—a figure $70,000 
more than the attorney general’s litigation budget for a full year.603  This 
announcement caused a lot of reaction—varying from outrage that the de-
cision was made so quickly, to concern about the resurrection of the death 
penalty debate in New Hampshire.604  This is the first capital prosecution 
since Gordon Perry, who avoided the death penalty by pleading guilty to 
first-degree murder in 1998.605   
In March 2007, the New Hampshire legislature debated the issue of 
capital punishment for the fourth time in seven years.  By a narrow vote, 
185–173, the legislature rejected a proposal to abolish the death penalty—
with a majority of the debate focused on the recent shooting of Briggs and 
the upcoming capital trial in New Hampshire.606 
  
the nation.  We pride ourselves on being first and we pat ourselves on the back for going our own way 
instead of following the herd.  What a perfect time to do both. . . . Shaheen has decided that executions 
remain an option.  She has dragged us all back into the execution business with the stroke of a pen.”). 
 601. Saltzman, supra note 583. 
 602. Pride, supra note 585; see also Brian R. Ballou & Raja Mishra, Accused Killer Has a Violent 
Record; N.H. Prepares to Honor Officer, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2006, at 3B.  
 603. Saltzman, supra note 583. 
 604. Accused Shooter Fears N.H. Return, CONCORD MONITOR, Oct. 26, 2006, at B7 (“[John Hayes, 
the public defender representing Addison,] also criticized legislators for immediately granting Attorney 
General Kelly Ayotte’s request for an extra $420,000, just for Addison’s prosecution.  ‘Here somebody 
in the State House said, “We’re going to grandstand and allocate this money and declare right now that 
this is going to be a death penalty case,”’ he said.  ‘Normally, there is some review, some process.  
Look at the entire process without the heat, especially when you have somebody with their life on the 
line.’”); Pride, supra note 585 (“What I disliked was their enthusiasm for the task.  Even Ayotte’s 
embrace of it seemed premature and possibly even political.  She has more facts at her disposal than the 
public, but wouldn’t it have been better to ponder the decision carefully until she could explain to the 
public why this case warranted the death penalty?”); Saltzman, supra note 583 (“‘We’re against kill-
ing,’ said Arnie Alpert, a member of the New Hampshire Coalition Against the Death Penalty, who 
said the focus of attention should be Briggs’s grieving family, not plans to seek the death penalty.  ‘We 
don’t think people should kill police officers, and we don’t believe the state should kill people.’”). 
 605. Accused Shooter Fears N.H. Return, supra note 604; Saltzman, supra note 583.  In April 2007, 
Ayotte announced that she would pursue the death penalty in a second case in New Hampshire.  See 
Brian R. Ballou, N.H. Attorney General to Seek Death Penalty in ’05 Slaying, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
28, 2007, at 3B. 
 606. Raja Mishra, N.H. Vote to Outlaw Executions Falls Short: Killing of Officer Figures in Debate, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2007, at 1B. 
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V.  CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD 
It is one thing to establish commissions to try to find ways to im-
pose the death penalty fairly and without error and to ban it for the 
mentally retarded.  But it is quite another to come to the conclu-
sion that capital punishment should be abolished as a matter of 
principle on the grounds that its enforcement inevitably involves 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”  It remains open for the United 
States Supreme Court to make that judgment under its “emerging 
standards of decency” doctrine.607 
It is indeed a very difficult task to abolish the death penalty in the 
United States judicially.  The majority of the world has now rejected it as a 
punishment, but the critical part of the test—the majority of U.S. states—
have not.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court remains the best option for 
complete abolition of the death penalty in every state, and the “evolving 
standards of decency” doctrine makes even the slightest change of opinion 
in state legislatures relevant to the overall constitutionality of the punish-
ment in the United States. 
However, it is very doubtful that the Supreme Court will declare the 
death penalty unconstitutional anytime in the near future.  If the death pen-
alty is to be abandoned in the United States, two scenarios are possible.  
First, there must be a political response against capital punishment like 
there was in England.  While the process of abolition in England may seem 
similar to that of the United States currently, this similarity is mostly su-
perficial. 
The key to abolition in England was the political leadership of the La-
bour Party, Sidney Silverman, and others who rose up, outnumbered, and 
made it their goal to end the death penalty.  If anything can be learned from 
comparing the histories of capital punishment in the two countries, it is that 
the United States needs the kind of leadership that England had in order to 
abolish the death penalty.  American politicians need to become better in-
formed on the realities of capital punishment, need to quit the demagogu-
ery on it, and start making conscientious votes to abandon the death pen-
alty in state legislatures.  If this were to happen, there might be the same 
rejection of the death penalty in Congress and the state legislatures as there 
was in England.  While the similarities may be mostly superficial between 
the two countries, the same deficiencies with regard to the death penalty 
exist in the United States as they did in England when the death penalty 
was abolished.  Therefore, there is a similar need in the United States for 
political leadership to abolish the death penalty in this country. 
  
 607. HOOD, supra note 86, at 73–74. 
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Second, if the political leadership does not develop, the United States 
may abandon the death penalty de facto.  Over the past decade, the use of 
the death penalty has been declining in this country: juries are imposing it 
less, prosecutors are seeking it less, and life without parole is becoming 
more popular as an alternative to death.  This could eventually lead to the 
death penalty withering away because it is used so infrequently.  This gra-
dual abandonment of the death penalty would not be like the nation-wide 
repeal in England, but more like society giving up on it as its flaws are 
recognized and society realizes that most of the world has rejected it as a 
punishment.  If this were to happen in a majority of jurisdictions, it is even 
possible that the Supreme Court would step in and declare the death pen-
alty unconstitutional for all offenses. 
Until that time, however, the Supreme Court continues to restrict the 
use of the death penalty in America.  What is next for the Supreme Court?  
Six states now have enacted laws allowing the death penalty as a punish-
ment for child sex crimes.  The constitutionality of these laws is still at 
issue, but they seem to go against the Court’s decision in Coker and its 
progeny.  Certiorari has just been granted after the recent Louisiana Su-
preme Court decision in Kennedy,608 ruling that the death penalty for child 
rape is not excessive, so the Supreme Court will take up the issue of the 
constitutionality of these laws soon and hopefully decide to explicitly limit 
the death penalty in the United States to murder.  While the complete abo-
lition of the death penalty would be a far better solution, it seems too dis-
tant a possibility for the Supreme Court to make without more significant 
changes in state legislatures. 
The British today look back to the days when the death penalty was 
debated and note the efforts of Sydney Silverman and Lord Chancellor 
Gardiner in bringing together both Houses of Parliament to finally put an 
end to capital punishment in England.  Perhaps one day in the not too dis-
tant future, Americans will look back on the early efforts of Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan, and the future leaders who stepped up in state legisla-
tures to make abolition of the death penalty a reality.  As Justice Blackmun 
said many years after his dissent in Furman, “I feel morally and intellectu-




 608. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008).  
 609. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). 
